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Summary
This thesis analyses the political economy of natural resources and investigates how
natural resources influence political survival, taxation and inefficiency in the health care
sector.
The first chapter investigates the causal effects of giant and first oil and mineral discov-
eries on the political fortunes of national leaders using a large dataset of 1255 leaders from
158 countries over the period 1950 to 2010 in ‘single risk’ and ‘competing risk’ discrete
time proportional hazard models. The results show that mineral discoveries reduce risk
for the incumbent in a ‘single risk model’ especially in non-election years. In contrast, oil
discoveries reduce risk disproportionately more in countries with weak political institu-
tions. In a ‘competing risk model’, oil discovery significantly reduces the risk of departure
via military coup while resource discovery reduces the risk of resignation. Non-resource
tax and military expenditure appears to be two potent mechanisms through which oil
discovery affects political survival.
The second chapter exploits the 2000s commodity price boom to identify the impact
of resource revenues on domestic taxation in resource exporting countries. I estimate
the average effect of resource revenues on non-resource taxation for 25 resource exporting
countries using synthetic control methodology. Non-resource tax per capita is on average
11% lower in resource exporting countries because of the 2000s commodity price boom
compared to a scenario without price shock. However, I also show that the effect is
heterogeneous and occurs only in oil exporting countries but not in mineral or precious
mineral exporting countries. Within the sample of oil exporting countries, the tax reducing
effect persists only in countries with a low level of institutional quality, are highly oil
dependent and prefer the use of tax instruments rather than non-tax instruments.
The third chapter uses stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to determine whether oil rents
drive inefficiency in the health care sector. SFA simultaneously estimates a production
function for health outputs and the determinants of inefficiency in production. Using a
sample of 119 countries covering the period 2000 to 2015, unexpectedly high oil revenues
are shown to increase inefficiency. Oil rents hinder countries in reaching their potential
life expectancy. Exploiting exogenous variation in the international oil price reveals that
causality runs from oil rents to inefficiency in democratic countries. The effect varies with
institutions, sex and age. The effect is more pronounced in democracies, and women and
children are affected more than men and adults. Transparency and inequality are potential
mechanisms.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The oil embargo proclaimed by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting countries
on Israel supporters in 1973 that lead to car-free Sundays in the Netherlands and Germany
and further fuelled inflation in western countries contributing to the defeats of left-wing
governments in the US and the UK towards the end of the decade is just one example of
how natural resources give some countries the power to influence other countries.
The influence of natural resources over politics is not restricted to international rela-
tions between resource rich and resource poor countries but is also present −on an even
greater scale− at the national level of resource rich countries. Currently, over 1.5 billion
people live in resource rich countries and in turn their lives are affected by resource influ-
enced politics (Barma et al., 2012). The existing evidence describes a rather pessimistic
outlook for the population in resource rich countries. Natural resources are associated
with slow economic growth, corruption, conflict and authoritarianism.1
The experience in resource rich countries, such as Nigeria, Bolivia or Sierra Leone,
coined the notion of a resource curse (Auty, 1993) and the question whether natural
resources are a ‘curse’ or a ‘blessing’ has been at the core of the economic and political
literature concerned with natural resources ever since (Auty, 2001; Gylfason, 2001; Sachs
and Warner, 2001). However, the evidence is not conclusive and successful resource-led
developments in countries, such as Norway and Botswana, prove that the resource curse
is not carved out of stone (Mehlum et al., 2006; van der Ploeg, 2011).
More recently, the topic of natural resource windfalls regained importance due to the
2000s commodity price boom. This price boom allowed many primary commodity export-
ers to prosper, especially in Africa. Growth rates in resource rich countries increased, but
even then per capita growth rates did not exceed growth rates in resource poor countries
1See Sachs and Warner (2001) for growth, Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) for corruption, Ross (2015)
for authoritarianism and De Soysa and Neumayer (2007) for conflict.
2(IMF, 2012b). This missed opportunity shows that we still lack in understanding the
impact of natural resources and miss effective instruments and policies to avoid adverse
effects of natural resources on development.
This thesis contributes to the knowledge about the political economy of natural re-
sources in three areas by studying the impact of natural resources on political survival,
taxation and health care spending inefficiency. Therefore, the thesis consists of three
stand-alone papers organized in three empirical chapters.
The first empirical chapter (chapter 2) intends to answer the question whether natural
resources prolong or shorten the time national leaders stay in office. Survival in office is
one of the key objectives of national leaders and depends inter alia on the size of a leader’s
core constituency and the amount of available funds which are interlinked. Funds can
be used to increase the core constituency and a broader core constituency provides more
funds.
Natural resources in this context should increase the available funds for the incumbent,
allowing to broaden the core constituency and therefore prolong the time a leader stays in
office (Caselli and Cunningham, 2009; Robinson et al., 2006). However, natural resources
could also fractionalize the core constituency in contest for access over natural resources,
increasing political competition and therefore reducing the time a leader stays in office
(Caselli, 2006).
To analyse which of the two effects dominates, chapter 2 explores the causal effect
of giant and first resource discoveries on the political fortunes of national leaders. We
construct a large dataset containing information about the timing of giant oil and mineral
discoveries2 and leaders’ tenure for 1255 leaders in 158 countries. We apply duration
models in the form of ‘single risk’ and ‘competing risk’ discrete time proportional hazard
models to estimate the causal effect of giant and first resource discoveries on leaders’ time
in office.
We find that mineral discoveries reduce risk for the incumbent in a ‘single risk model’
in non-election years. In contrast, oil discoveries reduce risk disproportionately more in
countries with weak political institutions. The effect appears to be induced by resource
income rather than expectations, because the effect for oil discoveries needs 11 years
to develop and around 5-8 years for mineral discoveries, which is around the time the
discovery becomes operational and generates income. In a ‘competing risk model’, oil
2A mineral deposit is coded as giant if it has the capacity to generate at least US$ 0.5 billion of annual
revenue for 20 years or more whereas an oil discovery is coded as giant if it contains at least 500 million
barrels of ultimate recoverable oil or gas equivalent.
3discovery significantly reduces the risk of departure via military coup while both oil and
mineral discoveries reduce the risk of resignation.
In agreement with the rentier state theory, we find that oil discoveries decrease tax
in the non-resource sector and increase military spending (Mahdavy, 1970; Ross, 2001).
Through these channels resource discoveries could increases the chances of political survival
for the incumbent.
The main result that giant resource discoveries reduce the risk of leaders leaving office
are broadly in line with previous findings. Omgba (2008) finds similar results for African
leaders, Wright et al. (2013) and Andersen and Aslaksen (2013) for regimes and Cuaresma
et al. (2011) for autocratic leaders.
Our contribution to the literature consists of the confirmation of the overall findings
using a plausibly exogenous resource shock and in the new results derived from the ‘com-
peting risk model’. We can attribute the risk-reducing effect of oil discoveries in countries
with low institutional quality to a risk reduction of military coups and resignation. Further,
our finding of a resignation-risk-reducing effect of giant mineral discoveries in non-election
years contradict the risk increasing effect found in Andersen and Aslaksen (2013) and the
zero result in Omgba (2008). Andersen and Aslaksen (2013) and Omgba (2008) use min-
eral rents as explanatory variable, which captures also small mineral deposits, while we
focus only on giant deposits. The contrasting results could imply that there is a non-linear
effect of minerals on political survival. Small deposits could be risk increasing, because
they are easier captured by the opposition, while giant deposits benefit the incumbent.
A potential mechanism on how resource discoveries reduce the risk of a leader leaving
office −reduced non-resource tax− was already mentioned in the first empirical chapter.
Taxes are part of the fiscal contract between citizens and the government and any change
to the fiscal contract can have severe effects on development apart from political survival.
Hence, this mechanism deserves an analysis on its own.
Therefore, the second empirical chapter (chapter 3) analyses the relationship between
natural resource income and domestic taxation. In particular, the chapter asks the ques-
tion whether resource revenues crowd out domestic taxes.
Natural resources have the potential to interrupt the fiscal contract by providing the
government with the financial means from an external source (Mahdavy, 1970; Ross, 2015).
In most countries, resource revenues accrue directly to the government and even if most
constitutions state that resources belong to the people they never go through their hands
which diminishes the importance of their opinions.
4In chapter 3, I empirically explore the relationship between resource revenues and
domestic taxation by exploiting the 2000s commodity price boom as a positive income
shock. Applying comparative case study analysis in the form of synthetic control method
to a sample of 25 resource exporting countries allows to estimate the average treatment
effect of resource revenues on non-resource taxation.
The results confirm the existence of a crowding-out effect. Due to the 2000s commodity
price boom total tax per capita is on average 11% lower in resource exporting countries
compared to a scenario without price boom. This translates roughly to a US$ 300 lower
tax burden per capita. Nevertheless, the analysis also shows that the crowding-out effect
is not a necessity and depends on certain country characteristics. The results for certain
sub-samples reveal heterogeneity of the crowding-out effect across countries. For example,
the crowding-out effect is only present in oil exporting countries, but not in mineral or
precious mineral exporting countries. Within the sub-sample of oil exporting countries,
the crowding-out effect is stronger in countries with a low level of institutional quality
and high resource dependency. Government preferences play also a role. Governments
preferring tax instruments over non-tax instruments to extract funds from the resource
sector are more prone to a crowding-out effect. Furthermore, while the crowding-out effect
can be observed in countries with private and state ownership structure of the oil sector,
the effect is greater in countries with private ownership.
Additionally, I verify the results by analysing five new oil producing countries. This
analysis confirms that the crowding-out effect is not a necessity and depends on certain
country characteristics. Only two of the five new producers show signs of a crowding-out
effect, while the other three increased their non-resource taxes after oil production started.
The chapter contributes to the literature connecting resource revenues with domestic
taxation. The result for the full sample −confirming a crowding-out effect− is in line
with previous findings in the literature (Bornhorst et al., 2009; Crivelli and Gupta, 2014;
Ossowski and Gonzales, 2012; Thomas and Trevin˜o, 2013). New results are derived from
the application of synthetic control method to specific sub-samples. This heterogeneity
analysis uncovered country characteristics and government preferences which promote the
crowding-out effect and yield valuable information for policies attempting to mitigate it.
For example, oil exporters could avoid the crowding-out effect by improving institutional
quality, investing into tax administration and diversify their economy.
The impact of natural resources is not restricted to the economic and political sphere.
In excess of and especially through their economic and political influence they also affect
5people’s lives on a social level. The literature concerned with natural resources provide
many models predicting a socially sub-optimal and inefficient use of resources. For ex-
ample, Ebeke et al. (2015) show that oil creates incentives for university students to pursue
a career enabling them to access rents in the future, instead of pursuing a career in a more
productive area. Corruption, patronage spending or white elephants −all associated with
natural resources− are other examples how natural resources can lead to inefficient use
of natural resources which should lead to lower social development (Bhattacharyya and
Hodler, 2010; Robinson and Torvik, 2005; Robinson et al., 2006).
The third empirical chapter (chapter 4) attempts to measure the impact of natural
resources on social development by estimating the effect of oil dependency on inefficiency
in the health care sector. Here I apply stochastic frontier analysis to a sample covering 119
countries between 2000 and 2015. Stochastic frontier analysis estimates coefficients of a
health production function and inefficiency determinants simultaneously and therefore al-
lows to make inferences about whether oil dependency drives inefficiency in the production
of the health output (life expectancy).
The results of the stochastic frontier analysis confirm that oil dependent countries have
on average a lower efficiency score than oil poor countries and that oil dependency is a
significant determinant of inefficiency in the health care sector, i.e. higher oil rents lead
to more inefficiency. Exploiting unexpected oil price changes shows that the inefficiency
increasing effect of oil is causal for democratic countries. Furthermore, the results show
that certain parts of the population are more affected by oil induced inefficiency than
others. Women’s health is adversely more affected than men’s and the same is true for
children compared to adults.
The results of chapter 4 are in line with other findings in the literature connecting
natural resources and health outcomes. Edwards (2016); Carmignani and Avom (2010);
Bulte et al. (2005) and Daniele (2011) find that natural resources have a negative impact
on health outcomes. The contribution of the chapter lies in the application of stochastic
frontier analysis and inclusion of the oil rents variable as an inefficiency determinant. This
approach allows to explore one possible reason why oil rich countries underperform in
terms of health outputs, namely that funds spend on health care are disproportionally
wasted in countries with high oil revenues. Furthermore, the results for different parts
of the population are new and provide valuable information for policy makers on how to
target policies attempting to increase efficiency in the health care sector.
In summary, this thesis provides new insights on the political economy of natural re-
6sources by analysing the impact of natural resources on political survival, taxation and
health care inefficiency. The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 is ded-
icated to Resource Discovery and the Political Fortunes of National Leaders, chapter 3 to
Resource Revenues and Domestic Taxation: Is there a crowding-out effect? and chapter
4 to Wasted windfalls: Inefficiencies in health care spending in oil rich countries. Finally,
chapter 5 concludes the thesis by discussing limitations of each chapter and providing an
outlook for future research.
7Chapter 2
Resource Discovery and the
Political Fortunes of National
Leaders
2.1 Introduction
The extent to which national leaders shape the destiny of a country is widely debated by
scholars. Some scholars view leaders as Great Men influencing the evolution of history
through idiosyncratic causative influences (Carlyle, 1837, 1859; Jones and Olken, 2005).
Others disagree and view leaders as either slaves of history (Tolstoy, 2007; Berlin, 1978) or
substantial individuals acting within the confines of existing social norms and institutions
(Marx, 1852; Weber, 1947).
As important as it is to investigate the role of leaders in shaping national history, an
equally important issue is to investigate the destiny of national leaders. Survival in office
is one of the key objectives of leaders (de Mesquita and Smith, 2002). However, political
survival is not an easy task. Leaders can continue holding office if and only if they have
enough political power. Political power is primarily derived from their access to resources
and the support of their core constituency in the society. These two determinants of
political power however are interlinked and somewhat locked in an interactive relationship.
For example, access to a sizeable amount of resources provide the leader with sufficient
economic power to buy support, increase the size of the core constituency, and suppress
opposition (Robinson et al., 2006; Caselli and Cunningham, 2009).1 Alternatively, a large
1This is commonly known as the rentier state theory. See Robinson et al. (2006) for a review of this
theory.
8pool of resources induces more competition among political elites for access which could
in fact diminish the size of the core constituency of the incumbent national leader and
shorten her duration in office (Caselli, 2006).
Resources that enhance or reduce political power of national leaders could take mul-
tiple forms. Some common examples are natural resource rents, foreign aid, lobbying
contributions, and tax revenues. In fact, the existing literature on political survival of
leaders studies the role of many of these factors. On the theory side, seemingly conflicting
models highlight the role of natural resource rents induced patronage, rebel threats, and
elite fragmentation in influencing the duration of a political leadership.2 On the empirical
side, several studies test the effect of resource wealth on political survival. However, they
are heavily focused on certain country groups (Omgba, 2008), leader types (Cuaresma
et al., 2011), and regimes (Wright et al., 2013; Andersen and Aslaksen, 2013). We observe
some nuanced differences across studies. For example, Wright et al. (2013) focus on regime
(authoritarianism and democracy) survival whereas Andersen and Aslaksen (2013) exam-
ine regime change only when the chief executive loses office along with her political party.
de Mesquita and Smith (2010) use a global sample of leaders but they only estimate a
‘single risk model’. Most of the existing studies use resource rent or primary products ex-
port as explanatory variables, thus making their estimates vulnerable to reverse causality
(Ross, 2015).
In this study, we take a new approach towards the question of leader survival. We
test the effect of giant oil3 and mineral discovery news shocks on leader survival using a
discrete time proportional hazard model with no restriction on the baseline hazard. The
use of discovery news shocks offer a cleaner identification strategy than ‘resource rent’ or
‘primary products export’ variables typically used by the existing literature. Moreover, we
also estimate our model using ‘first discovery’ which offers an even cleaner identification
strategy. Unlike previous studies, we recognise that a leader faces multiple risks. There-
fore, we estimate ‘competing risk models’ along with ‘single risk models’. The existing
literature solely relies on the ‘single risk model’. We also recognise that the nature of
risk faced by the leader during election and non-election years could very well be differ-
ent. Furthermore, leaders with term limits face different type of risks relative to leaders
without term limits. Therefore, we account for these nuances in our model using a large
dataset of 1255 leaders distributed across 158 countries over the period 1950 to 2010.
2See Caselli and Cunningham (2009) for a review of this literature.
3Throughout this chapter ‘oil and gas’ is referred to as ‘oil’. More on this in section 2.2.
9We start with an observational plot of the raw data. Figure 2.1 plots the Kaplan-Meier
survival function4 comparing leaders with and without resource discoveries. We consider
two types of resource discoveries: oil and minerals. We find that the average survival rate
for incumbent leaders with resource discoveries is higher than the average survival rate for
the same without resource discoveries at any given point in time. The Survival function
plot is not informative about confounding factors and the baseline estimates (Andersen and
Aslaksen, 2013). In particular, one might expect that the relationship between resource
discovery and leaders’ survival is conditional on the quality of institutions (Acemoglu
et al., 2004; Robinson and Torvik, 2005). Hence we estimate discrete time proportional
hazard models next.
Figure 2.1: Kaplan-Meier survival function by resource discovery
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Notes: Figure 2.1 compares in the left graph the Kaplan-Meier survival function for leaders with oil
discoveries (dashed line) with leaders without oil discoveries (solid line). The right graph compares the
Kaplan-Meier survival function for leaders with mineral discoveries (dashed line) with leaders without
mineral discoveries (solid line).
Using a ‘single risk model’ on a pooled sample of election as well as non-election years
we find that a mineral discovery reduces risk for the incumbent. This result survives in
4The Kaplan-Meier survival function estimates the conditional probability of survival beyond time t,
given survival up to time t : S(t) =
∏
j|tj≤t
(nj−dj
nj
)
,where nj is the number of leaders in office at time tj
and dj is the number of failures at time tj (Andersen and Aslaksen, 2013).
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the non-election year sample. In contrast, we do not observe any effect of an oil discovery
on risk in an aggregate sample. However, interacting oil discovery with institutional
quality reveals that the former reduces risk disproportionately more in countries with
weak political institutions (low democracy score, low executive constraint, and low level
of competition in the executive recruitment process).
A ‘single risk model’ as estimated by several existing studies aggregate the different
reasons of leaving office. In contrast a ‘competing risk model’ accounts for the diversity of
reasons behind a leader’s exit. Hence, we account for the risk of resignation and military
coup during non-election years and the risk of losing election during election years. We
find that a resource discovery significantly reduces the risk of losing office via resignation
and military coup. In particular, both oil and mineral discoveries appear to be ‘resignation
risk’ reducing. However, a reduction in ‘military coup risk’ is exclusively associated with
oil discovery shocks. The latter result perhaps reinforces the association between oil and
authoritarianism under which military coups typically occur. Resource discovery does not
seem to have any impact on the risk of election loss. We tackle the contentious issue of
‘term limits’ by excluding all term limit years from the non-election year sample for leaders
with term limits.
Our result could be interpreted as high income induced political risk reduction for the
incumbent leader following a resource discovery. We observe on average risk reduction
takes effect 5-8 years after mineral discovery and 11 years plus after oil discovery. There-
fore, by then these discoveries are likely to be operational as it takes 8-10 years to develop
a deposit. In case of mineral discoveries, the risk reduction effect is uniform across regime
type. In contrast, oil discoveries reduce risk in non-democratic countries. This is perhaps
suggestive that minerals are better connected to the rest of the economy than oil. There-
fore, it improves the income of both the incumbent and the challengers increasing the
likelihood of cooperation in non-election years. Cooperation without doubt significantly
reduces risks for the incumbent. Higher income in general could also create an atmosphere
of optimism, good will, and national unity, which could also benefit the incumbent. In
contrast, oil has more of an ‘enclave’ character which could disproportionately increase
the income of the incumbent which then could be used to support coercion or patronage
under an uncompetitive political system and reduce risk.
The theoretical literature discusses tax on the non-resource sector, military expendit-
ure, conflict onset, government borrowing, and economic growth as potential mechanisms
through which resource discovery affects leaders’ survival. We test these mechanisms and
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find that in agreement with the rentier state hypothesis oil discovery decreases tax as a
share of GDP from the non-resource sector. Oil discovery also increases military spending
and thereby reducing risk for the incumbent. In contrast, mineral discovery appears to
have no effect on military spending. It also appears to increase non-resource sector tax as
a share of GDP. The latter is perhaps reflective of the relatively high level of connectedness
of minerals to the rest of the economy.
We make the following contributions to the literature. First, to the best of our know-
ledge this is the first study to analyse the effect of resource discovery news shocks on the
political fortunes of national leaders. In doing so we marry a novel dataset on resource
discoveries with a dataset on national leaders. In contrast, existing empirical studies on
the political fortunes of national leaders tend to focus on resource rent or resource income.
Second, the dataset on resource discoveries is able to distinguish between minerals5 and
oil discoveries. This allows us to analyse the effects of oil and minerals on national leaders
separately which yields new results of heterogeneous effects by resource type. Third, the
existing literature estimates ‘single risk models’ whereas we estimate ‘single risk’ as well
as ‘competing risk models’. This creates new knowledge of the types of risk that respond
to a resource discovery shock. Fourth, using data on non-resource sector tax, military
expenditure, conflict onset, government borrowing, and economic growth we are able to
explore potential mechanisms. Finally, establishing causality is a key motivation in this
literature and this chapter offers a credible and cleaner identification strategy using the
resource discovery variable.
Our identification strategy is similar to Cotet and Tsui (2013a), Bhattacharyya et al.
(2017) and Arezki et al. (2017). It relies on the stochastic nature of the discovery dates
of giant and supergiant mineral and oil discoveries. A mineral deposit is coded as giant
if it has the capacity to generate at least US$ 0.5 billion of annual revenue for 20 years
or more whereas an oil discovery is coded as giant if it contains at least 500 million
barrels of ultimate recoverable oil or gas equivalent. A giant oil discovery has the capacity
to generate an annual revenue stream of approximately US$ 0.4 billion under certain
assumptions which will be discussed in section 2.2.1.
Our working argument is that accurately predicting the timing of a giant or supergiant
discovery is almost impossible because it is a rare event. How about politicians and
the government manipulating the announcement of the precise timing to gain political
mileage? This is unlikely in our dataset as the reported dates are independently verified
5The minerals are gold, silver, platinum group elements (PGE), copper, nickel, zinc, lead, cobalt,
molybdenum, tungsten, uranium oxide.
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using multiple industry sources and not just government records. Nonetheless, we also use
‘first discovery’ as an exogenous shock which offers even cleaner identification.
This chapter is related to a literature on the political consequences of natural resources.
The most prominent among them is the ‘rentier state theory’ dating back to Mahdavy
(1970). The ‘rentier state theory’ stipulates three mechanisms through which resource
wealth reduces democratic pressure on the incumbent and thereby extending her tenure.
The first mechanism is the ‘taxation effect’ whereby the incumbent in a resource rich
country is less reliant on her citizens for revenues. In return, the citizens demand less
accountability from the incumbent. The second mechanism is the ‘spending effect’ whereby
the incumbent could engage in the extension of patronage and strategic social spending
using resource wealth to remain in power. The third mechanism is the ‘coercion effect’
whereby the incumbent engages in coercion using resource wealth to disrupt the formation
of opposition political groups.
Several theoretical and empirical studies have used these mechanisms to explain polit-
ical survival. Acemoglu et al. (2004) and Acemoglu et al. (2010) emphasize the coercion
mechanism. The former argue that an incumbent would disrupt the formation of an op-
position critical mass by using resource wealth funded coercion. The latter emphasize the
role of the military as an agent of the incumbent to carry out coercion. Robinson and
Torvik (2005), Robinson et al. (2006), and Cuaresma et al. (2011) are examples where the
taxation and patronage mechanisms are used.
This chapter is also related to the resource curse literature. Auty (2001), Gylfason
(2001) and Sachs and Warner (2001, 2005) note that resource rich countries on average
grow much slower than resource poor countries. Subsequent studies have argued that
natural resources may lower the economic performance because they strengthen powerful
groups, weaken legal frameworks, and foster rentier-seeking activities (e.g. Tornell and
Lanem (1999) and Besley (2006)). Others have argued whether natural resources are
a curse or a blessing depends on country-specific circumstances especially institutional
quality (e.g Mehlum et al. (2006); Robinson et al. (2006); Bhattacharyya and Hodler
(2010, 2014); Bhattacharyya and Collier (2014)), natural resource type (Isham, 2005) and
ethnic fractionalisation (Hodler, 2006).
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the data
and empirical strategy. Section 2.3 presents evidence on the effects of resource discovery on
the political fortune of national leaders and discusses potential mechanisms. It separately
examines the effect on different risk types (resignation, military coup, and election loss)
13
using competing risk models. It also reports the heterogeneous effects of oil and minerals.
Section 2.4 deals with robustness and section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data and Empirical Strategy
We create a large dataset covering 1255 leaders in 158 countries6 over the period 1950 to
20107 by marrying the leaders’ database with the database on natural resource discovery.
In what follows, we illustrate the nature and source of our data which is followed by a
description of the empirical strategy.
2.2.1 Data
Leader Duration
A key variable in our analysis is the duration of a national leader staying in power. We
source this data from the Archigos dataset compiled by Goemans et al. (2009). The dataset
provides information on the entry and exit dates of the effective leader of a country. An
effective leader is defined as the person who de facto exercises power in the country. Hence,
this definition covers for cases whereby one person holds a formal title but is not able to
exercise power to make political decisions. For example, the tenure of Saudi Arabia’s King
Fahd is considered to have lasted 13 years from 1982 to 1995, when he suffered a stroke
and wasn’t able to govern the country any more, even though officially he remained the
head of state till his death in 2005. The binary ‘leader duration’ variable takes the value
1 in the event of an exit and 0 otherwise.
A typical challenge with an analysis of this nature is right censoring whereby a leader
leaves the study before an event occurs (Jenkins, 2005). For example, a leader could leave
office because of health reasons or natural death. In the absence of illness or death she
could have stayed longer in office. This is taken care of by right censoring where the leader
leaves the sample on the death or illness year. The ‘leader duration’ variable takes the
value 0 for the entire duration of such leaders including the death or illness year. We also
right censor leaders who are in office in the year 2010, the final year in our sample. Note
that leaders leaving office due to death by assassination is not right censored as we consider
these assassinations politically motivated. Nevertheless, our results do not change even if
we right censor the 8 assassinations that we have in our sample. We discuss this more in
section 2.4.
6A list of all countries used in the analysis is shown in appendix A table A 1
7The final year of the sample is dictated by our resource discovery data.
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The tenure start date could be different for different leaders. Following Andersen and
Aslaksen (2013) and Omgba (2008) we only count the years when the leader was in power
as of the 1st of January. Using all the available information allows us to use the ‘leader
duration’ variable in a discrete time survival model along with resource discovery.
In our dataset of 1255 leaders, the average time in office for a national leader is 6 years.
Several leaders leave office after 1 year and the maximum duration is 49 years due to the
Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Figure 2.2a depicts the distribution of leaders’ duration. We
note that around 20% of leaders leave office after 1 year and that number jumps to 53%
after 4 years. The corresponding hazard rate is depicted in figure 2.2b. The distribution
appears to be log-normal or log-logistic which have been used by the existing studies such
as Andersen and Aslaksen (2013) and Omgba (2008) in their parametric survival models
to determine the underlying baseline hazard. However, the spikes in years 4, 5, 8, 10
and 11 in figure 2.2a are not well accounted for by the conventional parametric method.
These spikes are a reflection of 4 or 5 year election cycles in most countries. We therefore
depart from the conventional parametric method by following a semi-parametric approach
to estimate the baseline hazard. Furthermore, we divide the sample into election and
non-election years which allows us to estimate separate hazard rates for the same.
Figure 2.2: Leaders’ tenure distribution
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Notes: The left panel shows the distribution of leaders’ time in office for 1255 leaders from 1950-2010 and
the right panel shows the estimated smoothed (Nelson-Aalen) hazard function for the same leaders and
period.
Reasons for Exit
In order to estimate the ‘competing risk model’, we would need to know why a leader
leaves office. Archigos codes regular and irregular leader changes (Goemans et al., 2009).
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A regular change is defined as a change in compliance with prevailing rules, provisions,
conventions and norms of the country whereas an irregular change is defined as removal
in contravention to explicit rules and conventions. The former includes resignation, term
limits and lost elections. Note that the Archigos database do not differentiate between
the causes of regular leader change. Hence we collect additional data from Lentz (1994),
rulers.org, statesmen.org and the comparative constitution project8 to code for resignation,
elections or term limits.
Archigos differentiates irregular leader changes into six categories9: removal due to do-
mestic popular protest, domestic rebels, military coups, other government actors, foreign
force, and others. The left hand graph in figure 2.3 depicts the distribution of leaders
exiting due to all possible causes. In the right hand graph we aggregate irregular leader
changes. In particular, we pool domestic popular protest, domestic rebels, other govern-
ment actors, foreign force, and other into one category and call it ‘other’. The distribution
appears to be as follows: 18% are censored, 20% lose elections, 12% hit term limits and
leave, and 31% resign. The remaining leader changes are irregular out of which 12% are
military coups and 7% ‘others’. These represents the exit categories considered in the
‘competing risk model’.
Figure 2.3: Failure distribution by reason
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Notes: The left graph shows the number of leaders leaving office by all possible reasons. The right graph
shows the number of leaders leaving office because of elections, term limits, resignation, military coup and
other reasons. The category ”other” in the right graph is the sum of domestic popular protest, domestic
rebels, other government actors, foreign force and other in the left graph.
8Data available at: http://rulers.org, http://www.worldstatesmen.org and http:
//comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/
9Archigos provides an even more detailed coding for all irregular categories. Separating all categories
into removal of leaders with or without foreign support. We do not take this fine coding into account
because most irregular categories are very rare events and would not affect results.
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Resource Discovery
We obtain the mineral discovery data from Minex Consulting (2014). Oil and gas dis-
covery data come from Horn (2004). Both datasets provide geocoded information about
the location and the year of discovery. A mineral deposit is coded as giant if it has the ca-
pacity to generate at least US$ 0.5 billion of annual revenue for 20 years or more accounting
for fluctuations in commodity price. A giant oil or/and gas (including condensate) field is
a deposit that contains at least a total of 500 million barrels of ultimate recoverable oil or
gas equivalent. This would be able to generate an annual revenue stream of approximately
US$ 0.4 billion under the assumptions that over the sample period the average gestation
lag between production and discovery is 5 years, the average price of a barrel is US$ 25,
and the average discount rate including the country specific risk premium is 10 percent.10
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that both the giant oil and mineral discovery shocks
are approximately of the same size on average. However, it is important to note that the
value of a discovery is an estimate and the projections rely on the estimation of the value
at the time of the discovery. These estimates are often revised in subsequent years. The
‘ultimate recoverable deposit’ could also change if there was a major shift in technology.
Therefore, discoveries are better treated as exogenous news shocks rather than projection
based expected revenue shocks.
To capture the effect of resource discovery we construct a dummy variable which takes
the value 1 in the year of discovery till the end of the incumbent leader’s tenure. This
approach of coding discovery offers a treatment control perspective over the entire post-
discovery period of a leader’s time in office. In other words, this approach compares
leaders with discovery treatment with leaders without discovery treatment throughout
their tenure.
In addition to capturing the aggregate effect of discovery treatment, we also track the
time path. Later in section 2.3 using alternative specifications we are able to track how
many years it takes for the effect of discovery on leaders’ tenure to kick in.
We code mineral and oil discoveries separately as they exhibit varying degrees of con-
nectedness to the rest of the economy and thereby potentially heterogeneous political
consequences for the incumbent (Andersen and Aslaksen, 2013).
Figure 2.4 shows the geographic distribution of oil and mineral discoveries covered in
the dataset.
10Some studies claim that the risk premium augmented discount rate be as high as 14-15 percent. Arezki
et al. (2017) presents a more sophisticated analysis of net present value of giant oil discoveries and find
that the median size of a giant discovery is approximately 5-6 percent of GDP.
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Overall the dataset covers 740 giant and supergiant oil discoveries in 63 countries and
453 giant and supergiant mineral discoveries in 61 countries. Table 2.1 reports the time
distribution of resource discoveries and table A 2 and A 3 in appendix A lists the countries
with the number of discoveries.
Table 2.1: Time distribution of resource discoveries
Years 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2010 Sum
Oil 58 166 203 94 94 125 740
Mineral 45 77 83 70 102 76 453
Institutions
The resource curse literature reports that the effect of natural resources on economic
and political outcomes are conditional on the institutional quality (Mehlum et al., 2006;
Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010; Andersen and Aslaksen, 2013). Therefore, it is worth-
while exploring any institution-based heterogeneity in the relationship between resource
discovery and leaders’ tenure. For this reason, we include component variables from the
Polity index provided by Marshall and Jaggers (2014) in our regressions to look at inter-
action effects. Following Vreeland (2008) we use the adjusted x-polity index to measure
the overall level of democracy or autocracy. The x-polity index is a combination of exec-
utive constraints (xconst), recruitment competition (xrcomp), and recruitment openness
(xropen). The index ranges from 1 to 14 with 1 indicating an autocratic country and 14
a democratic country. We use the x-polity index as opposed to the Polity2 index because
the former excludes component variables such as political hostility and turmoil. The de-
gree of political hostility and turmoil could be influenced by the incumbent leader thereby
creating endogeneity challenges for our specification (Vreeland, 2008).
We also use xconst which is a measure of the level of ”institutional constraints on the
decision-making powers of the chief executive” (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002, p.63). The
index runs on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 indicating unlimited power for the leader while 7
indicating maximum legislative constraints on the leader.
Finally, we use xrcomp which measures the competitiveness of executive recruitment,
i.e. ”how institutionalized, competitive and open are the mechanisms for selecting a
political leader” (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002, p.49). This index ranges from 1 to 4, with
1 indicating no competition (for example, a leader is chosen by right of descent) while 4
indicating competitive elections. Between these two extremes are situations characterized
by the forceful seizure of power and/or rigged elections.
Other Control Variables
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We control for log of population, entry age, first leader since independence, mineral
discoveryt−10 and oil discoveryt−10 in every regression. Log of population is included in
every specification because it predicts to a certain extent the likelihood of a resource
discovery. This issue is further discussed in section 2.3. Furthermore, log of population ac-
counts for the size of a country which could influence leaders’ tenure. Robinson (1960) and
Cuaresma et al. (2011) argue that large countries are difficult to govern and longer tenure
for national leaders in these locations provide economic stability. The log of population
data is sourced from the Penn World Tables.
We control for leaders’ entry age because younger leaders could potentially stay longer
in power (Bienen and van de Walle, 1992). The entry age data is sourced from Archigos. In
addition, every specification also includes a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the leader
is the first leader after independence. The first leader post-independence is often viewed as
the progenitor of the newly independent country coming out of the shackles of colonialism.
Therefore, they typically enjoy high popularity and have an obvious advantage in terms
of staying longer in power.11
Lei and Michaels (2014) and Bhattacharyya et al. (2017) argue that past discoveries
influence the likelihood of current discoveries. Therefore, we include mineral discoveryt−10
and oil discoveryt−10 in all specifications to control for past giant and supergiant resource
discoveries. These indicator variables take the value 1 for ten years if a deposit was
discovered in the last ten years of the predecessor’s term. Note that this definition takes
into account past discoveries during the previous leader’s tenure as well as spillover effects
of past discoveries on the current leader.
We use information on elections from Archigos. Parliamentary and presidential election
dates for every leader up to the year 2006 is sourced from Archigos. The remaining four
years till 2010 is sourced from the website of the International Foundation for Electoral
Systems.12 Finally, the information on rules, changes and length of term limits is sourced
from the Comparative Constitutions Project.13
2.2.2 Empirical Strategy
We aim to estimate the probability of a leader leaving office conditional on the same leader
holding office up to that point in time. Hence, we focus on the time spent in office rather
than the calendar time. Note that a leader’s term in office is characterised by her staying
11This data is sourced from the website http://chartsbin.com/view/2295.
12Available at http://electionguide.org/
13available at http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/.
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in office independently from the start of her term. Irrespective of the start date, our
specification treats two leaders the same if they stay in power for the same number of
years.
A basic survival model assumes that a failure could occur at any time. In contrast, this
is not a given in our setting mainly due to the fact that a significant proportion of leaders
leave office because of election defeats and term limits. Elections occur during election
years and the probability of election defeat is zero in non-election years. Therefore, the
underlying continuous time duration variable would have a distribution that is continuous
between elections with probability mass points in election years. A similar logic also
applies to term limits. Due to data limitations we do not deal with term limits in the
main specification. The main specification deals with non-election and election years and
exclude term limit years. We deal with term limit years separately in section 2.3.4.
To address the issue of elections we follow the approach of Narendranathan and Stewart
(1993a) and use a discrete time survival model. The discrete time model estimates specific
hazard rates for specific years and therefore could be used to estimate separate hazard rates
for election and non-election years.
Finally, a leader could leave office due to resignation, rebellion, political protests,
military coup or foreign invasion. The general assumption under a continuous time hazard
model that the exit can occur at any time would be relevant here. We deal with these
issues in section 2.3.3.
The Single Risk Model
We estimate both ‘single risk’ and ‘competing risk models’. We start by describing the
‘single risk model’ first. The model follows Cox (1972) and Narendranathan and Stewart
(1993a) and defines the conditional probability of leader i leaving office in year t, as
hi(t) = λ(t) exp(x
′(t)β) (2.1)
where λ(t) is the baseline hazard representing the underlying risk for all leaders, x′(t)
is a vector of leader and country characteristics including oil and mineral discovery,
leader’s entry age, log of population, first leader after independence, institutions, min-
eral discoveryt−10 and oil discoveryt−10, and β is the vector of unknown coefficients. Note
that the vector of leader and country characteristics do not include a constant.
The discrete-time model is estimated in a semi-parametric setting imposing no restric-
tions on the shape of the baseline hazard following Meyer (1990). This can be achieved
by introducing time dummies for each recorded time interval avoiding to make an as-
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sumption about the shape of the baseline hazard. As discussed earlier, varying covariates
are measured annually and therefore the duration of a leader’s stay in office is recorded
to the full year completed. A recorded duration of t whole years indicate duration on a
continuous time scale between t − 1 and t years. The probability of leaving office,qne, in
a non-election14 year t conditional on x′(t) given that the leader is still in office at year
t− 1, is given by
qne,i(t|x(t)) = Prob(Ti < t|t− 1 ≤ Ti) = 1− exp
{
−
∫ t
t−1
hi(τ)dτ
}
= 1− exp
{
−
∫ t
t−1
λ(τ)exp(x′(t)β)dτ
}
The above assumes that x′(t) is constant between t − 1 and t, i.e. changes in the
time-varying variables occur at integer points. Therefore, the discrete time hazard could
be written as
= 1− exp[−exp{x′(β) + δ(t)}] where δ(t) = ln
{∫ t
t−1
λ(τ)d(τ)
}
The model has an extreme value form for the failure probability in discrete time with
an unrestricted baseline hazard (Narendranathan and Stewart, 1993a,b)
As explained earlier, elections can only occur in election years. To account for the
different circumstances in these years we assume that these point probabilities take the
same extreme value form as before but with different coefficients. Hence, the probability
of failure in an election year, qe,i, is parameterized as
qe,i(t|x(t)) = Prob(failing in election year|survival up to election year, x(t))
= 1− exp[−exp{x′(α) + δ(t)}]
where δ(t) is defined as above and x′(t) consists of the same control variable as ex-
plained before and α is the vector of unknown coefficients.
Let Ti be the time in years a leader i stays in office. The likelihood contribution for
leader i in non-election years is then given by
Li = qne,i(Ti)
Ti∏
t=1
{1− qne,i(t− 1)} (2.2)
and the likelihood contribution by leader i in election years is then given by
14The subscript ne stands for non-election year and e for election year
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Li = qe,i(Ti)
Ti∏
t=1
{1− qe,i(t− 1)} (2.3)
The first term on the right hand side of equations 2.2 and 2.3 is the probability of
leaving office at time T and the second term represents the probability of staying in office
up to time T . Equations 2.2 and 2.3 allow us to estimate separate hazards for election
and non-election years.
The above model could be illustrated in a binary response model framework. In the
case of non-election years (qne,i) the binary dependent variable is equal to 1 in the year
the leader leaves office and equal to 0 in the remaining years. In the case of election years,
(qe,i), the model uses only the sub-sample of leaders who proceed to an election year. Here
the binary dependent variable in an election year is equal to 1 if the leader leaves office
and 0 if the leader proceeds to the next year. The 0 code here signifies election wins and
no failures due to any other reason.
One advantage of the binary variable framework is that the extreme value assumption
can be relaxed and coefficients can be estimated in a logit model (Arulampalam and Smith,
2004). The conditional probabilities qne,i and qe,i can then be specified as
qne,i(t) =
exp{x′(β) + δ(t)}
1 + exp{x′(β) + δ(t)}
and
qe,i(t) =
exp{x′(α) + δ(t)}
1 + exp{x′(α) + δ(t)}
which is used in equations 2.2 and 2.3 to estimate the hazard for election and non-
election years.
The Competing Risk Model
The above model only considered a single risk of leaving office, but it can be expanded
to a ‘competing risk model’. This is what we illustrate next which is a value addition to
the existing literature.15
Consider K different reasons for a leader to leave office. In our case, the identified
reasons to leave office are election, term limit, resignation, military coup and other irregular
reasons. Each k relates to a jth(j = 1, 2, 3, ..., J) cause-specific hazard hjt(.) for leader i.
Then the likelihood contribution of leader i with an observed duration Ti and failure type
k is given by
15See Jenkins (2005) for a survey of competing risk models.
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Li = qk,i(Ti)
Ti∏
t=1
[ J∏
j=1
{
1− qk,i(t− 1)
}]
(2.4)
Similar to the ‘single risk model’ the sample is separated into election years, (qe,k,i), and
non-election years, (qne,k,i). We use a multinomial logit model and the above likelihood
function (Equation 2.4) to estimate the different risk types simultaneously (Jenkins, 2005).
2.3 Evidence
2.3.1 How random are resource discoveries?
Our identification strategy relies on the exogeneity of giant and supergiant resource discov-
eries. Therefore, it is important to establish how random these discoveries are. In table 2.2
we test to what extent giant oil discoveries this year are predicted by social, political and
economic factors of the previous year after controlling for country and year fixed effects.
We do not find any evidence that pre-existing conditions affect the probability of giant oil
discoveries. In table 2.3 we repeat the same exercise for giant mineral discoveries and find
similar results. The only exception is the statistical significance of log of population which
we include as a control in all models.
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2.3.2 Single Risk Models
In table 2.4 we start by estimating the effect of a giant resource discovery on the hazard
rate of a national leader while controlling for x-polity, log of population, leader’s entry
age, first leader after independence, oil discoveryt−10 and mineral discoveryt−10. We use a
‘single risk model’ without interactions. The coefficient estimates here could be interpreted
as follows. A positive coefficient implies an increase in the hazard rate and hence a leader
is more likely to leave office earlier. Alternatively, a negative coefficient implies a leader
is likely to stay longer in office. The magnitude of the coefficient is expressed by the
hazard ratio HR = exp(β) and HR − 1 represents the percentage change in the hazard
rate (Jenkins, 2005).
Table 2.4: Resource Discovery and Political Survival:
Election vs. non-election years
(1) (2) (3)
all years non-election years election years
Oil discovery −0.187 −0.281 −0.056
(0.195) (0.254) (0.275)
Mineral discovery −0.330∗∗ −0.342∗∗ −0.456
(0.129) (0.163) (0.316)
x-polity 0.103∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.028)
(log of) Population 0.026 0.032 −0.005
(0.052) (0.067) (0.077)
Leader entry age −0.025∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
First leader after independence −0.650∗∗∗ −0.461∗∗ −1.860∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.209) (0.497)
Mineral discovery t−10 −0.216 −0.248 −0.084
(0.183) (0.227) (0.329)
Oil discovery t−10 0.099 0.119 0.005
(0.151) (0.189) (0.325)
Observations 6,034 5,211 823
# of leaders 1124 1053 526
# of countries 143 143 127
LL -2172 -1598 -447
Notes: The table shows the impact of resource discoveries and institutions on the hazard of leaving office
for the whole sample (Model 1), for non-election years (Model 2) and for election years (Model 3). The
corresponding baseline hazard is semi-parametrically defined. Standard errors are robust and clustered at
the country level; *, ** and *** stand for significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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In column 1, we use the full sample treating election and non-election years equally.
We do not find any effect of oil discovery however mineral discovery appears to be risk
reducing. A coefficient estimate of −0.33 translates into exp(−0.33) = 0.72 indicating a
(1−0.72)×100 = 28 percent decline in hazard or risk. In columns 2 and 3, we distinguish
between non-election years and election years respectively. We find that mineral discovery
is risk reducing in non-election years while it does nothing to help or hinder the chances
of an incumbent in elections.16 Oil discovery does not seem to matter for the incumbent
in both election and non-election years.
The political economy literature finds that the economic and political consequences of
natural resources are often conditional on the quality of political institutions. Therefore,
in table 2.5 we further examine the effect of giant resource discovery on political survival
in non-election years conditional on the quality of institutions.
Table 2.5: Resource Discovery, Institutions and Political Survival:
Single Risk Model in non-election years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Institution: x-polity x-polity xconst xconst xrcomp xrcomp
Oil discovery −0.281 −1.584∗∗∗ −0.323 −1.715∗∗∗ −0.346 −2.569∗∗∗
(0.254) (0.437) (0.259) (0.512) (0.265) (0.699)
Mineral disc. −0.342∗∗ −0.413 −0.326∗ −0.483 −0.283 −0.915
(0.163) (0.468) (0.169) (0.474) (0.174) (0.608)
Institution 0.059∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.084∗∗ 0.048 −0.029 −0.100
(0.017) (0.017) (0.036) (0.036) (0.070) (0.071)
Oil # Inst. 0.159∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.094) (0.211)
Mineral # Inst. 0.005 0.026 0.207
(0.045) (0.092) (0.194)
Observations 5,211 5,211 5,211 5,211 5,211 5,211
# of leaders 1053 1053 1053 1053 1053 1053
# of countries 143 143 143 143 143 143
LL -1598 -1584 -1605 -1591 -1611 -1593
Notes: The table shows the impact of resource discoveries, institutions and their interactions on the hazard
of leaving office in non-election years. Included control variables: (log of) Population, leader entry age,
first leader after independence, oil discoveryt−10 and mineral discoveryt−10. Standard errors are robust
and clustered at the country level; *, ** and *** stand for significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Column 1 is identical to column 2 of table 2.4. In column 2, we interact oil discovery
and mineral discovery with the x-polity index which measures the overall level of demo-
16This is contrary to Andersen and Aslaksen (2013) finding that mineral rent increases risk.
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cracy. Oil discovery appears to be risk reducing for leaders in countries with an average
x-polity score under 8. Note that the average x-polity score in Qatar and Saudi Arabia is
2, in Romania it is 7, and in Norway it is 13. Our estimates predict that the probability
of leaving office for a complete autocratic leader (x-polity=1) is reduced by 5.7 percent,
while the same for a moderately autocratic leader with x-polity score of 7 is 3.3 percent.17
Columns 4 and 6 report interaction effects with executive constraints (xconst) and
recruitment competition (xrcomp) which are measures of constraints on the chief executive
and competitiveness in executive recruitment respectively. Similar to the x-polity result in
column 2, we find oil discovery to be risk reducing for the incumbent in non-election years
in states with weak xconst and xrcomp. Figure 2.5 plots the average marginal effects of oil
discovery. We do not find any effect of mineral discovery once interacted with institutions.
Figure 2.5: Oil Discovery, Institutions and Political Survival in non-election years:
Average Marginal effects with 95% CI
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Notes: The graphs a, b, and c show the average marginal effect of oil discovery on leaders’ time in office
conditional on the level of democracy (x-polity), the constraints a leader faces (xconst) and the competition
a leader faces (xrcomp). They correspond to Model 2, 4, and 6 in table 2.5 respectively.
The heterogeneous effects of minerals and oil is perhaps explained by their different
levels of connectedness. Oil exhibits enclave characteristics which exclusively favours the
incumbent. Oil revenue could be used by the incumbent for the purpose of coercion and
patronage under weak political institutions which would reduce risk. In contrast, minerals
17The risk reduction percentages are calculated by the specific Sata command margins. The command
calculates the marginal effect at each value of x-polity, xconst or xrcomp.
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are better connected to the rest of the economy thereby empowering both the incumbent
and the opposition. This could promote cooperation and reduce political risks for the
incumbent.
Next, we ask the question whether the risk reducing effects are motivated by actual
income or income expectations. To ascertain we need to observe how long it takes for a
resource discovery to have an impact on risk. If the effect is instantaneous then it is most
likely to be driven by expectations. Anything to the contrary would point towards actual
income to be the driving force.
Table 2.6 finds that risk reduction takes effect 5-8 years after a mineral discovery. It
typically takes 5-8 years post discovery to construct a mine and perhaps the incumbent
reaps benefit during the construction phase from the new employment and infrastructure.
However, this appears to be short-lived as it disappears over the 9-16 year period. The risk
reducing effect returns again 16 years after discovery when the incumbent starts enjoying
rent from the extracted deposits.
Table 2.6: The effect of mineral discovery over time
(1) (2) (3)
Institution: x-polity xconst xrcomp
Mineral discovery 1−4years −0.285 −0.268 −0.239
(0.184) (0.185) (0.180)
Mineral discovery 5−8years −0.943∗∗ −0.914∗∗ −0.835∗
(0.448) (0.452) (0.459)
Mineral discovery 9−12years 0.692 0.727 0.792∗
(0.455) (0.463) (0.482)
Mineral discovery 13−16years −0.916 −0.940 −0.915
(0.656) (0.661) (0.666)
Mineral discovery >16years −0.971∗∗ −0.978∗∗ −0.934∗∗
(0.464) (0.463) (0.456)
Oil discovery −0.277 −0.317 −0.340
(0.255) (0.260) (0.266)
Institution 0.059∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗ −0.027
(0.017) (0.036) (0.070)
Observations 5,211 5,211 5,211
# of leaders 1053 1053 1053
# of countries 143 143 143
LL -1592 -1599 -1605
Notes: The table shows the impact of mineral discoveries over time on the hazard of leaving office in
non-election years. Included control variables: (log of) Population, leader entry age, first leader after
independence, oil discoveryt−10 and mineral discoveryt−10. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the
country level; *, ** and *** stand for significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 2.7 focuses on oil. Since oil is risk reducing only in countries with weak political
institutions, we restrict our sample here to x-polity < 8, xconst < 4 and xrcomp < 3.18
We find that the risk reducing effect of oil appears 11-20 years after a giant or supergiant
discovery. Unlike minerals the effects here is much delayed and appears only after a
deposit is fully developed. Perhaps this is indicative that oil rig development is highly
capital intensive and therefore creates very little employment during the construction
phase (Karl, 2007). Once the deposit is fully developed 11-20 years after discovery, the
incumbent mainly benefits from rent.19
Table 2.7: The effect of oil discovery over time
(1) (2) (3)
Institution: x-polity xconst xrcomp
Oil discovery 1−5years −0.447 −0.306 0.144
(0.382) (0.374) (0.423)
Oil discovery 6−10years −0.358 −0.299 0.158
(0.453) (0.458) (0.480)
Oil discovery 11−15years −2.150∗∗ −2.160∗∗ −1.700
(1.057) (1.056) (1.282)
Oil discovery 16−20years −1.848∗∗ −1.770∗ −0.899
(0.940) (0.924) (1.040)
Oil discovery >20years −1.329 −1.059 −0.102
(0.949) (0.869) (0.718)
Mineral discovery 0.195 0.169 0.081
(0.302) (0.276) (0.301)
Institution −0.187∗∗ −0.648∗∗∗ −1.912∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.129) (0.256)
Observations 2,550 2,550 2,550
# of leaders 353 353 353
# of countries 100 100 100
LL -596 -607 -525
Notes: The table shows the impact of oil discoveries over time on the hazard of leaving office in non-
election years for countries with x-polity<8, xconst<4 and xrcomp<3. Included control variables: (log of)
Population, leader entry age, first leader after independence, oil discoveryt−10 and mineral discoveryt−10.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level; *, ** and *** stand for significant at the
10%, 5% and 1% level.
So far we have used giant and supergiant resource discoveries as exogenous news shocks
to identify the effect of resources on leaders’ tenure. Next we use an even cleaner iden-
18These are the corresponding levels of institutional quality with significant marginal effects for oil
discovery, see figure 2.5.
19This is consistent with the findings of Andersen and Aslaksen (2013) and de Mesquita and Smith
(2010) who use oil rent as their explanatory variable.
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tification strategy using first discovery in resource poor countries. Leaders in countries
with a history of resource discoveries could expect giant discoveries in the future. In con-
trast, the first giant discovery in a resource poor country is unexpected and likely to be
exogenous. We follow Smith (2015) in defining a resource poor country in 1950 and table
A 5 in appendix A presents a list.20 Table 2.8 reports the effects of first discovery shocks
on tenure in a non-election year in a resource poor country and the results are similar to
those of all discoveries (from table 2.5). Note that this time oil discovery is also signific-
ant at the 10% level in the specifications without interaction (column (1), (2) and (3)).
However, the overall significant oil discovery coefficient is again driven by countries with
weak institutional quality as can be seen in the marginal effects plot reported in figure
2.6.
Table 2.8: First Resource Discovery, Institutions and Survival:
Single Risk Model in non-election years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Institution: x-polity x-polity xconst xconst xrcomp xrcomp
F. oil discovery −0.872∗ −2.546∗∗∗ −0.921∗ −2.944∗∗∗ −0.927∗ −3.916∗∗∗
(0.477) (0.708) (0.478) (0.869) (0.474) (1.228)
F. mineral disc. −0.677∗∗ −0.715 −0.671∗∗ −0.645 −0.640∗∗ −1.049
(0.325) (0.684) (0.326) (0.780) (0.326) (0.960)
Institution 0.050∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.069∗ 0.055 −0.060 −0.079
(0.018) (0.018) (0.038) (0.038) (0.082) (0.082)
F. oil # Institution 0.272∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ 1.262∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.172) (0.393)
F. mineral # Inst. 0.009 −0.001 0.176
(0.080) (0.188) (0.355)
Observations 3,670 3,670 3,670 3,670 3,670 3,670
# of leaders 745 745 745 745 745 745
# of countries 92 92 92 92 92 92
LL -1187 -1176 -1191 -1181 -1193 -1184
Notes: The table shows the impact of first (F.) resource discoveries in initially resource poor countries
on the hazard of leaving office for leaders in non-election years. Included control variables: (log of)
Population, leader entry age, first leader after independence, oil discoveryt−10 and mineral discoveryt−10.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level; *, ** and *** stand for significant at the
10%, 5% and 1% level.
20Smith (2015) defines a country as resource poor if annual oil and gas production per capita in 1950 was
less than one oil barrel energy equivalent. He converts natural gas production to its oil barrel equivalent
in terms of energy generation using the conversion rate of 0.00586152 oil barrels per terajoule. Countries
that produced more than one barrel per capita at the start of the period, or already had significant mineral
wealth are dropped from his sample as unsuitable comparison countries.
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Figure 2.6: First Oil Discovery, Institutions and Political Survival in non-election years:
Average Marginal effects with 95% CI
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Notes: The graphs a, b, and c show the average marginal effect of first oil discovery in resource poor
countries on leaders’ time in office conditional on the level of democracy (x-polity), the constraints a leader
faces (xconst) and the competition a leader faces (xrcomp). They correspond to Model 2, 4, and 6 in table
2.8.
Next, in table 2.9 we turn our attention to a single risk model in election years. The
sample consists only of years in which an election took place and accounts therefore for
the additional risk of election defeat. Columns 1 and 3 include the resource discovery
variables and institutions without the interaction terms and columns 2 and 4 interacts
oil disocovery and mineral discovery with x-polity and xconst. Executive recruitment
competition (xcomp) is omitted here because it is endogenous in an election year. Countries
with elections systematically score higher xrcomp than countries without elections. We
find that mineral discovery and its interaction with institutions does not seem to have
any effect on tenure in an election year. Oil discovery appears to be risk reducing for a
leader in an election year in a country with less legislative control on the executive. In
particular, the average marginal effect plot in figure 2.7 reveals that oil discovery reduces
the risk of leaving office by 9.6% - 10.7% 21 for a leader with xconst score of less than 4.
For example, Mexico and Mozambique have average xconst score of 4 while Myanmar has
2.
21Risk reduction of 9.7% corresponds to xconst=1 and 10.7% corresponds to xconst = 3.
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Table 2.9: Resource Discovery, Institutions and Political Survival:
Single Risk Model in election years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Institution: x-polity x-polity xconst xconst
Oil discovery −0.056 −1.958 −0.091 −2.085∗
(0.275) (1.374) (0.273) (1.086)
Mineral discovery −0.456 −1.520 −0.481 −1.083
(0.316) (0.962) (0.322) (0.885)
Institution 0.176∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.056) (0.057)
Oil # Institution 0.163 0.354∗∗
(0.106) (0.172)
Mineral # Institution 0.094 0.110
(0.080) (0.150)
Observations 823 823 823 823
# of leaders 526 526 526 526
# of countries 127 127 127 127
LL -447 -443 -452 -448
Notes: The table shows the impact of resource discoveries, institutions and their interactions on the
hazard of leaving office in election years. Included control variables: (log of) Population, leader entry age,
first leader after independence, oil discoveryt−10 and mineral discoveryt−10. Standard errors are robust
and clustered at the country level; *, ** and *** stand for significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Figure 2.7: Oil Discovery, Executive Constraint and Political Survival in election years:
Average Marginal effects with 95% CI
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Notes: The graph shows the average marginal effect of oil discovery on leaders’ time in office conditional
on the constraints a leader faces (xconst) and corresponds to Model 4 in table 2.9.
Concluding the the ‘single risk model’ results: mineral discovery reduces risk generally
in non-election years, but not in election years and oil discovery reduces risks only in
countries with weak institutions in non-election years, the same is true but to a lesser
extend in election years.
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2.3.3 Competing Risk Models
The ‘single risk models’ discussed above show that resource discoveries influence the overall
risk of a leader leaving office in non-election years. The effect is somewhat muted during
election years. Using ‘competing risk models’ we investigate to what extent the effect of
discoveries differ by risk types. In particular, we focus on the risk of resignation, military
coups, and others22 in non-election years and the risk of losing elections in election years.
Furthermore, we also treat term limit years separately for leaders with and without term
limit.
Table 2.10: Resource Discovery and the Risk of Resignation:
Competing Risk Model in non-election years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Institution: x-polity x-polity xconst xconst xrcomp xrcomp
Oil discovery −0.260 −2.292∗∗∗ −0.342 −2.564∗∗∗ −0.396 −4.030∗∗∗
(0.316) (0.642) (0.328) (0.728) (0.345) (0.954)
Mineral disc. −0.482∗∗ −1.492∗∗ −0.483∗∗ −1.589∗∗ −0.368 −2.380∗∗∗
(0.208) (0.689) (0.219) (0.733) (0.229) (0.889)
Institution 0.162∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.051) (0.053) (0.104) (0.106)
Oil # Inst. 0.211∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 1.203∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.122) (0.264)
Mineral # Inst. 0.093 0.203 0.616∗∗
(0.058) (0.125) (0.251)
Observations 5,211 5,211 5,211 5,211 5,212 5,213
# of leaders 1053 1053 1053 1053 1053 1053
# of countries 143 143 143 143 143 143
LL -1957 -1957 -1957 -1957 -1940 -1906
Notes: The table shows the impact of resource discoveries and institutions on the hazard of leaving office
because of resignation in non-election years. Included control variables: (log of) Population, leader entry
age, first leader after independence, oil discoveryt−10 and mineral discoveryt−10. Standard errors are robust
and clustered at the country level; *, ** and *** stand for significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Table 2.10 shows the impact of resource discoveries and institutions on the probability
of resignation in a non-election year. Resignation here is defined as a leader leaving office
in a regulated manner, but does not participate in an election. The reasons for resignation
could be numerous ranging from satisfactory agenda fulfilment to being pushed out by her
political party or cronies. Oil discovery appears to reduce resignation risk for leaders in
22The category others is an aggregated residual of leaders leaving office because of: domestic protest,
domestic rebels, other government actors, foreign force and assassination by unsupported individuals.
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countries with weak institutions. In particular, oil discovery reduces the risk of resignation
by 2.3% - 3.1% for leaders with x-polity score between 1 and 8 and by 2.8% - 3.5% with
xconst score between 1 and 4. Leaders in countries without any institutionalised regulation
on executive selection (xrcomp = 1) face a 4% reduced risk of resignation following a giant
oil discovery. Mineral discovery reduces resignation risk by approximately 38% percent in
a non-election year independent of the institutional quality.
Table 2.11 examines the effect of discoveries on military coups in non-election years.
Note that these are successful military coups that lead to leader changes. In addition to
the military grabbing power, these transitions also include struggle within the military
junta by irregular means (a coup within a coup). We find mineral discovery has no role in
military coups. In contrast, oil discovery significantly reduces the risk of military coups
especially in countries with weak political institutions. The risk is reduced by 1.3% - 5.5%
for leaders in countries with x-polity score lower than 7. This is perhaps indicative of the
link between oil and authoritarianism.
Table 2.11: Resource Discovery and the Risk of Military coups:
Competing Risk Model in non-election years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Institution: x-polity x-polity xconst xconst xrcomp xrcomp
Oil discovery −1.097∗∗ −1.794∗∗∗ −0.949∗∗ −1.463∗∗ −0.590 −0.145
(0.426) (0.548) (0.422) (0.737) (0.391) (1.279)
Mineral disc. −0.120 0.177 −0.112 −0.020 −0.191 −1.085
(0.320) (0.618) (0.314) (0.608) (0.317) (0.823)
Institution −0.198∗∗∗ −0.206∗∗∗ −0.552∗∗∗ −0.564∗∗∗ −1.464∗∗∗ −1.522∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.078) (0.083) (0.210) (0.243)
Oil # Inst. 0.172∗∗∗ 0.245 −0.306
(0.062) (0.264) (0.707)
Mineral # Inst. −0.062 −0.051 0.529
(0.099) (0.230) (0.434)
Observations 5,211 5,211 5,211 5,211 5,212 5,213
# of leaders 1053 1053 1053 1053 1053 1053
# of countries 143 143 143 143 143 143
LL -1957 -1957 -1957 -1957 -1940 -1906
Notes: The table shows the impact of resource discoveries and institutions on the hazard of leaving office
because of military coups in non-election years. Included control variables: (log of) Population, leader
entry age, first leader after independence, oil discoveryt−10 and mineral discoveryt−10. Standard errors are
robust and clustered at the country level; *, ** and *** stand for significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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We also estimate the model with the ‘others’ (domestic protest, domestic rebels, other
government actors, foreign force and assassination by unsupported individuals) risk cat-
egory during non-election years and find no effect of resource discovery. These results are
reported in appendix A table A 7.
Next, we turn to the risk of losing election in election years. In an election year, the risk
of losing election dwarfs any other threats. There are only 8 resignations, 7 military coups
and 3 leaders leaving for other reasons compared to 255 lost elections in election years.
The small sample size of resignations, military coups and other reasons is insufficient for
the estimation of separate models. Therefore, we focus only on the risk of election loss in
an election year in table 2.12. Unsurprisingly, strong political institutions and checks and
balances increase the risk of election loss for an incumbent but we do not find any direct
effect of resource discovery nor one conditional on institutions.
Table 2.12: Resource Discovery and the Risk of losing elections:
Competing Risk Model in election years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Institution: x-polity x-polity xconst xconst
Oil discovery −0.024 −1.526 −0.059 −1.761
(0.294) (1.473) (0.289) (1.162)
Mineral discovery −0.520 −1.704 −0.555 −1.040
(0.352) (1.064) (0.361) (1.024)
Institution 0.212∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.028) (0.058) (0.058)
Oil # Institution 0.127 0.299
(0.113) (0.183)
Mineral # Institution 0.101 0.086
(0.087) (0.169)
Observations 823 823 823 823
# of leaders 526 526 526 526
# of countries 127 127 127 127
LL -423 -421 -429 -427
Notes: The table shows the impact of resource discoveries and institutions on the hazard of leaving office
because of losing an election. Included control variables: (log of) Population, leader entry age, first leader
after independence, oil discoveryt−10 and mineral discoveryt−10. Standard errors are robust and clustered
at the country level; *, ** and *** stand for significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Concluding the results from the ‘competing risk model’ shows that the risk reducing
effect of mineral discovery obtained in the single risk model is purely driven by a reduction
of resignation risk in non-election years. Mineral discovery do not influence the risk of
military coups, elections or other reasons of leaving office. The conditional risk reducing
effect of oil discovery is slightly more widespread and reduces apart from the risk of
resignation also the risk of losing office because of military coups.
2.3.4 Term Limits
So far we did not include term limit years in our analysis. This implies that in the non-
election year specifications we include all the non-term limit years of leaders in countries
with term limit but exclude the term limit years. This is because term limits represent
a special case which requires exclusive treatment. This is what we intend to do next in
table 2.13 by estimating a single risk model for leaders with term limit in their term limit
year.
Figure 2.8 presents a breakdown on leaders with term limits. From the 369 leaders
with term limits only 196 reach their term limit year, 173 leave office before, and 44 leaders
stay longer. Table 2.13 shows that resource discovery does not seem to have any significant
impact on the tenure of leaders with term limits in term limit years in a single risk model.
Nonetheless, these results should be interpreted with caution as we have a sample size of
only 206 observations.
Figure 2.8: Leaders with term limit
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Notes: The graph shows leaders who face term limits and if they left office before, on or after the maximum
term.
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Table 2.13: Resource Discovery, Institutions and Political Survival:
Single Risk Model in term limit years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Institution: x-polity x-polity xconst xconst
Oil discovery 0.214 1.805 0.150 1.693
(0.699) (1.315) (0.600) (1.331)
Mineral discovery −1.149 0.486 −1.027 1.146
(0.716) (1.048) (0.761) (1.096)
Institution 0.387∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗ 1.169∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.102) (0.158) (0.243)
Oil # Institution −0.216 −0.403
(0.143) (0.296)
Mineral # Institution −0.200∗ −0.565∗∗
(0.116) (0.245)
Observations 206 206 206 206
# of leaders 196 196 196 196
# of countries 65 65 65 65
LL -64 -61 -64 -61
Notes: The table shows the impact of resource discoveries, institutions and their interactions on the
hazard of leaving office for leaders in term limit years. Included control variables: (log of) Population,
leader entry age, first leader after independence, oil discoveryt−10 and mineral discoveryt−10. Standard
errors are robust and clustered at the country level; *, ** and *** stand for significant at the 10%, 5% and
1% level.
2.3.5 Mechanisms
Tax on the non-resource sector, military expenditure, conflict onset, government borrow-
ing, and economic growth are potential mechanisms through which resource discovery
could affect leaders’ survival. The ‘rentier state hypothesis’ posits that governments re-
ceiving sufficient natural resource revenues are less likely to tax their citizens heavily
and in return, the citizens demand less accountability from them (Mahdavy, 1970). The
incumbent can also stay in power by using resource wealth to boost military spending,
government borrowing and economic growth. Resource discoveries could increase the risk
of armed conflict onset (Lei and Michaels, 2014) thereby increasing the risk for the incum-
bent (Caselli, 2006). In order for these variables to act as credible mechanisms, they must
respond to mineral and oil discoveries. We estimate the following regression:
yit = αi + βt + γ1(L)Discoverylit + γ2Xit + it
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where yit is the dependent variable (non-resource tax, military expenditure, conflict
onset, public debt, and economic growth) for country i in year t. αi and βt are country
and year fixed effects. Discoverylit is a dummy variable equal one for two consecutive
years, (L) years after the discovery L ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19} for leader l. The
coefficient γ1 therefore measures the effect of a resource discovery 1-2, 3-4, 5-6, . . . , 19-20
years after the discovery on the outcome variable (year 1 is the discovery year). X are
control variables including past oil and mineral discovery in all specifications. Further, for
regressions with the outcome variable measured as a share of GDP we include the log of
GDP per capita as a control. it is the error term. We analyse the impact of mineral and
oil discoveries separately. The oil sample covers leaders from non-democracies only with
x-polity score < 8 because the risk reducing effect of oil discovery is conditional on the
level of institutional quality.
We find that oil discovery decreases non-resource sector tax as a share of GDP. Oil
discovery also increases military spending and thereby reducing risk for the incumbent. In
contrast, mineral discovery appears to have no effect on military spending. It also appears
to increase non-resource sector tax as a share of GDP. The latter is perhaps reflective of
the relatively high level of connectedness of minerals to the rest of the economy. We do
not find any effect on conflict onset, public debt, and economic growth. The conflict onset
result is in agreement with Cotet and Tsui (2013a).
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2.4 Robustness
We perform a battery of robustness tests of the empirical relationship between resource
discovery and leaders tenure. They deal with nuanced issues relating to exploration effort,
term limits, leaders who do not face elections, pre-election years, assassinated leaders, and
resource dependence. Following is a discussion of these results.
Exploration effort could be the main driver of discoveries. Therefore a potent question
is to what extent leaders’ time in office influence exploration effort thereby influencing the
likelihood of giant and supergiant discoveries? To take account of this issue we use data
from Cotet and Tsui (2013a) on the number of Wildcats drilled in a country in a year.
Wildcats are explorative boreholes drilled with the expectation of finding oil and therefore
is a good proxy for exploration effort. Cotet and Tsui (2013a) provide Wildcat data for 57
countries for the period 1946 to 2003. This reduces the sample by about 60 percent. We
re-estimate the baseline results with the observations for which Wildcat data is available
and find little difference from original results in a ‘single risk model’. Therefore, our results
are robust to the inclusion of exploration effort. Table A 8 and A 9 in appendix A reports
these results.
Our non-election year specifications include all the non-term limit years of leaders in
countries with term limits along with non-election years of leaders without term limits.
This could be a challenge if leaders with term limits systematically behave differently from
leaders without term limits in non-election years. We therefore test the robustness of our
results by dropping leaders with term limits from the non-election year sample and our
results survive. Table A 10 in appendix A reports these results.
We estimate the probability of leaving office separately for election and non-election
years but we do not distinguish between leaders who do or do not face elections. For
example, a monarch who does not face the risk of an election could behave differently in
a non-election year from a leader who does. Therefore, we drop leaders who do not face
elections from the non-election year sample and re-estimate the ‘single risk models’. The
results are robust. Table A 11 in appendix A reports these results. Note that we do not
run interaction with xrcomp here as the exclusion of non-election leaders from the sample
creates endogeneity issues with regards to this variable.
Non-election years especially the year before election could have a disproportionate
impact on the outcome variable in election years. For example, a leader could use certain
policies in the year before election to influence election outcome. We test the potential of
such spillovers in a ‘single risk model’ for election years using one year lagged covariates
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and the results are robust. Table A 12 in appendix A reports these results.
Recall that leaders leaving office due to death by assassination is not right censored
in our sample as we treat these assassinations to be politically motivated. Next, we
test the robustness of our results by right censoring the 8 assassinations that we have in
the sample. The results are robust and table A 13 in appendix A reports them. The
assassinated leaders are: Palme of Sweden, Verwoerd of South Africa, Rabin of Israel,
Faisal of Saudi Arabia, Bandarcenaike S.W.R.D. of Sri Lanka, Kennedy of USA, Castillo
Armas of Guatemala and Remon Cantera of Panama.
Our analysis includes countries which are resource dependent and therefore we could
be picking up the effect of resource dependence rather than resource discovery. To check
indeed we are picking up the effect of resource discovery, we follow Smith (2015) and use
his sample of resource poor countries in 1950. Under this approach we are solely picking
up the effect of resource discoveries23 in resource poor countries thereby ruling out the
confounding influence of ‘resource dependence’. The results are robust with the additional
feature of interaction between mineral discovery and institutions now statistically signi-
ficant. Appendix A table A 5 lists the countries fitting Smith’s definition of resource poor
countries in 1950. Tables A 14 and A 15 report results of single risk models in non-election
and election years respectively.
2.5 Conclusion
A large literature focuses on how leaders influence the economic and institutional perform-
ance of a country. However, surprisingly little is known about the link between natural
resources and the political fortunes of a national leader. We take a fresh look here using
a new dataset of giant oil and mineral discoveries. We combine this with a large dataset
of 1255 leaders in 158 countries over the period 1950 to 2010 and empirically explore how
leaders are affected by giant resource discoveries. We innovate by using both ‘single risk’
and ‘competing risk’ discrete time proportional hazard models. We find that mineral dis-
coveries reduce risk for the incumbent in a ‘single risk model’ especially in a non-election
year. In contrast, oil discoveries reduce risk disproportionately more for the incumbent in
countries with weak political institutions.
The effects appear to be induced by actual income or rent rather than income expect-
ations. We track the evolution of risk for the incumbent after a discovery news shock
23Note that these are all giant and supergiant discoveries in resource poor countries and not just first
discoveries as in table 2.8.
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and find that risk reduces significantly during the construction and extraction stages of
a mine. The construction stage brings employment and new infrastructure and therefore
is beneficial for the incumbent. In contrast, oil discovery reduces risk almost a decade
after a giant discovery when the deposit is likely to be fully operational. Therefore, oil
rents appears to be a powerful political tool for the incumbent in oil countries with weak
political institutions.
We also observe that in a ‘competing risk model’ oil discovery significantly reduces the
risk of losing office via military coup while resource (oil and mineral) discovery in general
reduces the risk of resignation. Resource discovery does not seem to have any impact on
the risk of election loss and on leaders with term limits.
We test potential mechanisms and find that oil discovery decreases tax as a share of
GDP from the non-resource sector. Oil discovery also increases military spending and
thereby reducing political risk for the incumbent. In contrast, mineral discovery appears
to have no effect on military spending. It also appears to increase non-resource sector tax
as a share of GDP which supports the thesis that minerals are better connected to the
rest of the economy.
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Chapter 3
Resource Revenues and Domestic
Taxation: Is there a crowding-out
effect?
3.1 Introduction
Low levels of government revenues are a major obstacle for development in many countries
(Chaudhry, 1997). Government revenues average at 17% and 25% of GDP in low- and
middle-income countries respectively compared to 32% in high-income countries (Knebel-
mann, 2017). At the same time, natural resources, such as oil, gas, and minerals contrib-
ute significantly to the government budget in many countries. They generate annually
an estimated US$ 4 trillion in economic rents worldwide and the World Bank categorises
currently over 50 countries as resource dependent. This massive amount of economic rents
could eradicate poverty in those countries, improving the lives of over 1.5 billion people
(Barma et al., 2012). Countries ‘blessed’ with an abundance of natural resources could
use them to fill the revenue gap and lift resource-rich low- and middle-income countries
on a better development trajectory. However, the reality often looks different.
Many scholars argue that resource revenues crowd out other forms of government reven-
ues, especially domestic taxes (Bornhorst et al., 2009; Crivelli and Gupta, 2014; Mahdavy,
1970; Ossowski and Gonzales, 2012; Ross, 2001; Thomas and Trevin˜o, 2013). Focusing on
the resource sector and substituting resource revenues for other forms of taxation can be
appealing for the government for several reasons. The potential gains in terms of rents
is huge, outperforming in many countries the potential gains from traditional taxation
(Barma et al., 2012). Collecting revenues from the resource sector is relatively easy be-
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cause fewer stakeholders are involved. Fewer stakeholders and the resulting low visibility
make it easier to hide income if desired (Lei and Michaels, 2014). Apart from lower effort,
more waste and/or corruption, it could also be argued that governments substitute taxes
with resource revenues intentionally to promote economic growth. Lower taxation of com-
panies and individuals lead to lower production costs and higher disposable incomes. The
former increases competitiveness of domestic businesses and the latter increases consump-
tion (IMF, 2012b).
However, there are also arguments against a crowding-out effect, stating that resource
revenues could increase tax income. The most obvious way for resource revenues to in-
crease tax income would be if the government invests the resource revenues directly into
tax administration (Besley and Mclaren, 1993; Besley and Persson, 2009, 2013). Higher
wages for tax collectors, better training and technology should improve the tax admin-
istration and therefore governments’ tax income. Further, to collect revenues from the
resource sector the government needs a sophisticated tax administration division dealing
with resource companies. If this division is not operating in isolation, it could be that
they have positive spillovers on the rest of the tax administration (Knebelmann, 2017).
Resource revenues influence taxes positively or negatively and this chapter analyses if
there is a prevailing direction. Exploiting the 2000s commodity price boom as a positive
income shock for resource exporting countries and using comparative case study analysis
in the form of the synthetic control method, I find a crowding-out effect of non-resource tax
per capita through resource revenues. Due to the 2000s commodity price boom total tax
per capita is on average 11% lower in resource exporting countries compared to what total
tax per capita would have been without the price boom. The results confirm the finding
of other scholars.1 However, I also show that this effect is heterogeneous by resource type,
institutional quality, resource dependence, the use of different fiscal instruments, and the
ownership structure of the resource sector, which are new findings. Further, I conduct
five case studies of new resource producers and the results indicate that the crowding-out
effect is not a necessity. Only two new resource producers faced lower tax per capita while
three of them actually increased their tax income per capita.
The existence of a crowding-out effect should be a concern for policymakers because
resource revenues reliance can impede the planning of a sustainable state budget in sev-
eral ways. Firstly, the market price of natural resources is unpredictable which makes
revenues volatile (ECB, 2004; Loutia et al., 2016). Secondly, the life cycle of resource
1e.g. Bornhorst et al. (2009); Crivelli and Gupta (2014); Thomas and Trevin˜o (2013); Ossowski and
Gonzales (2012)
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projects can span over several decades, which increases uncertainty. Fiscal policy decision
regarding the resource project at the time of discovery could turn out to be sub-optimal
and renegotiation of former mistakes come with high reputational costs, influencing future
projects (Knebelmann, 2017). Thirdly, oil and minerals are non-renewable resources that
will run out in the near future, hence, consuming the benefits is not sustainable (Auty,
1998; Barma et al., 2012).
Reliance on resource revenues can have further adverse political effects by reducing
transparency. Political and economic research associates traditional taxation with im-
provements in transparency and governance, because tax compliance is only sustained
through bargains and concessions between citizens and the government (Moore, 1966;
North, 1990; Prichard, 2015). Resource revenues do not possess the same beneficial at-
tributes (Ross, 2015). This argument represents also the first mechanism of the rentier
effect in which according to Ross (2015) resource-rich governments use resource revenues
to reduce taxation (taxation effect) to avoid demands from citizens to democratize.2
A further negative consequence of a crowding-out effect is that non-financial objectives
become more difficult to accomplish. Apart of generating revenues taxes are also a fiscal
policy instrument, which can stabilise the economy in turbulent times, redistribute income
to reduce inequality, or reduce consumption of goods with negative externalities such
as smoking. An underdeveloped tax system fails to provide these policy possibilities
(Mahdavy, 1970; McLure et al., 2016).
The empirical literature so far has focused on the question how resource revenues
influence tax or revenue effort, which is the tax or revenue to GDP ratio. Bornhorst
et al. (2009) find in a sample of 30 hydrocarbon-producing countries in the period 1992
to 2005 that a one percentage point increase in hydrocarbon revenues reduces revenue
effort by around 0.2 percentage points. Extending the Bornhorst et al. (2009) sample to
35 hydrocarbon-producing countries and an extended time period till 2009, Crivelli and
Gupta (2014) find that a one percentage point increase in the resource revenues to GDP
ratio leads to a 0.3 percentage point decrease in tax effort, mainly driven by a reduction in
revenues from taxes on goods and services. Focusing on geographic sub-samples, Ossowski
and Gonzales (2012) and Thomas and Trevin˜o (2013) find similar results for Latin America
and Sub-Saharan Africa respectively. In contrast, a recent paper by Knebelmann (2017)
challenges those findings. She uses a sample of 31 oil-rich countries and exploits the 2000s
2The other two mechanisms are the spending effect and repression effect through which resource-rich
governments increase public spending and suppress formation of political groups to avoid democratization
(Ross, 2015).
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oil price boom as an exogenous shock in resource revenues to measure the causal impact
of resource revenues on domestic taxation. She does not find a negative effect of resource
revenues on domestic tax effort, rather a weak positive effect.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, I am using
a novel methodology, which apart from estimating an average treatment effect, allows the
analysis of sub-samples and inferences about heterogeneity across countries, a new advance.
The synthetic control methodology developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and
Abadie et al. (2010) is based on comparative case studies and allows for a deeper insight
into the crowding-out effect. Second, I focus on non-resource tax per capita instead of
the non-resource tax to GDP ratio (tax effort). Using a ratio as dependent variable
provides useful information, but it is not certain if the effect is triggered by a change
in the numerator or denominator.3 Further, total tax per capita allows seeing the issue
from a distinct perspective.4 Tax effort measures how important taxes are in an economy
while per capita values show by how much an individual is affected by a resource price
shock. It further allows calculating how much government revenues are foregone because
of the price shock. Third, I also analyse different resource types. The literature about
natural resources and their impact on an economy focuses on oil because it is strategically
important and the most traded commodity worldwide (United Nations, 2016). I also
include some mineral and precious mineral producers to see whether the ‘resource curse’
is actually an ‘oil curse’. Fourth, I am exploiting the 2000s commodity price boom as
an exogenous shock to determine the causal relationship between resource revenues and
total tax per capita. Only Knebelmann (2017) used an identification strategy relying on
exogenous variation of resource revenues. And finally, I analyse the existence of a crowding-
out effect for five non-resource producers who became resource producers. Contrary to
the main part of the study, in which the focus is on established resource producers, here
I provide evidence and policy implications for countries who extract oil for the first time.
These results can be of interest for countries who recently discovered natural resources,
such as Uganda, Kenya and Ghana.
The identification strategy relies on the stochastic character of the 2000s commodity
price boom from the perspective of resource exporting countries. The 2000s commodity
price boom describes the rise of many physical commodities in the early 21st century (Hel-
3This could also hold for the tax per capita variable, particularly in countries with a large foreign work
force. However, a t-test comparing the average population growth rate in resource exporting countries
before and during the 2000s commodity boom did not reveal a significant difference, while average GDP
growth is significantly greater during the price boom.
4Total tax per capita always refers to non-resource tax per capita throughout this chapter if not stated
otherwise.
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bling, 2012). The focus of this chapter is on non-renewable natural resources in particular
oil, minerals, and precious minerals, because these commodities fulfil the requirements of
the rentier state theory. They create rents and are mostly exported, which generates an
external windfall for the government from outside of the domestic economy. This gives
the government the possibility to substitute rents for taxes (Beblawi, 1990). Between 1999
and 2012 the international oil price, mineral price index and precious mineral price index
increased by 450, 180 and 600 percent respectively. The price hike is associated with
increasing demand from emerging economies, low interest rates set by the Federal Re-
serve resulting in a weak US$ and speculative investments (Carter et al., 2011; Hamilton,
2009, 2011). None of the reasons can be influenced by individual resource exporters in the
sample and therefore the price shock qualifies as plausible exogenous allowing to analyse
the causal relationship between resource revenues and non-resource tax income. More on
the exogeneity and timing of the 2000s commodity price boom will be discussed in section
3.2.
The working argument is that the non-resource sector of a resource exporting eco-
nomy is affected in the same way by a resource price shock as the non-resource sector of
a non-resource producing country.5 The only difference between resource exporting and
non-resource producing country is that the government in a resource exporting country
receives additional funds from the resource sector during the price boom. These additional
funds can be saved (increasing reserves), stolen by members of the government (corruption)
or transferred to the non-resource sector by increasing public expenditure or by reducing
taxes. The latter is the focus of this chapter. Under the assumption that non-resource
producers are affected in the same way as the non-resource sector in a resource exporting
country, they can be used to construct synthetic control countries. The idea of the syn-
thetic control methodology is to create a counterfactual country that behaves in the same
manner as the resource producing country if the price shock would not have occurred.
Comparing the resource producing country with the synthetic control country shows how
tax per capita is affected because of a price shock. Identification and assumptions will be
discussed further in section 3.3.
I find evidence for crowding-out. On average the treatment effect is negative supporting
previous findings by indicating that the 2000s commodity price boom and the resulting
increase in resource revenues lead to a decrease of about 11% in non-resource tax per
capita in resource exporting countries. However, this average effect is heterogeneous and
5The non-resource sector of a non-resource producing country is the same as the whole economy.
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the synthetic control analysis shows that the tax reducing effect is more prone in highly
oil dependent countries with a low level of institutional quality and a preference to extract
revenues from the resource sector via tax instruments. I do not find a significant effect for
mineral or precious mineral exporting countries. The average treatment effect indicates
that a person in an oil exporting country paid around US$ 300 less tax each year because of
the price boom as compared to a scenario without price shock. For example, Saudi Arabia
with an average population of around 24 million, lost US$ 7.7 billion each year. This
foregone yearly tax income is only US$ 1.55 bn short of what the Saudi’s tax authority
expects to generate from the VAT introduced for the first time in Saudi Arabia’s history
in 2018.6
The results survive several robustness checks. Controlling for outliers by excluding the
biggest oil exporter and potential swing producer (Saudi Arabia) and the country with
the highest per capita taxes (Norway) does not alter the results. Further, the results are
robust using different specifications controlling for additional predictor variables.
After providing evidence for a crowding-out effect for established resource exporting
countries, I show results for five new resource producers. The results of the five new
oil producers show that three countries have a tax increasing effect (Vietnam, Sudan,
Equatorial Guinea), while two countries experience a tax decreasing effect (East Timor,
Chad).
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 describes the 2000s
commodity price boom and explains why it can be considered as exogenous in this setting.
Section 3.3 and 3.4 explains the methodology and data used to estimate the effect. Section
3.5 discusses the results and section 3.6 provides robustness checks. I then conduct five
case studies in section 3.6 to see if the results change for new resource producers and
section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 The 2000s commodity price boom
In this section, I describe the price behaviour of oil, minerals and precious minerals
throughout the 2000s, the reasons for the commodity price boom as well as the timing
and the exogeneity of the 2000s commodity price boom for resource exporting countries.
Following the 1973 and 1979 energy crisis the oil price plummeted from an all-time
high above US$ 75 per barrel to US$ 22 in the mid-1980s (see Figure 3.1). The price
6The Saudi tax administration (General Authority of Zakat and Tax) estimates that the 5% VAT will
generate US$ 9.35bn in 2018 (Arabian Business, 2018).
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stayed low for the following years fluctuating between US$ 18 and US$ 30 per barrel with
an average of US$ 22 until 1998. From 1999 on the oil price increased almost continuously
up to a new all-time high of about US$ 85 in 2011 and stayed on a high level in 2012.
Two short interruptions of the price boom occurred between 1999 and 2012. The first,
between 2002 and 2003, was because of uncertainties created after the terrorist attack on
9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. The second downturn came because of the Great Recession
in 2009. The overall increase between 1999 and 2012 was around 450%.
Figure 3.1: Oil price 1970-2015
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The precious mineral price index from the World Bank measures the price changes
of Gold, Silver and Platinum. The base year is 2010 (=100) and the prices of the com-
ponents are measured in constant 2005 US$. The precious mineral price index increased
dramatically between 1999 and 2012 (see Figure 3.2). The index stood at around US$ 23
in 1999 and increased by almost 600% to just above US$ 138 in 2012. Contrary to the oil
price the precious mineral price index increased continuously without interruption.
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Figure 3.2: Precious mineral price index 1970-2015
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The mineral price index shows the price of Aluminium, Copper, Iron Ore, Lead, Nickel,
Tin and Zinc. The base year is again 2010 (=100) and the prices of the components are
measured in constant 2005 US$. In comparison to oil and precious minerals, the mineral
price boom was smaller and started later. The index stood at US$ 58 in 2004 and increased
by almost 180% to just over US$ 104 in 2011 (see Figure 3.3). Similar to the oil price
boom there was one interruption in 2009 because of the Great Recession.
Figure 3.3: Mineral price index 1970-2015
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The reasons for the commodity price boom are still discussed and no single cause could
be determined. The most prominent arguments include that the price boom was demand
driven by high economic growth in China (Hamilton, 2009), the monetary policy of the
Federal Reserves with low interest rates resulting in depreciation of the US$ (Carter et al.,
2011; Frankel, 2008), and that speculative investment played a role (Masters, 2008). Most
likely it was a mix of all these reasons. Important here to note is that contrary to past
commodity price booms there was no significant supply reduction that triggered the price
boom. World oil supply was remarkably stable despite events such as hurricanes in the
Gulf of Mexico, turmoil in Nigeria and conflict in Iraq (Hamilton, 2009). The mentioned
reasons of high demand, a weak US$ and speculation are likely not influenced by resource
exporters which makes the period ideal to analyse the causal impact of a resource income
shock.
The timing of the commodity price boom is derived by econometric means. I regressed
the price or price index for oil, minerals and precious minerals on its lagged value for
the time between 1961 and 2015 and conduct a Wald-test for each year testing the null
hypothesis of no structural break. The Wald statistics identifies structural breaks for the
oil price coefficient from 1999 until 2012.7 The precious mineral price index has significant
structural breaks at the 10% level for the whole period 1999 to 2012 and the metal price
index has structural breaks from 2004 until 2011. Those are the event periods considered as
the commodity price boom in each country according to their primary exported commodity
(see grey area in figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). Note that this test does not indicate the direction
of price changes. Special caution have to be taken when interpreting the results for the year
2008/2009 in which the Great Recession started and the oil price as well as the mineral
price index declined significantly. Table B 2 in appendix B reports Wald test statistics.
To establish exogeneity in this setting it is necessary to understand that the price
shock does not have to be stochastic. It suffices that the treatment assignment is merely
orthogonal to the country’s characteristics (Liou and Musgrave, 2014). This statement
translates into two conditions that must be true to capture a causal effect. First, none of
the treatment countries influenced the timing or the likelihood of the event and second,
no country influenced their assignment to treatment, i.e. did not anticipate it. In other
words, the event affects the treatment countries, but the treatment countries did not affect
the event.
7The only exception is 2001. The oil price was affected in 2001 mainly through the 9/11 terrorist
attacks but it only slowed down the oil price boom which speed quickly revived in the following years. The
p-value in 2001 is 0.115 and only slightly above conventional significance level and will be included in the
treatment period to avoid a gap in the sample.
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A resource producer can influence the timing, likelihood or magnitude of a price shock
only through the supply side by changing production levels. Overall, world oil production
increased at an almost constant rate over the considered period (see figure 3.4). The av-
erage oil production growth rate for the sample period is 1.4%, before and after 1999 it
was 1.6% and 1.3% respectively. Increasing supply should lead to a fall in prices assum-
ing constant demand. However, oil consumption increased over the same period shifting
demand up at a stronger rate than supply leading to a price increase.
Figure 3.4: Oil price and world production 1985-2015
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For an individual country to be able to influence the oil price, it must have a big
enough market share. Figure 3.5 shows oil production of the six biggest oil producers
in the world. Out of the six countries, only Saudi Arabia deserves a further discussion
because the remaining five are net-oil importer (USA, China) or have no data available
(Iraq, Russia, Canada) to be part of the sample.
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Figure 3.5: Top six oil producers 1980-2015
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Saudi Arabia is considered a swing producer. The favourable oil fields on the Arabic
peninsula and estimated reserves of around 260 billion barrels allow Saudi Arabia to
change production level at will and influence the oil price (Fattouh and Mahadeva, 2013).
However, the kingdom is part of OPEC and therefore decisions are made under concessions
and discussions with other members. Saudi Arabia’s oil production was almost constant
from the beginning of the 1990s till 2002 at around 9 million barrels per day. In 2003,
production increased to 10 million barrels per day and stayed above this level ever since (see
figure 3.5). The increase in production should lead to a price decrease but the production
increase was not enough and prices continued to rise. However, given the market power
of Saudi Arabia I also test all specifications excluding Saudi Arabia from the sample (see
section 3.6).
Saudi Arabia is part of OPEC and if Saudi Arabia on its own could be capable to
influence the oil price then OPEC should also be discussed. OPEC members produce 40%
of world’s crude oil and their exports represent about 60% of traded oil internationally
(Fattouh and Mahadeva, 2013; Loutia et al., 2016). The impact of OPEC’s production
decisions on the international oil price is highly debated in the economic literature but
no consent has been achieved. Some scholars find that OPEC can influence the oil price
while others find contradicting results. Other scholars argue in favour of a compromise
that OPEC’s power differs according to the period considered.8
8see Fattouh and Mahadeva (2013) and Loutia et al. (2016) for an overview of the related literature.
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Considering the period at hand, the 2000s, two facts give confidence that OPEC could
not manipulate the oil price boom. First, in the year 2000 Ali Rodriguez, Venezuela’s oil
minister and OPEC’s president introduced a new price band mechanism to keep oil within
a price band between US$ 22 and US$ 28 per barrel. Member quotas were supposed to be
adjusted automatically in the instance the oil price exceeded or undercut the price band.
The mechanism was tacitly abandoned in 2005 and since then OPEC is more quiet about
price aims (Piotrowski, 2015). However, the automatic mechanism for once shows that
OPEC worked against a possible price boom. Second, OPEC’s spare capacity9 was low
for the 2003-2008 period. Saudi Arabia alone usually holds a spare capacity between 1.5
and 2 million barrels. In the period 2003-2008 the spare capacity of all OPEC members
combined barely reached 2 million barrels, which represents less than 3% of global supply
(EIA, 2018). Therefore, for most of the considered time period OPEC worked against the
price boom or did not have the possibility to do anything about it which makes the 2000s
commodity price boom plausibly exogenous also for OPEC members.
The inability of OPEC members to influence the price boom can also be seen in
statements from Algerian Oil minister Chakib Khelil who said “there is not much we can
do [about rising prices],” in 2005 or Qatar Oil Minister Abdullah al-Attiyah who stated,
“This is out of the control of OPEC.”10
One remaining point before exogeneity can be established is the predictability of the
price shock. Did oil exporters anticipate the price shock and adjust their behaviour? This
is unlikely because predicting the future oil price is difficult up to the point that financial
institutions such as the IMF assume that the oil price follows a random walk, i.e. the best
possible prediction of next year’s oil price is this year’s oil price (ECB, 2004). Figure 3.6
compares the actual oil price with forecasts from World Bank’s Pink Sheets (The World
Bank, 2018a). The prediction is always done for the following two years and from 1999
onwards when the price boom started, the prediction is always below the actual oil price.11
The same is true for other price forecasts.
9Spare capacity is defined by EIA as the volume of production that could start within 30 days and
be sustained for at least 90 days (EIA, 2018). The indicator measures the possible responsiveness of oil
producers to adjust their oil production level.
10As cited in Piotrowski (2015).
11The forecast here is only shown until 2007. The World Bank did change their methodology after 2007
and published henceforth values in constant 2000, 2005 or 2010 US$. A further graph, showing forecasts
until 2015 in current US$ is provided in the appendix (see figure B.1 in appendix B). In figure B.1 however
forecasts between 2001 and 2004 are not reported by the World Bank in current US$ which is the reason
why the figure is not included here.
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Figure 3.6: Oil price and World Bank forecasts
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In conclusion, during the 2000s commodity price boom the oil price increased by over
400%, none of the oil exporting countries influenced the price through supply adjustments
and it was arguably an unexpected event. Therefore, the oil price boom was plausibly
exogenous.
The situation for mineral and precious mineral exporters is similar. The main reason
for the price increase was the strong economic growth in China, weak US$ and speculations
pushing up the price not just for oil but also for minerals and precious minerals (Helbling,
2012). The mineral and precious mineral exporters in the sample are all minor producers
relative to world production. Table B 1 in appendix B shows the market share of each
country for its main commodity. The exception is Chile as the world’s biggest copper
producer contributing 36% of world copper output. With the exception of Chile, it is
unlikely that one of the mineral or precious mineral producers have enough market power
to influence the price boom. Figure 3.7a compares the actual mineral price index with
forecasts from the World Bank and Figure 3.7b does the same for gold.12 In both cases,
the prediction seem to be rather inaccurate.
12The main commodity of the three precious mineral exporters in the sample is gold.
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Figure 3.7: Mineral and Gold price and WB forecasts
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(b) Gold
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3.3 Methodology
The 2000s commodity price boom represents a natural experiment and the resulting exo-
genous variation is explored in this chapter to identify the causal effect of a positive
resource induced income shock on domestic taxation. A common approach to identify a
causal effect with natural experiments is the difference-in-difference (DiD) approach (An-
grist and Pischke, 2009). DiD estimates a causal effect by contrasting the changes in the
pre- and post-treatment period between treatment and control countries. The identifying
assumption is that in the absence of the treatment, the outcome variable of the treated and
control countries would have followed parallel trends (Abadie, 2005; Angrist and Pischke,
2009; Ashenfelter, 1978; Ashenfelter and Card, 1984). The parallel trend assumption is not
always plausible and cannot be tested. However, a minimum requirement for a valid DiD
should be that the parallel trend assumption holds in the pre-treatment period, which can
be tested by interacting the treatment dummy with the time dummies. The interaction
term should be zero for the whole pre-treatment period (Angrist and Krueger, 1999). This
test fails for the sample at hand, hence DiD is not feasible with the available data.
An alternative way, to exploit natural experiments is the synthetic control method
(SCM) proposed by Abadie et al. (2010) and Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). SCM
assumes that in the absence of treatment the expected outcome would have been the same
for treatment and control countries conditional on past outcomes and control variables.
This is the so called ‘independence conditional on past outcomes’ assumption (Firpo and
Possebom, 2015). The advantage of SCM is that it does not rely on parallel trends, allows
the effect to vary over time and works in situations with small sample size (Abadie et al.,
2015), which makes it the preferred methodology for this chapter.
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3.3.1 Synthetic Control Method
In what follows, I discuss implementation, inference and identifying assumptions of the
synthetic control method (SCM). The original SCM framework was designed for cases
where treatment occurs only to one country (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). It is obvious
that the 2000s commodity price boom influenced not just one resource exporting country
but all of them. For this reason, I follow Cavallo’s extended SCM approach, which allows
for multiple treated units at different times (Cavallo et al., 2013).
The basic idea of SCM is to construct a synthetic control country as a weighted average
of the available control countries. The weights are generated by a data-driven algorithm
to ensure that covariates and outcomes of the synthetic control country match with the
treated country in the pre-treatment period. The weights are then used to predict the
outcome variable for the counterfactual of no treatment in the post-treatment period.
The resulting synthetic control country can be compared to the actual outcome and the
difference represents the treatment effect (Abadie et al., 2010; Cavallo et al., 2013). A
formal discussion follows below.
3.3.2 Implementation of SCM
Suppose a universe with (J + 1) ∈ N countries during T ∈ N time periods. For now, the
intervention (price shock) affects only country 1 (treatment country) and the rest of the
countries are unaffected. Intervention starts in T0 + 1 and continuous uninterrupted till
T , where 1 ≤ T0 < T . Let the scalar Y Nj,t be the potential outcome in the absence of the
treatment for country j ∈ {1, . . . , J + 1} in period t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. The scalar Y Ij,t denotes
the potential outcome that would be observed if the intervention occurs from T0 + 1 to T
in country j at time t. With this notation
αj,t = Y
I
j,t − Y Nj,t (3.1)
describes the intervention effect for country j in period t. Let Dj,t be the intervention
dummy assuming the value 1 if country j faces the intervention in period t and value 0
otherwise. Combining this gives the observed outcome for country j in period t by
Yj,t = Y
N
j,t + αj,tDj,t.
Because only the first country is affected by the intervention from period T0 + 1 to T ,
the intervention dummy is defined as:
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Dj,t =

1, if j = 1 and t > T0
0, otherwise
The aim is to estimate the intervention effect (α1,T0+1, . . . , α1,T ) for country 1 for each
post-intervention period (T0 + 1, . . . , T ). Since Y
I
1,t is observable it is only necessary to
estimate Y N1,t, the unobserved outcome for country 1 without treatment.
The synthetic control estimator of Y N1,t can be defined as
Yˆ N1,t =
J+1∑
j=2
wˆjYj,t. (3.2)
Suppose a vector of weights Wˆ = [wˆ2, . . . , wˆJ+1]
′ with wˆj > 0 for j = 2, . . . , J + 1 and∑J+1
j=2 wˆj = 1 exists so that
Y1,t =
J+1∑
j=2
wˆjYj,t,∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T0} and Z1 =
J+1∑
j=2
wˆjZj (3.3)
holds, then
αˆ1,t = Y1,t −
J+1∑
j=2
wˆjYj,t, ∀ t ∈ {T0 + 1, . . . , T} (3.4)
represents the estimated treatment effect for the treated country. The first part of
equation 3.3 states that the weighted average of the pre-treatment outcome of the control
countries should perfectly match the pre-treatment outcomes of the treated country. The
second part of equation 3.3 indicates that the weighted average of the control countries’
covariates perfectly replicate the covariates of the treated country. These two conditions
only hold if the outcome and the covariates of the treated country (Y1,t, Z1) lie within the
convex hull of [(Y2,1, . . . , Y2,T0 , Z
′
2), . . . , (YJ+1,1, . . . , YJ+1,T0 , Z
′
J+1)] (Abadie et al., 2010).
This is not often the case but Abadie et al. (2010) show a way to select Wˆ so that equation
3.3 holds approximately. They propose to minimize the distance between the vector of
covariates and outcome variable of the treatment countries and the weighted matrix with
the same outcome variable and covariates of each control country in the pre-treatment
period using the Euclidian metric (or a re-weighted version of it) (Firpo and Possebom,
2015).
In practice, let X1 be the vector of outcome variable and covariates of the treated
country in the pre-treatment period and X0 the corresponding matrix including the same
variables as in X1 for each control country. The distance between treated outcome and
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covariates and control outcome and covariates is then given by the vector ||X1 − X0W ||
and the vector Wˆ is chosen to minimize the distance
||X1 −X0W ||V =
√
(X1 −X0W )′V (X1 −X0W ) (3.5)
where V is a (K × K) diagonal positive semidefinite matrix whose trace equals one.
Intuitively, W is a weighting vector that measures the relative importance of each country
in the donor pool13 and V measures the relative importance of each covariate and the
outcome variable.
It is standard practice to estimate the root mean square prediction error (RMSPE)
as a goodness of fit measure to evaluate the discrepancy between treated and synthetic
control outcomes, i.e. how good the first part of equation 3.3 holds. RMSPE is defined as
RMSPE =
[
1
T0
T0∑
t=1
(
Y1,t −
J+1∑
j=2
wˆjYj,t
)2] 1
2
(3.6)
While the choice of the covariates (Zi) can be justified by including those variables
which better explain the outcome (Yi) the choice of the inclusion of the pre-treatment
outcome variable can influence V and the RMSPE. Abadie et al. (2010) propose to include
all pre-treatment outcome variables, however, this approach was criticised by Kaul et al.
(2018) showing that the inclusion of all pre-treatment outcome variables overshadows all
other covariates. Following, Ferman et al. (2016) the preferred specification is the one
with the lowest pre-treatment RMSPE. I tested for different combinations of included
outcome variables and on average the lowest RMSPE is achieved if the average of the
outcome variable is included (see table B 3 in appendix B). In the main specification, I
include always the pre-treatment average of the outcome variable to construct the synthetic
control country.
So far, the SCM estimator considered in equation 3.4 only deals with the single treat-
ment case but this approach can be extended to allow for multiple treatment countries
(Cavallo et al., 2013). With multiple treatment countries, assume that there are G ∈ N
interventions. For each intervention g ∈ {1, . . . , G}, there are Jg + 1 observed countries
and denote the country with the intervention as 1g. In the same manner as in equation
3.4 define the synthetic control estimator of α1g ,t as
αˆ1g ,t =
∑G
g=1 αˆ1g ,t
G
(3.7)
13Donor pool refers to the set of potential control countries, which are used to construct the synthetic
control country (Abadie et al., 2010).
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for each t ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
Intuitively, the extension for multiple treatment countries means that first a synthetic
control country is created for each treatment country out of the donor pool. Second,
results are derived from the difference between treatment and synthetic control country
for each treatment country. Finally, the results are pooled together to calculate the average
treatment effect for each post-treatment period (T0 + 1, . . . , T ).
The explained procedure results in a scaling effect because SCM compares the path of
the outcome variable. The country-specific effect will depend on the level of the outcome
variable, i.e. the same change in total tax per capita is more important in a country
with low total tax per capita. To avoid this scale effect, Cavallo et al. (2013) proposes
to normalize the estimates before pooling the country-specific results. Normalization is
achieved by setting total tax per capita equal to one for each treatment country in the
year before the treatment starts (T0).
3.3.3 Inference
Standard errors in common regression techniques usually measure uncertainty about ag-
gregate data. SCM uses aggregate data, hence, uncertainty about them would be 0.
However, other forms of uncertainty occur when using aggregate data. Uncertainty in the
SCM is derived from ignorance about the synthetic control country’s ability to replicate
the treatment country in the absence of the treatment. To establish statistical inference
Cavallo et al. (2013) proposes to estimate p-values with a procedure similar to permutation
tests. These methods allow for valid inference also in settings with few control countries
and pre-treatment periods.14 The idea is to estimate placebo effects and rank them to
analyse whether the effect is relatively large compared to a randomly assigned effect. The
placebos are derived from estimating the effect for each untreated country (from the donor
pool) treating each as if treatment occurred.
The p-values are estimated for each time period according to the following procedure
(Cavallo et al., 2013; Firpo and Possebom, 2015):
1. For each intervention g ∈ {1, . . . , G}, define which country is assumed to be treated
and estimate for each of its control countries an individual placebo effect, αjg ,t as
described in equation 3.4, where jg ∈ {2, . . . , Jg + 1}.
2. At each post-treatment period, compute every possible placebo average effect by
picking a single individual placebo effect, αjg ,t, from each intervention g and then
14Nevertheless, confidence increases with N →∞ and/or T →∞.
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taking the average across the G placebos, ¯ˆαq,t =
∑G
g=1 αˆJ˜g,t
G , where q indexes placebo
estimations and j˜g ∈ {2, . . . , Jg+1}. There are many possible placebo averages given
by Q :=
∏G
g=1 J
g and the number quickly grows with G.
3. Rank all placebo average effects and compare in the resulting distribution which rank
the actual treatment effect has for each post-treatment period t ∈ {T0 + 1, . . . , T}.
4. Finally, compute the p-value, pt =
∑Q
q=1 I[| ¯ˆαq,t|≥| ¯ˆα1,t|]
Q for each t ∈ {T0 + 1, . . . , T}
which shows the probability that the actual treatment effect would have been ob-
served by chance (Cavallo et al., 2013; Firpo and Possebom, 2015).
3.3.4 Identifying Assumptions
The main assumption of the SCM is the ‘independence conditional on past outcome’
assumption meaning that the weighted average of the control countries replicates the
treatment country in the pre-treatment period and behave in the post-treatment period
the same way as the treatment country would have in the absence of the treatment (Firpo
and Possebom, 2015). For this to be true certain assumptions must be made in this setting
which will be explained here.
First, it has to be established that the event affects only the treatment countries but
not the donor pool or that the event affects all countries the same way with the exception
of one mechanism. For policy changes this assumption is easier to defend than in the case
of the 2000s commodity price boom because all countries in the world are affected by the
price boom in one way or another. While only some countries produce oil or minerals, all
countries in the world consume them. Therefore, the identification in this chapter rests
on the second part of the assumption, namely that the effect is everywhere the same with
one exceptional mechanism.
The exceptional mechanism is that the government in resource exporting countries
receive more revenues, which it can use to lower taxes in the non-resource sector. This
mechanism, called here ‘resource transfer’, connects the resource sector with the non-
resource sector through the government and does not exist in non-resource producing
countries because they do not possess a resource sector. Therefore, the strategy is that
by comparing a resource exporting country with a synthetic control country, constructed
out of non-resource producing countries, it is possible to capture the ‘resource transfer’
mechanism.
Let’s assume two countries, a resource exporting country and a non-resource producing
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country. The whole economy in a non-resource producing country consists of a single non-
resource sector and the government. Government and economy interact through taxes,
regulations, laws, etc. The economy of the resource exporting country can be divided into
government, non-resource sector and resource sector. Again, resource and non-resource
sectors interact with the government through taxes, laws, regulations, etc. Hence, the
only difference is the existence of a resource sector in one of the two countries.
A positive price shock now, as it occurred in the 2000s, has several indications for the
two countries. First, the non-resource sector in both countries have to pay a higher price
for the resource, which leads to additional revenues for the resource sector. In turn, the re-
source sector payments to the government in form of taxes, royalties or production sharing
agreements increase. This additional government income can now be re-distributed to the
non-resource sector by the government in the form of lower taxes or increased spending.
Without this ‘resource transfer’ mechanism the impact in the non-resource sector; higher
price, inflation, and less economic growth would be the same in both countries because
both non-resource sectors must pay higher prices for the resources. The only difference
is the ‘resource transfer’ mechanism which only occurs in the resource exporting coun-
try. The analysis, therefore, compares the non-resource sector of a resource exporting
country with a synthetic control non-resource sector. The synthetic control non-resource
sector is constructed out of a weighted average of non-resource sectors and government
characteristics from a donor pool of non-resource producing countries.
The ‘resource transfer’ mechanism consists of all the possibilities a government faces
when confronted with additional income from a positive price shock. This means they can
use it to spend on public goods, save it, steal it, and finally substitute it for non-resource
taxes. The latter is the mechanism of interest in this chapter and controls are included
for the remaining channels in all specifications.
For the ‘independence conditional on past outcome’ assumption to hold I have to as-
sume that non-resource sectors in non-resource producing countries are affected in the
same way as the non-resource sector in the resource exporting country and the only dif-
ference is the ‘resource transfer’ mechanism through the government. This further implies
that spillovers between resource sector and non-resource sector do not exist or are neg-
ligible. This is important to ensure that the only mechanism captured by SCM is the
‘resource transfer’ mechanism. In the case of oil exporting countries this assumption is
reasonable. The ‘enclave’ character of the oil industry in combination with it’s high cap-
ital intensity fosters only few linkages to the rest of the economy and contributes little
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to create employment (Karl, 2007). For mineral and precious mineral exporters, the as-
sumption is most likely to be violated because mining can be labour intensive. This has
to be considered when analysing the results and could potentially be the reason for the
zero results for mineral and precious mineral exporters.
Finally, two further assumptions must hold. The first is that the effect is everywhere
the same, which is given for each resource type because the resource price increased every-
where the same. Second, spillovers between countries in the outcome variable do not exist.
Countries usually are in competition and tax policy can be a determinant for a company on
where to settle. However, this tax competition is more prone between resource poor coun-
tries. Nevertheless, if resource-rich countries’ tax policies influence non-resource producing
countries this would minimize the estimates because the effect is defined as the difference
between resource exporters and non-resource producers. If this biases the results the true
effect would be greater than what is estimated here.
3.4 Sample, data and descriptive statistics
3.4.1 Treatment countries and donor pool
The treatment group includes countries who are net resource exporter and produce a
significant amount of resources before the 2000s commodity price boom. The treatment
countries have to be net exporters because selling the commodity domestically would
not qualify as an external windfall following the rentier state theory (Beblawi, 1990).
Countries are categorised according to their main exported commodity: oil, minerals or
precious minerals. Further, they have to produce a significant amount of resources before
the event to be sure that they are affected by the price boom. Significant amount is defined
by producing economic rents from natural resources exceeding 5% of GDP on average in
the pre-treatment period.
Including all net exporting countries producing at least 5% of resource rents on average
10 years prior to the commodity price boom leaves 38 treatment countries. 13 of those
countries had to be excluded because of missing total tax p.c. data15 or because no
combination of control countries could match the treatment country in the pre-treatment
period.16 Of the 25 remaining treatment countries 19 are oil producers, 3 are precious
mineral producers and 3 are other mineral producers (see table 3.1).
15Countries with missing tax data: Russia, Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Surin-
ame, Congo, and Liberia.
16This was the case for Iran, Republic of the Congo, Angola, and Nigeria
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Table 3.1: Treatment countries
Country Res. rent Commodity non-res. tax
p.c. (US$)
Algeria 9.56% Oil 410.34
Azerbaijan 14.78% Oil 163.82
Brunei 18.57% Oil 1057.84
Cameroon 5.67% Oil 85.72
Chile 6.12% Mineral 1422.57
Ecuador 5.77% Oil 242.98
Egypt 8.79% Oil 210.75
Gabon 27.66% Oil 1228.42
Guinea 5.32% Mineral 31.66
Guyana 7.19% Pr. mineral 361.15
Indonesia 5.93% Oil 171.85
Kazakhstan 7.52% Oil 461.41
Kuwait 29.55% Oil 357.60
Libya 22.66% Oil 713.79
Malaysia 5.05% Oil 883.76
Mauritania 8.28% Mineral 120.07
Mongolia 8.79% Pr. mineral 298.58
Norway 5.20% Oil 21529.50
Papua New Guinea 20.16% Pr. mineral 197.82
Saudi Arabia 27.46% Oil 354.82
Syria 19.60% Oil 256.77
Trinidad and Tobago 10.29% Oil 1231.03
Turkmenistan 33.68% Oil 115.75
Venezuela 15.06% Oil 622.64
Yemen 23.59% Oil 75.43
Notes: Resource rent is in percent of GDP, non-resource tax per capita is in constant 2010 US$, values
are averages for the pre-treatment period (1989-1998 for oil and precious mineral producer and 1994-2003
for mineral producer).
The pre-treatment period includes, wherever possible, all 10 years prior to the price
boom. Because of data issues (gaps) and idiosyncratic shocks (e.g. Arab spring and/or
civil war) the pre- and post-treatment period had to be adjusted or missing data has been
interpolated for some treatment countries. Table B 4 in appendix B lists all adjustments.
Each treatment country has an individually assigned donor pool. For a country to be
eligible to be part of one or more donor pools it has to be from the same region and a
non-resource producer.
Restricting each country to the same region ensures that countries have a similar
background and are more similar to each other in economic and cultural aspects. This also
avoids interpolation bias which occurs when two extreme countries average out to match
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the treatment country resulting in the possibility that observed effects simply represents
differences in the countries’ characteristics (Abadie et al., 2015). The region restriction
had to be lifted for Gabon and Libya. Otherwise, the pre-treatment fit would not have
allowed to include them in the analysis. To ensure that this exception does not drive the
results I conducted a robustness check excluding Gabon and Libya from the analysis and
the results survive (see section 3.6).
Donor pool countries have to be non-resource producers to comply with the model as
explained in section 3.3.4. Because there are only few countries in the world producing
no resources the definition is adjusted to be relative to the economic size of a country.
Non-resource producers are defined as countries generating resource rents less than 1%
of GDP to make sure that the amount is negligible and does not represent an important
source of government revenues. Donor pools and weights for each treatment country can
be seen in table B 5 in appendix B.
3.4.2 Data
The dependent variable, total tax p.c., measures total non-resource per capita taxes17
and is derived from the Government Revenue Dataset (GRD), which was created by the
International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD). GRD provides information about
government revenues and its components for most countries of the world for the time
period 1980 to 2015 as percentage of GDP (Prichard et al., 2014).
The main advantage of the GRD data is that they distinguish between revenues and
taxes generated from the resource sector and revenues derived from the remaining economy.
Without this distinction, the analysis would be flawed by the fact that resource extracting
companies also pay taxes to the government.
The GRD data are stated in percentage of GDP and to obtain the per capita values
the variables were multiplied by GDP figures from the World Economic Outlook measured
in constant 2010 US$18 and divided by population data from the World Development
Indicators.19 Total tax p.c. ranges within the treatment countries from less than US$ 100
in Cameroon, Guinea and Yemen to over US$ 21,000 in Norway (Table 3.1). Norway is an
outlier considering that total tax p.c. is 15 times higher than the second highest observed
17Excluding social contribution.
18The World Economic Outlook does not directly provide GDP in constant US$. I followed the proposed
way by the WEO to calculate the GDP in constant US$ series (https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/weo/faq.htm#q3a)
19WEO also provides population data but WDI are preferred over WEO because they are more precise
and cover more countries and years. The exception is Kuwait in 1994 where WEO data are available but
WDI population data are missing.
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total tax p.c. (Chile, over US$ 1,400). Because of Norway’s extreme value a robustness
check was carried out excluding Norway from all specifications in section 3.6.
The predictor variable chosen to construct the synthetic control countries are derived
from the identifying assumption explained in section 3.3.4. The first variable is the average
of the non-resource total tax p.c. in the pre-treatment period. The average of the outcome
variable rather than a combination of lags was chosen because it resulted in the lowest
pre-treatment RMSPE (see appendix B table B 3). The second variable is non-resource
GDP p.c., which ensures that the non-resource sectors in the treatment and synthetic
control country are of similar size. The third set of variables consists of all alternatives a
government faces when confronted with additional resource income. They include govern-
ment spending measured as capital formation and current government expenditure as well
as reserves in case the government saves the money and corruption to control for stolen
funds. Definition and source of each variable used is provided in the appendix table B 6
and table B 7 shows summary statistics for the whole sample.
Comparing the treatment countries with non-resource producing countries shows that
they are on average of a different nature. Table 3.2 shows descriptive statistics comparing
treatment countries with non-resource producers. The t-statistic shows that citizens in
resource exporting countries pay fewer total tax per capita and have a lower non-resource
GDP. The resource exporters have a higher capital formation and are more corrupt, while
they receive significantly less ODA and are more autocratic. There is no significant dif-
ference in terms of government expenditure, reserves, agriculture and inflation.
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics
Non-resource Resource Diff. t-stats p-value
producers exporters
Total tax p.c. 2779.16 907.68 1871.47 5.715 0.000
Non-res. GDP p.c. 8237.46 4083.92 4153.53 5.107 0.000
Gov. Expenditure 16.50 16.36 0.13 0.254 0.800
Capital formation 21.95 24.27 −2.32 −3.576 0.000
Reserves 13.91 14.10 −0.19 −0.166 0.868
Corruption 0.26 −0.36 0.62 4.766 0.000
Agriculture 15.76 16.19 −0.43 −0.419 0.676
ODA 9.66 4.23 5.43 4.724 0.000
Inflation 43.78 78.29 −34.51 −1.490 0.137
Polilty2 4.42 −0.96 5.38 10.605 0.000
Notes: Means calculated for 10 years prior to the 2000s commodity price boom. Government expenditure,
capital formation, reserves, agriculture, and ODA is measured in percent of GDP.
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3.5 Results
Figure 3.8 shows the results for the synthetic control method. Each line represents one
country and shows the difference in non-resource total tax p.c. between treatment and
synthetic control country over time. The differences are scaled to 0 in the year prior
to the treatment (lead 0) and the vertical line at lead 1 indicates the start year of the
commodity price boom, 1999 for oil and precious mineral exporters and 2004 for mineral
exporters.
Figure 3.8: Synthetic control method, all countries
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The vast amount of lines in figure 3.8 makes it almost impossible to identify a single
country but by laying all countries into one figure it is still possible to derive some inform-
ation. The first indicative result is that more countries have a negative effect, i.e. total
tax p.c. decreased because of the commodity price boom. The second indicative result
is that the effect is heterogeneous. There are as many countries with seemingly no effect
as there are with a negative effect and even a few countries seem to have increased taxes,
which would be the opposite of a crowding-out effect. The biggest effect is even positive
in Azerbaijan.
The indicative results are that governments extract on average less tax from the non-
resource sector when more funds are available from the resource sector due to a positive
price shock and that this effect is heterogeneous.
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Average treatment effect
The first indicative result derived from figure 3.8, the existence of a negative average
treatment effect, is confirmed in figure 3.9 (left panel). Figure 3.9 shows average total tax
p.c. for the 25 resource exporters and the corresponding synthetic control. The resource
exporters and its synthetic counterfactual overlap well in the pre-treatment period (lead
-10 to 0) and start to diverge in the post-treatment period. Again lead 1 indicates the
first post-treatment year, 1999 for oil and precious mineral exporters and 2004 for mineral
exporters. For the whole post-treatment period, total tax p.c. is higher in the synthetic
control country. This synthetic control country represents the total tax p.c. for resource
exporting countries in the absence of the 2000s commodity price boom. On average total
tax p.c. is 11% lower in resource exporting countries. The difference is significant at
conventional level for all years after the event start, except for year 1 (Figure 3.9, right
panel).
Figure 3.9: Synthetic control estimates, resource exporting countries
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The first indicative result from figure 3.8, negative average treatment effect, is therefore
confirmed in the data and in line with the existing literature finding a crowding-out effect
(Bornhorst et al., 2009; Crivelli and Gupta, 2014; Thomas and Trevin˜o, 2013). The second
indicative result, that the effect is heterogeneous, will be discussed and analysed further
below.
Resource type
To analyse possible heterogeneity, I start by separating the three resource types: oil,
minerals, and precious minerals. The literature associates different outcomes to different
resources (Andersen and Aslaksen, 2013; Isham, 2005; Ross, 2015). One reason oil could
influence total tax p.c. in a different way than minerals or precious minerals is that
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the latter two have more forward and backward linkages with the remaining economy.
Minerals and precious minerals are labour-intensive industries and require more low-skilled
labour, while oil is a capital-intensive industry with the need of advanced technology and
few but skilled workers (Karl, 2007). Another reason could be that economic rents are
higher in the oil sector and that on average governments are better capable to extract a
higher percentage share from an oil well than from a mineral mine. For a mining project
governments commonly retain 40-60% of revenues while this share is around 65-85% for
an oil project (IMF, 2012a). The higher share of revenues and rents can then be used to
substitute resource revenues for non-resource taxes.
Figure 3.10 shows the results for the 19 oil exporting countries in the sample. Total
tax p.c. is lower for the whole treatment period for this sub-sample compared to their
synthetic counterpart. Tax revenues seem to fall straight after the price boom started,
but the downward trend is reversed after two years and total tax p.c. starts to recover. In
the year 2000 total tax p.c. is 13% lower than it was in 1998 and 17% lower than in the
synthetic control country in the same year.20 It takes overall six years for the oil exporting
countries to get back to their initial 1998 level of total tax p.c. and by this time, they
still lack 13% behind the synthetic control country. The p-values indicate that the effect
is significant with the exception 11-12 years after the event started, which corresponds to
the years 2009-2010 and the start of the Great Recession.
Figure 3.10: Synthetic control estimates, oil exporting countries
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The results for mineral and precious mineral exporting countries are different. There
seems to be no difference between mineral exporting countries and the synthetic control
country in the pre- and post-treatment period (Figure 3.11). Precious mineral exporting
countries, on the other side, are faced with a total tax p.c. increasing effect at the beginning
20Predicted values for the synthetic control and actual values for each sub-sample and year are shown
in table B 8 in appendix B and table 3.4 discussed below shows the difference in percentage terms.
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of the commodity price boom until 2005 (Figure 3.12). However, for both sub-samples the
p-values indicate a high probability that anything observed occurred by chance. There
seems to be no significant effect for mineral or precious mineral producers.
Figure 3.11: Synthetic control estimates, mineral exporting countries
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Figure 3.12: Synthetic control estimates, precious mineral exporting countries
.8
.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
.8
.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
to
ta
l t
ax
 p
.c
. (n
orm
ali
ze
d t
o 1
 in
 19
89
)
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
year
precious mineral exporters synthetic control
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
th
at
 th
is 
wo
ul
d 
ha
pp
en
 b
y 
ch
an
ce
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Number of years after event (1=1999)
Summarizing the results for different resources shows that the commodity price boom
decreased total tax p.c. in oil exporting countries but not in other resource exporting
countries. The non-effect for mineral and precious mineral exporters could be driven by
the small sample size of only three countries in each sub-sample. A deeper look at each
individual country, however, confirms that there is no effect (see figure B.2 and figure B.3
in appendix B). From this point on forward, I focus on oil exporting countries.
Continuing with the effect on oil exporters, I next split the sample according to in-
stitutions, ownership structure of the oil sector, oil tax to oil non-tax ratio, and resource
dependency of the state budget. See table 3.3 for an overview which oil exporting country
belongs to which category. The classification is according to 1998 values, the year before
the oil boom started.
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Table 3.3: Oil exporting treatment countries
Country non-res. Polity2 Owner- Oil de- tax to non-
tax p.c. ship pendency tax ratio
Algeria 396 -3 State High Non-tax
Azerbaijan 144 -7 State Medium Non-tax
Brunei 1007 . State High Tax
Cameroon 106 -4 Private Medium Non-tax
Ecuador 288 9 State . Non-tax
Egypt 231 -6 State Medium Non-tax
Gabon 1718 -4 Private High Tax
Indonesia 182 -5 State Medium Tax
Kazakhstan 609 -4 Private . Tax
Kuwait 583 -7 State High Non-tax
Libya 746 -7 State High Non-tax
Malaysia 904 3 State Low Tax
Norway 23300 10 State Low Tax
Saudi Arabia 416 -10 State High Non-tax
Syria 261 -9 State High Non-tax
Trinidad and Tobago 1730 10 Private Low Tax
Turkmenistan 132 -9 State Low Tax
Venezuela 1024 8 State Medium Tax
Yemen 100 -2 Private High Non-tax
Notes: Values are measured in 1998, the year prior to the event. Non-resource total tax p.c. is measured
in constant 2010 US$ from GRD dataset. Polity2 is the polity index from Marshall and Jaggers (2014). Oil
dependency measures the percentage share of government revenues derived from the oil sector (low<20%,
medium 20-40%, high>40%). Tax to non-ratio measures oil tax revenues divided by oil non-tax revenues
(Tax is a ratio>1, non-tax is a ratio<1).
Institutions
Some scholars claim that the adverse effects of natural resources on economic and polit-
ical outcomes are conditional on the level of institutional quality (Bhattacharyya and
Hodler, 2010; Bhattacharyya and Collier, 2014; Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et al.,
2006). Therefore, it is worthwhile to explore this potential source of heterogeneity. To
test for conditionality I use the Polity2 score from Marshall et al. (2013) which measures
democracy on a 21 points scale ranging from -10 (autocratic institutions) to +10 (demo-
cratic institutions). I split the sample into democratic countries (Polity2: +4 - +10),
intermediate countries (Polity2: -3 - +3) and autocratic countries (Polity2: -4 - -10).
Figure 3.13 shows that the oil price boom did not influence total tax p.c. in democratic
countries. Democratic oil exporting countries follow the same path as their synthetic
counterpart in the pre- and post-treatment period. Differences between democratic oil
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exporters and synthetic control are likely to happen by chance, most p-values are above
conventional levels for the whole treatment period.
Figure 3.13: Synthetic control estimates, democratic oil exporting countries
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Countries with an intermediate level of institutional quality (Polity2 score between -3
and +3) show mixed results. In figure 3.14, the synthetic control estimates for intermediate
countries seem to indicate a total tax p.c. decreasing effect and in the years 1-2 and 7-10
the p-values also indicate that this effect is significant. However, for the remaining years
the effect is insignificant.
Figure 3.14: Synthetic control estimates, intermediate oil exporting countries
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The case for autocratic countries is clearer. Figure 3.15 shows the result and the total
tax p.c. decreasing effect is significant at conventional levels in all years except for year 9-
11 after the event (Great Recession). On average autocratic oil exporting countries collect
16% less total tax p.c. than their synthetic counterparts.
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Figure 3.15: Synthetic control estimates, autocratic oil exporting countries
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The heterogeneous results for countries with different levels of institutional quality
could be explained by Garcia’s argument that democratic institutions are more expensive
(Garcia and von Haldenwang, 2015). Participation, redistribution and more public goods
require more funds and therefore the 2000s oil price boom perhaps was not enough to
decrease non-resource total tax p.c. in democracies. Further, the results support the
argument of a conditional resource curse21 and under this condition confirms the ‘tax
effect’ argument from Mahdavy (1970) and Ross (2015).
Ownership structure
The ownership structure of the resource sector could also influence taxation of the re-
maining economy. A private resource sector needs a sophisticated tax administration to
extract a fair share. This resource division within the tax administration could have posit-
ive spillovers on the rest of the tax administration. The positive spillovers could lead to a
more efficient tax administration and to more tax income (Knebelmann, 2017). A nation-
alized resource sector, on the other hand, is often organized under the direct authority of
the leader or in a form that the leader has access to its funds. The easy access to resource
revenues could lead the government to neglect income from the remaining economy and
reduce taxation.
Figure 3.16 shows the results for countries with a private organized oil sector. Overall
a total tax p.c. decreasing effect can be observed. However, the effect starts small and
becomes stronger after 6-7 years. From 1999 till 2004 the difference is on average 12% and
from 2005 till 2012 the oil exporting countries collect on average 40% less total tax p.c.
compared to their synthetic counterparts.
21see Liou and Musgrave (2014) for an overview of conditionalist resouce curse research.
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Figure 3.16: Synthetic control estimates, private oil sector
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The results for countries with nationalised oil sector show a smaller and partly less
significant effect (see figure 3.17). After 9 years the effect is not significant anymore. In
the remaining years countries with nationalised oil sector collected on average 10% less
total tax p.c. than their synthetic counterparts.
Figure 3.17: Synthetic control estimates, nationalised oil sector
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The results for private- and state-owned oil sectors are indicative that governments
intending to extract more revenues from a private oil company faces more challenges and
longer negotiation time to increase their share of the resource revenues, which then can be
used to substitute for non-resource taxes. Countries with nationalised oil sector benefit
immediately but to a lesser extent.
Fiscal instruments
Another form of government preferences that may influence the relationship between oil
revenues and total tax p.c. could be the instruments chosen to extract revenues from the
resource sector. To test for this possible source of heterogeneity I construct a tax to non-
tax ratio for each oil exporter in the year before the event. A ratio smaller one indicates
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that the government extracts more revenues with non-tax instruments while governments
with a ratio greater than one use more tax instruments.
The effect in non-tax countries (tax to non-tax ratio < 1) is small and mostly insigni-
ficant (Figure 3.18). While tax countries (tax to non-tax ratio > 1) have a total tax p.c.
reducing effect, significant at conventional level for all years (Figure 3.19). On average tax
countries collect 21% less tax than the synthetic control.
Figure 3.18: Synthetic control estimate, tax to non-tax ratio<1
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Figure 3.19: Synthetic control estimate, tax to non-tax ratio>1
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The heterogeneity between tax and non-tax countries could be driven by the fact that
tax countries collect on average more taxes (US$ 913)22 compared to non-tax countries
(US$ 327). The higher tax income gives tax countries more room to reduce taxes while
non-tax countries’ possibilities are already exhausted, eventually because they never build
them.
22Excluding Norway, with Norway average non-resource tax per capita would be US$ 3400.
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Resource dependency
A last type of heterogeneity is the level of resource dependency of the state budget. Re-
source dependency is also an inverse proxy for tax effort, i.e. more reliance on resource
revenues implies less effort in the non-resource sector. The sample is divided into three
categories according to the percentage share of resource revenues of total government rev-
enues in the year prior to the event. Countries are categorised as low resource dependent if
less than 20% of government revenues are collected from the resource sector, resource rev-
enues for medium-dependent countries range from 20-40% of total government revenues,
and high-dependent countries collect more than 40% of total revenues from the resource
sector.
Figure 3.20 and figure 3.21 show results for low and medium dependent countries.
For most years the estimates are insignificant. Note that for the first time oil exporting
countries have a higher total tax per capita in the case of medium-dependent countries
even if significant in only a few years.
Figure 3.20: Synthetic control estimate, low oil dependence (less than 20%)
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Figure 3.21: Synthetic control estimate, medium oil dependency (20-40%)
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Figure 3.22 shows the result for high-dependent oil exporting countries. Countries
with a state budget deriving more than 40% of its funds from the resource sector show a
negative effect, i.e. total tax p.c. is on average 26% lower in oil exporting countries due
to the 2000s oil price boom.
Figure 3.22: Synthetic control estimate, high oil dependency (more than 40%)
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The results of the heterogeneity analysis seem to indicate that autocratic countries
with a focus on tax revenues or a high share of resource revenues in the state budget
are confronted with a crowding-out effect. Total tax p.c. is lower in those oil exporting
countries because of a positive resource income shock.
The size of the crowding-out effect
Finally, I analyse the size of the crowding-out effect in monetary terms. Table 3.4 shows
the percentage and absolute difference between treatment and synthetic control countries
for each significant sub-sample.23 The synthetic control country is chosen as base in each
year and the percentage difference shows how many percent the treatment countries’ total
tax p.c. is higher or lower than total tax p.c. of the synthetic control. Differences shown
in US$ are the corresponding values to the percentage differences of total tax p.c. of the
treated minus total tax p.c. of the synthetic control country.
Column (1) and (2), shows the results for all oil exporting countries and corresponds
to the results shown in figure 3.10. On average, individuals and companies in oil exporting
countries paid 14% less tax each year or US$ 316 per capita. For example, Saudi Arabia
with an average population of 24.4 million loses on average US$ 7.7 bn each year. This is
only US$ 1.55 bn short of what the Saudi’s government expects to generate from the 5%
VAT introduced in 2018.
23The significant sub-samples are all, autocratic, private, state, tax to non-tax ratio > 1 and highly
resource dependent oil exporting countries.
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The sub-sample of autocratic countries (column (3) and (4)) shows a smaller absolute
effect but bigger percentage difference. The synthetic control countries collect on average
US$ 114 (16%) more in total tax p.c. than the actual autocratic oil exporting countries.
For example, Cameroon, and Syria both with similar population size (17.8 and 18.7 mil-
lion, respectively) lose US$ 2.0 bn and US$ 2.1 bn on average each year. Comparing oil
exporting countries with private or state organized oil sector shows that the overall effect
is greater for countries with private oil sector, US$ 372 against US$ 257 respectively.
The biggest effect can be seen for countries with a tax to non-tax ratio greater than
one. Those are countries focusing more on tax instruments to extract money from the
resource sector than on non-tax instruments. Overall, individuals and companies in those
countries pay on average US$ 938 less in total tax p.c. due to the oil price boom.
Concluding, the average yearly increase in oil price of 14% from 1999 to 2012 reduced
total tax per capita on average between US$ 110 and US$ 940 per capita depending on
the sub-sample.
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3.6 Robustness checks
I conduct a battery of robustness checks dealing with Saudi Arabia, Norway, Gabon, Libya
and additional predictor variables.
I start by excluding Saudi Arabia from the specifications. As discussed in section 3.2,
Saudi Arabia is a swing producer and may have enough market power to influence the oil
price. If Saudi Arabia changed oil production in the considered time period influencing
the 2000s oil price boom this would lead to endogeneity. Results for the synthetic control
estimates excluding Saudi Arabia are shown in figure B.4 in appendix B. Overall the effect
becomes slightly smaller but the patterns and significance stays the same.
A further robustness check is conducted by excluding Libya and Gabon. As mentioned
in section 3.4 the construction of the synthetic control countries was only possible for
Gabon and Libya by ignoring the region restriction. Therefore, the donor pool consists for
those two countries out of all non-resource producer in the world. To ensure that Gabon
and Libya are not driving the results I test the main specifications excluding Gabon and
Libya. Results for the synthetic control estimates excluding Libya and Gabon are shown
in figure B.6 in appendix B and effects observed in the main specifications survive.
Next, I include further predictor variables to construct the synthetic control. So far
the analysis only included the variables derived from the identifying assumption: total tax
p.c., non-resource GDP, public expenditure, capital formation, reserves and corruption.
These variables cover all the areas of what the government can do with the additional funds
derived from the price boom and ensures that the non-resource economy is of the same
size. However, other variables could determine how much tax the government can extract
from the non-resource sector such as the sectoral composition, foreign aid, or inflation. For
this reason, I include (value added) agriculture and ODA, both measured as percentage of
non-resource GDP and inflation successively and combined. Figure B.8 in the appendix
shows the results, which remain robust.
Finally, I run a last robustness check excluding Norway from the sample. The fact
that Norway’s total tax p.c. is 15 times higher than the second highest total tax p.c. in
the sample unfolds the question whether Norway is driving the results. Figure B.9 in the
appendix presents robust results.
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3.7 New producers
In this section, I will discuss five case studies of non-resource producing countries who dis-
covered oil and started extraction between 1980 and 2015. Contrary to the main analysis,
which focused on established resource exporters, here the focus is on new producers and
provides relevant information for future oil producers.
The five new producers and their treatment start years are: Vietnam (1989), Equatorial
Guinea (1993), Sudan (1999), Chad (2003) and East Timor (2004). Figure 3.23 shows oil
income generated in each of the five countries. Most countries produced oil already before
the treatment, but oil rents never exceeded 1% of GDP and played an insignificant role
in the economy. Treatment is therefore defined from the year in which oil rents start to
exceed 1% of GDP.
Figure 3.23: Oil income, new producers
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A few notes on identification and methodology is appropriate for this new setting.
First, it should be noted that the timing of oil production start is not exogenous. This is
because a country’s fiscal regime influences the decision of oil companies to start extraction,
delay it or not to produce at all. Therefore, the results can only be seen as a correlation.
Second, the countries started to produce at different times, which makes data availability
an issue. For example, Vietnam started oil extraction in 1989 and is lacking data on
corruption, reserves and government expenditure. To make the most out of the limited
data I included all possible control variables to construct the synthetic control. They
include the main control variables: non-resource GDP, government expenditure, capital
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formation, reserves and corruption as well as the additional predictor agriculture, ODA
and inflation. Variables and weights are shown in table B 9 in the appendix. Third, p-
values should not be taken at face value with only one treatment country. This is because
the iteration procedure used to calculate p-values compares the effect of the treatment
country with all possible placebo effects. The number of placebo effects depends on the
size of the donor pool, which is significantly smaller in the case of a single treated country.
The analysis follows the same pattern as outlined in section 3.3 following Abadie et al.
(2010) approach for a single treated country. First, different specifications are tested
with different combinations of the lagged outcome variables to construct the synthetic
control. Pre-treatment RMSPEs for each country and specification are shown in table
B 10 in appendix B. Second, the donor pool is chosen in the same manner as above,
including only non-resource producers from the same region. Third, a synthetic control
country is constructed and the difference between actual and counterfactual is analysed.
Post-treatment period is restricted to 10 years, except for Equatorial Guinea for which
pre-treatment is only three years and post-treatment period was downsized to five years.
The results for each new producer are shown in figure 3.24 and the difference between
treatment and synthetic control country in percent and US$ are shown in table 3.5. Viet-
nam, Sudan and Equatorial Guinea all show a total tax p.c. increase after oil extraction
took off compared to the synthetic control, while Chad and East Timor experienced a
negative effect.
Figure 3.24: Synthetic control estimate, new producers
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On average total tax p.c. is 287% higher in Vietnam during the ten years after oil
extraction started. This seems like a considerable effect in percentage terms but consider-
ing Vietnam’s low level of total tax p.c. (US$ 16) in the pre-treatment period this 287%
increase represent only US$ 53 on average.
Sudan’s initial total tax p.c. was US$ 71 in 1998 and since oil extraction took off in
1999 total tax p.c. increased to over US$ 124. On average Sudan’s actual total tax p.c. is
26% or US$ 20 per capita higher compared to the synthetic control.
Equatorial Guinea started with total tax p.c. of about US$ 59 in 1993. Since oil
extraction took off it is on average by 93% or US$ 66 higher compared to the synthetic
control.
Compared to the three new producers above, the effect is negative and a lot smaller
in Chad. On average total tax p.c. is 11% smaller in Chad compared to the synthetic
control, which represents a mere difference of about US$ 5.
Finally, the effect in East Timor is also negative with a lower average total tax p.c.
of 74%. However, considering the data limitation for East Timor this result should be
interpreted with caution.
Table 3.5: Absolute and percentage differences, New producers
Vietnam Sudan Eq. Guinea Chad East Timor
difference difference difference difference difference
T in % in US$ in % in US$ in % in US$ in % in US$ in % in US$
1 7.8% 1.17 -5.1% -4.00 6.1% 3.52 4.0% 1.51 -48.6% -57.35
2 14.1% 2.13 -15.2% -12.44 9.4% 5.13 -5.7% -2.23 -64.4% -81.06
3 182.9% 27.30 8.4% 6.24 -10.5% -6.73 -23.6% -10.22 -84.3% -122.20
4 263.3% 39.37 45.3% 25.68 13.4% 6.92 -32.9% -14.80 -83.5% -152.46
5 407.9% 62.89 26.3% 19.35 106.7% 66.67 -21.5% -10.15 -86.8% -182.33
6 413.4% 73.78 57.5% 45.82 112.0% 76.96 -26.5% -12.64
7 404.1% 81.06 51.5% 40.14 88.3% 62.71 -3.5% -1.63
8 440.4% 88.59 33.8% 28.53 117.1% 84.66 11.9% 5.63
9 407.6% 84.36 39.0% 36.20 226.3% 159.86 -9.2% -4.57
10 328.0% 67.42 17.9% 18.90 262.5% 204.80 -3.8% -1.95
Sum 528.07 204.42 664.51 -51.04 -595.39
Av. 287.0% 52.81 25.9% 20.44 93.1% 66.45 -11.1% -5.10 -73.5% -119.08
Notes: The table shows the difference in total tax per capita between actual and synthetic control country.
The synthetic control countries serve as base value and percentage differences are calculated accordingly.
Treatment starts in T=1: Vietnam (1989). Sudan (1999), Equatorial Guinea (1993), Chad (1992), East
Timor (2004)
87
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter uses a novel methodology to shed light on the question whether natural
resources crowd out non-resource tax revenues. The synthetic control method (SCM)
confirms the existence of a crowding-out effect and further provides evidence about country
characteristics that determine this effect. The average treatment effect shows that the
2000s commodity price boom decreased total tax p.c. in resource exporting countries by
around 11% compared to a scenario without a price boom. This is roughly a US$ 300
lower tax burden per capita.
Apart from the negative average treatment effect, the SCM also shows that the effect
differs according to resource type, institutional quality, government preferences in terms of
tax instruments, and resource dependency. The crowding-out effect could only be found
in oil exporting countries but not in mineral and precious mineral exporting countries.
Furthermore, the crowding-out effect was only observed in high oil dependent countries
with autocratic institutions and a preference of extracting funds from the oil sector through
tax instruments.
The crowding-out effect should be a concern for policy makers for several reasons.
Lower taxes increase the dependency on resource revenues which is a volatile income stream
impeding budget planning, non-fiscal objectives become more difficult to achieve, and
positive externalities from taxes such as transparency and better governance are averted.
However, the analysis also shows that the crowding-out effect is not a necessary path-
way for new oil producers. Five case studies for Vietnam, Sudan, East Timor, Equatorial
Guinea and Chad show that only two out of the five countries suffer from lower taxes while
the remaining countries averted the crowding-out effect and could even increase taxes after
they started to produce oil.
One caveat regarding the analysis should be mentioned here. SCM can only accompany
one treatment or commodity boom, which raises an issue regarding the assumption that
the treatment is the same in each treatment country. Some countries extract more than
one resource, for example Azerbaijan extracts apart from oil also iron ore, copper and
gold. Therefore, Azerbaijan faced two income shocks from 1999 onwards (oil and gold)
and another two from 2004 onwards (iron ore and copper). Countries are identified by
the main commodity they produce, and this resource should be the main contributor to
any observed effect. However, it is difficult to assign the whole effect to one particular
resource.
Future research could disentangle the tax data even further and analyse the effect on
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different tax types, e.g. income, VAT, property, direct, indirect, individual or company tax.
This is of particular interest because it can shed light into the behaviour of governments
in resource rich countries. The burden of different taxes is carried by different parts of the
population. Lower property tax, for example, benefits the elite while sales tax or VAT is
burdened by the entire population and proportionally affects more the poor.
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Chapter 4
Wasted windfalls: Inefficiencies in
health care spending in oil rich
countries
4.1 Introduction
Oil rich countries often underperform in economic and social development.1 For example,
Gabon, an oil rich upper middle-income country reached merely 64.5 years in terms of life
expectancy in 2013. This is 7.5 years below the average life expectancy in upper-middle
income countries in the same year. The discrepancy of Gabon is not an exceptional case
for oil rich countries. The mediocre performance is also true in Angola (11 years), Chad (7
years), Trinidad and Tobago (7 years) and Saudi Arabia (4 years). This chapter explores
one possible reason, namely that funds spend on health care are disproportionally wasted
in countries with high oil revenues.
The literature about natural resources usually focuses on the effect of oil on economic
growth. For a decade or two the common wisdom was that natural resources impede eco-
nomic growth (Isham, 2005; Sachs and Warner, 2001). Those findings have been challenged
lately (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Brunnschweiler, 2008; Cotet and Tsui, 2013b). A
smaller, but still essential literature is connecting natural resources with social develop-
ment and analyses the effect of natural resources on non-monetary well-being indicators,
such as education or health outcomes (e.g. Arezki and Gylfason (2013); Blanco and Grier
(2012); Carmignani (2013); Cotet and Tsui (2013b); Edwards (2016); Gylfason (2001)).
This chapter contributes to the literature connecting oil with social development by
1For an overview of this literature see Frankel (2010); van der Ploeg (2011); Ross (1999, 2015)
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estimating the effect of oil rents on inefficiency in the health care sector. Using stochastic
frontier analysis (SFA), I construct health production functions for 119 countries for the
period 2000-2015 and test whether oil rents are a determinant of inefficiency in the health
care sector. SFA estimates a frontier representing the maximum potential outcome a coun-
try could have achieved in terms of health output (life expectancy at birth) and compares
it with the actual health output, the difference is defined as inefficiency. I find that oil rich
countries have on average a lower level of efficiency than oil poor countries and that oil is a
significant determinant of this inefficiency partially explaining the underperformance of oil
rich countries while controlling for income. For example, Gabon has a technical efficiency
estimate of 0.82 and by eradicating inefficiency Gabon could increase life expectancy by
11 years, outperforming the average upper-middle income country by about 3.5 years.
The empirical literature finds mostly a negative effect of natural resources on health
outcomes. Edwards (2016) analyses the impact of mining on health and education out-
comes in up to 157 countries by instrumenting the size of the mining sector with the
geological variation in a country’s resource endowment and controlling for income, geo-
graphy and institutions. He finds a negative effect of the mining sector on life expectancy
and infant mortality. His results show that doubling the mining share of an economy
increases infant mortality on average by 20% and reduces life expectancy by about 5%.
Carmignani and Avom (2010) find a statistically significant negative effect of resource in-
tensity on social development in a sample of 87 countries for the period 1975-2005. Social
development is defined as an aggregate measure of life expectancy, immunization rate and
average year of schooling. Resource intensity is defined as ‘primary commodity exports
as percentage of total merchandise exports’. They use the instrumental variable approach
and dynamic panel estimators to confirm their hypothesis that primary commodities are
negatively correlated with social development. They further provide evidence that the
negative effect is due to inequality and macroeconomic volatility. Bulte et al. (2005) find
an indirect connection between point-source resources and development indicators. The
connection in their model is through institutional quality and they show that point-source
resources negatively affect institutional quality which in turn reduces social development
indicators such as the Human Development Index, undernourished population share, water
access, and life expectancy. Daniele (2011) analyses the relation between resource depend-
ence/abundance and social development (Human development index and child mortality).
He finds a negative correlation between resource dependence and social development but
finds a positive correlation for his resource abundance measure. The findings are robust
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particularly in countries with low levels of institutional quality.
There is also evidence that points in the opposite direction. Cotet and Tsui (2013b)
find a positive effect of oil on health. Exploiting the timing of oil discoveries and cross-
country variation in the size of initial oil endowments they find that oil increases life
expectancy and decreases infant mortality in the long run. They also find that the effect
is stronger in non-democratic countries.
I depart from the existing literature in several ways. First, I use stochastic frontier
analysis (SFA) and to the best of my knowledge this is the first study including oil rents
as an inefficiency determinant in SFA. The empirical techniques used in the literature
all assume that countries produce efficiently completely ignoring inefficiency. That in-
efficiency is present in the health care sector is well established (Greene, 2005a; Grigoli
and Kapsoli, 2013; Kapsoli and Teodoru, 2017; Ogloblin, 2011). Further, SFA uses in-
puts -public/private health care expenditure and education- to estimate the production
function, apart from education the empirical literature does not control for government
preferences in the form of health care expenditure. Second, I exploit exogenous variation
in oil rents due to fluctuations in the international oil price to establish causality. Third, I
conduct a heterogeneity analysis and test whether the effect is different across institutional
quality, sex and age. The latter two dimensions represent new results.
The identification strategy is similar to Smith (2016) and relies on the stochastic, often
unpredictable nature of price changes. I compare oil rents in boom, bust and valley years.
Boom years are defined as years in which the international oil price increases by at least
10% compared to the previous year and in bust years the oil price decreases by at least 10%.
Valley years are years with less than +/- 10% price fluctuation and serve as comparison
unit. The plausible exogenous variation of the international oil price can be exploited to
analyse unexpected changes in oil income in a country. A decrease in oil income should
force the government to save which in turn should increase inefficiency. Hence, a causal
relation should show up as greater inefficiency in bust years compared to valley years. The
effect in boom years is more ambiguous. An increase in the international oil price should
increase the state budget and increase funds available for the health care sector. More
investment should improve life expectancy but the effect on inefficiency could go either
way, depending on investment quality. Inefficiency could decrease if the additional funds
are invested efficiently but inefficiency could also increase if the additional funds are spent
in a wasteful or corrupt manner. Identification strategy and methodology are discussed in
section 4.2 and 4.3.
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The results indicate that oil is a significant determinant of inefficiency and explains
aside from other factors why life expectancy is lower in oil rich countries compared to
oil poor countries. For example, the average technical efficiency estimate of oil rich high-
income countries is 0.94 compared to 0.97 in oil poor countries in the same income group.
The potential gains in life expectancy from eradicating inefficiency in oil rich high-income
countries would be 5 years compared to only 2 years in oil poor high-income countries. The
boom-bust-valley year analysis shows that the effect is causal for the full sample running
from oil rents to inefficiency. The effect is also heterogeneous and stronger in democratic
countries compared to intermediate and autocratic countries and causality could only be
established in the democratic sub-sample, but not in the intermediate and autocratic sub-
sample. Further, the results are heterogeneous across sex and age. Women’s health is
more affected by oil than men’s and children suffer more than adults.
The results are robust to the exclusion of potential oil price setters, time lags and
different definitions of price shocks. The robustness checks are discussed in section 4.6.
Transparency and inequality are identified as potential channels through which oil
rents affect inefficiency in the health care sector. Oil rents incentivize the government to
be less transparent, so it is easier to use them for their own purposes, such as patronage
spending or stealing (Ross, 2011; Williams, 2011). Lower transparency increases the pos-
sibilities for officials to enrich themselves and spend the money with their own aims in
mind contributing to inefficiency. Inequality persists in oil rich countries because oil is a
point-source resource from which the elite benefits disproportionally more relative to the
rest of the population (Karl, 2007). Inequality impedes poor people from accessing health
care facilities and promotes the misallocation of funds contributing to inefficiency (Oglob-
lin, 2011). My analysis confirms that lower transparency and higher inequality lead to
higher inefficiency in the health care sector in democratic countries. The two mechanisms
are tested and discussed in section 4.7.
The chapter contributes to the literature about the resource curse, social development
and health care spending efficiency. Health represents human capital itself and is also
an input to produce other forms of human capital (Bleakley, 2010). Human capital con-
tributes to economic growth and an inefficient health care sector triggered by oil could
reduce human capital accumulation. Therefore, the analysis shows a way how natural
capital in the form of oil reduces human capital and in turn could slow down economic
growth. Further, the chapter contributes to the literature concerned with the determinants
of social development. The SFA analyses how a non-monetary well-being indicator −life
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expectancy− is affected by oil. Finally, the chapter contributes to the literature concerned
with efficiency in the health care sector. Health care expenditure contributes between 9-
10% to world GDP representing a significant part in most economies (Ortiz-Ospina and
Roser, 2018). Therefore, the scarce resources should be used in the most efficient way pos-
sible, because waste in this sector does not only affect economic indicators but everyone’s
life directly.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 outlines the identification strategy used
to test for a causal relationship between oil and inefficiency in the health care sector.
Section 4.3 explains the stochastic frontier approach and section 4.4 describes data and
descriptive statistics. Section 4.5 and 4.6 presents results and robustness checks. Section
4.7 discusses possible mechanisms and section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Identification Strategy
Identifying causality in an analysis concerned with natural resources is a major challenge.
It can be argued that any dependent variable could cause a change in oil production
or exploration efforts and is therefore vulnerable to reverse causality. For example, an
inefficient health care sector could be the reason to extract more resources to generate
more funds which in turn could be invested into the health care sector to improve life
expectancy through higher investments or efficiency improving investments.
To establish a causal relation running from oil rents to health care inefficiency it would
be necessary to exploit exogenous variation in oil income. Several strategies have been
proposed in the literature ranging from the timing of giant resource discoveries (Arezki
et al., 2017; Bhattacharyya et al., 2017; Cotet and Tsui, 2013a) over instrumenting past
reserves (Edwards, 2016) or price fluctuations due to natural disasters (Ramsay, 2011)
to price shocks (Smith, 2016). This chapter follows a strategy similar to Smith (2016)
exploiting price shocks during the 2000-2015 period. This period offers a wide range of
oil price changes which are plausibly exogenous. To define the price shocks as exogenous
it is necessary to establish that the shocks are orthogonal to country’s characteristics, i.e.
the oil producers did not influence the oil price shocks and did not anticipate it (Liou and
Musgrave, 2014).
From the beginning of the 2000s until 2008 the international oil price increased by
165% (see figure 4.1). The reasons for this boom are still discussed in the literature. The
main arguments include an increase in demand for oil driven by economic growth in China
(Hamilton, 2009), low interest rates set by the Federal Reserve resulting in depreciation of
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the US$ (Carter et al., 2011; Frankel, 2008), and speculative investment (Masters, 2008).
In 2009 the oil price plummeted by 32% due to the Great Recession but consistent high
demand from China and low interest rates set by the Federal Reserves helped the oil price
to recover quickly. After the recovery the oil price stayed at an elevated level till 2013 and
between 2013 and 2015 a decrease of the oil price by 45% occurred which is associated
with a decline in world economic growth and to a lesser extent to the shale oil revolution
in the US (Prest, 2018).
Figure 4.1: Oil price 2000-2015
20
40
60
80
10
0
O
il p
ric
e 
pe
r b
ar
re
l (i
n c
on
st.
 20
10
 U
S$
)
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
Year
Data from http://www.worldbank.org/commodities
Oil producing countries can influence the international oil price only through the supply
side. Except for the shale oil revolution in the US, the reasons mentioned in the literature
explaining the oil price fluctuation happened on the demand side. This makes the price
fluctuations for this period plausible exogenous for oil producers.
The only country traditionally associated with enough market power to influence the
international oil price is Saudi Arabia (Fattouh and Mahadeva, 2013). Saudi Arabia played
for a long time the role of a swing producer to stabilize oil prices. However, in recent years
through the shale oil revolution the new big player in the oil market is the USA (Morse,
2018). Saudi Arabia makes its decisions within OPEC and the USA can influence the oil
price through shale oil production and its own interest rate. Therefore, both countries
could have influenced the oil price between 2000 and 2015. To ensure that Saudi Arabia,
the USA and OPEC do not drive the results by influencing the oil price I run robustness
checks excluding those countries individually and combined and the results do not alter
(robustness checks are shown section 4.6).
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The remaining oil producing countries in the sample do not have large enough mar-
ket shares to influence the oil price and cannot anticipate the shocks2 making the price
fluctuations between 2000 and 2015 plausibly exogenous for them.
To exploit the price fluctuations, I define boom and bust years as years in which the
oil price increased or decreased by more than 10% respectively compared to the previous
year. The remaining years with fluctuation less than 10% are defined as valley years and
serve as comparison group. Figure 4.2 shows the oil price from 2000 to 2015 and indicates
the boom, bust and valley years for the sample period.
Figure 4.2: Boom, bust and valley years
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The strategy of this chapter is to exploit price fluctuations of the international oil price
as exogenous shocks in oil income. Overall, the oil rents coefficients in boom, bust and
valley years are expected to be positive and significant, i.e. inefficiency is greater in oil
producing countries. Further, a significant difference in the size of the effect in boom and
bust years compared to the effect in valley years would imply that changes in oil rents
influence inefficiency. If the difference between boom, bust and valley years is according
to expectation, then it can be concluded that causality runs from oil rents to inefficiency
and not the other way around. The expected changes in boom and bust years will be
discussed below.
The effect in boom years is expected to be ambiguous, i.e. inefficiency could increase or
decrease due to an increase in oil income. This is because in boom years oil income should
2See chapter 3 of this thesis for a discussion about oil price anticipation.
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increase the state budget and the extra funds can be invested in the health care sector.
This should increase the performance in terms of life expectancy by shifting the production
function outwards. However, the effect on inefficiency −distance between actual outcome
and production function− depends on the quality of the investment. Hiring an additional
doctor or a nurse should decrease inefficiency if the doctor or nurse is needed in the
hospital. If the doctor or nurse is not needed and the motivation for hiring was to reduce
unemployment then the additional doctor or nurse will not improve the performance of a
hospital and could increase inefficiency. Similarly, building a new hospital should increase
access to health care, increasing life expectancy and decrease inefficiency. However, if the
hospital is built in a special location to favour a certain group and gain political support
then the impact on efficiency is not clear and depends on the location’s initial hospital
endowment. It could be that this location already has enough hospitals and it would have
been more efficient to build it somewhere else.
The effect in bust years should be unambiguous, showing an inefficiency increase com-
pared to the effect in valley years and is used in this chapter as the base to establish
causality. The unexpected decrease in the international oil price should reduce funds
available for investments and should lead to austerity. Austerity comes with an increase
in inefficiency, especially in the health care sector. First, unfinished projects which only
contributed so far to costs −but benefits have not been harvested yet− are usually the first
to be cancelled. Second, necessary updates −like investments in new medical machinery−
will be delayed making it necessary to use already out-dated and therefore inefficient
machinery for longer. Third, saving in health care personal usually affects first support
workers, nurses and junior doctors in that order. Especially nurses and support workers
serve complimentary for senior doctors to perform efficiently. Therefore, a decrease in the
oil price (bust year) should increase inefficiency.
The exception could be that in bust years unprofitable investments are shut down first
which could overall increase efficiency. However, this is unlikely because if an inefficient
project started it is likely that the motivation behind it was not purely driven by a social
cost-benefit argument but rather by the incentive of personal gains such as in ‘white
elephant’ projects3 to gain political support (Robinson and Torvik, 2005). Shutting down
these projects first would be the same as admitting by the politician that the project was
unproductive in the first place and would harm the politician’s reputation. To avoid the
bad reputation the politician is incentivised to shut down efficient projects before shutting
3White elephants are investments with negative social surplus and can be used by politicians to gain
political support in the form of patronage (Robinson and Torvik, 2005).
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down his/her ‘own inefficient projects’.
It could also be argued that spending cuts generate more value per dollar with improve-
ments in terms of efficiency. However, the effect on inefficiency depends on the comparison
group and timing. First, even if the value per dollar increases the counterfactual could
still be an even greater increase in value per dollar. Second, the potential benefits of
spending cuts in term of health outcome or inefficiency usually take time to develop. In
the short-run, it is even more likely that inefficiency increases because personal needs time
to adjust to the new situation.
Summarizing the identification strategy: fluctuation in the international oil price
should increase/decrease oil rents. The effect of oil rents on inefficiency in valley years is
used as the baseline effect showing the basic level of inefficiency due to oil. Changes in
this baseline effect, i.e. different coefficients in boom and bust years, can be attributed to
an increase/decrease in oil price and therefore interpreted as a causal relationship running
from oil rents to inefficiency in the health care sector. Because the effect on inefficiency
is ambiguous in boom years, the analysis focuses on the difference of the effect between
bust and valley years. A confirmation for causality running from oil rents to inefficiency
would show up as significant greater inefficiency in bust years compared to valley years.
4.3 Methodology
In this section, I explain the conceptual framework of efficiency analysis followed by a
detailed explanation of the stochastic frontier methodology used to estimate the impact of
oil on inefficiency in the health care sector. I start by explaining basic concepts relevant
to efficiency analysis.
Production is simply defined as the process transferring inputs into outputs. In this
context, inefficiency can be defined in two ways, first as output-oriented and second as
input-oriented inefficiency. A production process is efficient if the highest possible output
is achieved with given inputs (output-oriented), or that a given output cannot be achieved
with fewer inputs (input-oriented) (Kumbhakar et al., 2015). The focus in this chapter is
on output-oriented inefficiency for two reasons. First, the budget allocated to the health
care sector is usually fixed for a certain period, hence the health care sector produces
outputs with given inputs. Second, the output −life expectancy− is supposedly to be
maximised and not set to a given level.
Inefficiency in this chapter always refers to technical inefficiency. Contrary to alloc-
ative inefficiency, technical inefficiency is only concerned with the fact that given inputs
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are fully utilized given current technology. Allocative inefficiency would also be concerned
with the possible combinations of inputs used to produce the output. However, to estimate
allocative inefficiency it would be necessary to use a cost minimization or profit maximiz-
ation approach, both would need information about the quantity and price of each input
(Kumbhakar et al., 2015). Such detailed data is not available and therefore only technical
inefficiency is considered.
The methodologies used to estimate technical efficiency can be categorized into para-
metric and non-parametric approaches. Both have advantages and disadvantages. Para-
metric approaches for example require several assumptions on the distribution of the error
term and the functional form of the model. However, one advantage of parametric ap-
proaches is that they assume a stochastic relation between inputs and outputs which allows
to separate inefficiency from measurement errors and noise in the data. The most often
used parametric method is the stochastic frontier model (Kapsoli and Teodoru, 2017).
Non-parametric methods, on the other side, do not require assumptions about the
shape and form of the inefficiency term because they are based on mathematical program-
ming. However, this advantage of non-parametric methods creates also disadvantages
because they do not account for randomness in the data. Each observation is assumed to
provide information which ignores measurement errors and noise in the data and makes
the approach sensitive to outliers (Grigoli and Kapsoli, 2013). Further, it is difficult to
estimate unbiased coefficients for the determinants of inefficiency.
To estimate the impact of oil on inefficiency in the health care sector I use a data-
set covering 119 countries. The countries are potentially heterogeneous in several ways
and the data could include measurement errors and perhaps outliers. Those reasons are
already enough to opt for a parametric approach in the form of stochastic frontier analysis,
however, considering that the main aim of this chapter is to determine whether oil is a de-
terminant of inefficiency and the non-parametric approaches do not provide a convincing
strategy to measure unbiased estimators it becomes necessary to use stochastic frontier
analysis in this setting.
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The Stochastic Frontier Model
The idea of stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) was initially developed in the seminal papers
from Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). The basic idea consists
of estimating an OLS and split the error term into a noise term and an inefficiency term,
such that the model to be estimated is of the following form:
yi = α+ x
′
iβ + i, i = 1, . . . , N (4.1)
i = vi − ui (4.2)
vi˜N (0, σ2v) (4.3)
ui˜F(µi, σ2u) (4.4)
where yi represents the logarithm of the output and xi is a vector of inputs in country
i. β is the vector of technology parameters showing the impact of an input on the output.
The composed error term, i, consists of a random component, vi, representing measure-
ment and specification errors, and a one-sided disturbance component, ui, representing
inefficiency. The distribution of the random component, vi, is assumed to follow a normal
distribution with zero mean and variance σ2v . The distribution of the one-sided disturb-
ance component, ui, must be assumed to make the model estimable. The most common
assumptions about the distribution of ui is the half-normal (ui˜N+(0, σ2u)), exponential
(ui˜E(σu)), gamma (ui˜G(Θ, P )) and truncated-normal (ui˜N+(µi, σ2u)).
Since Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) many new models
were developed with more desirable characteristics (e.g. Greene (2005b); Schmidt and
Sickles (1984); Stevenson (1980); Battese and Coelli (1988); Cornwell et al. (1990); Pitt
and Lee (1981); Battese and Coelli (1992, 1995); Kumbhakar (1990); Belotti et al. (2013)).
One of the main improvements was the introduction of panel data in SFA. Cross-sectional
data allow to estimate the performance of each country at one point in time, while panel
data allow to estimate the pattern of inefficiency over time. This is important because
there is no reason to believe that inefficiency in the health care sector is constant over
time. Further, panel data allow to separate country specific effects that are not related to
inefficiency (Battese and Coelli, 1995).
The model chosen in this chapter is from Battese and Coelli (1995). It allows us to
use panel data estimating time variant inefficiency and it also includes the possibility to
estimate inefficiency determinants, which is of special interest for this chapter because the
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main question is whether oil rents influence inefficiency in the health care sector. The
model is of the following form:
yit = α+ x
′
itβ + it, i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , Ti (4.5)
it = vit − uit (4.6)
vit˜N (0, σ2v) (4.7)
uit˜F(µit, σ2u) (4.8)
where everything is defined in the same way as in equation 4.1 - 4.4 except for the
subscript t indicating that the observations are now for country i in year t. Including
the time dimension and comparing the same country over time allows to estimate time
variant inefficiency. Further, Battese and Coelli (1995) show that equations 4.5 - 4.8 allow
to define the mean of the inefficiency distribution, µit, as a function of explanatory vari-
ables. This allows to estimate the production function and the inefficiency determinants
simultaneously.
Battese and Coelli (1995) define uit as:
uit = z
′
itδ + wit (4.9)
where z′it is a vector of inefficiency determinants and δ are the parameters to be estim-
ated. Thus, δ shows how a variable of the z-vector influences the inefficiency term. wit
is a random variable defining the truncation of the normal distribution with zero mean
and variance, σ2. wit is set such that the point of truncation is −z′itδ. Therefore, uit has
the following distribution: N+(z′it, σ2u), i.e. a non-negative truncated normal distribution
with mean z′itδ and variance σ
2
u.
Equations 4.5 - 4.9 can be estimated with maximum likelihood (Battese and Coelli,
1995) and technical efficiency in country i in year t is defined by equation 4.10:
TEit = exp(−uit) = exp(−zitδ − wit) (4.10)
One shortcoming of the Battese and Coelli (1995) model is that the intercept α is
the same across countries leading to a potential misspecification bias in the presence of
time-invariant unobservable factors, which are unrelated to the production process but
affect the output. The time-invariant effect of these factors may be falsely included in the
inefficiency term leading to biased results (Greene, 2004). Greene (2005b) developed the
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‘true fixed effects’ model to deal with the potential problem of time-invariant unobservable
heterogeneity. The main difference to Battese and Coelli (1995) is that the intercept α in
equation 4.5 becomes αi, a unit specific intercept. The two models represent two extremes,
while Battese and Coelli (1995) include all time-invariant unobserved country differences
in the inefficiency term, Greene (2005b) excludes all of them from the inefficiency term.
How much of the unobserved country differences should be part of the inefficiency term is
debatable and the truth would most likely lie between the two extremes (Greene, 2005c).
Hence, the best approach would be to estimate both models and see them as upper and
lower bound estimates of the true values. However, my attempt to estimate Greene (2005b)
‘true fixed effects’ model failed as the regression did not converge. Therefore, I admit the
shortcoming of Battese and Coelli (1995) that all time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity
is included in the inefficiency term and try to mitigate this issue by including income
dummies in the production function to group countries which are more similar than others
together which should reduce the problem to a certain extend.
Production function of health (y and x variables)
The outcome variable (yit) is the natural logarithm of life expectancy at birth indicating
the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the
time of birth were to stay the same (The World Bank, 2018b).
The following variables are included in the production function as inputs (x):
Publ. exp. Public health care expenditure per capita in international purchasing power
parity (PPP) dollars.
Priv. exp. Private health care expenditure per capita in international purchasing power
parity (PPP) dollars.
Schooling Mean years of education of the population over 25.
All input variables are converted to their natural logarithm. Public and private ex-
penditure are the monetary resources a country allocates to the health care sector to pay
for doctors, nurses, medicines and medical equipment. The impact on the output should
therefore be self-explanatory. Higher spending −public or private− should be positively
correlated with life expectancy. The monetary values are measured in international pur-
chasing power parity dollars to make them comparable across countries. Note, public and
private health expenditure refer to mandatory and voluntary contributions to the health
102
care sector respectively (OECD/WHO, 2014). Hence, the variables do not measure the
performance of private or public health care facilities such as private or public hospitals.4
There is also consensus in the literature that educational attainment is an input in
the production function of health (Evans et al., 2000; Greene, 2005b; Ogloblin, 2011).
Schooling is positively correlated with life expectancy and is likely to be a causal factor
in the production of health. Better educated people tend to have healthier life-styles with
more exercise, better diet, use of preventive care and a better understanding of medical
treatments. Following Evans et al. (2000) and Greene (2005b), a square term of schooling is
also included in the production function to account for the diminishing effect of education.
A critical point with SFA is that a form of homogeneity in the production function is
assumed. The homogeneity assumption is that countries produce with the same technology
(Kumbhakar et al., 2015). This creates an issue in an analysis pooling potentially hetero-
genous countries together. It is likely that low-income countries use different or out-dated
technology compared to high-income countries. To control for this issue, income dummies
for low-, lower middle-, upper middle- and high-income countries are included in the pro-
duction function in all regressions.5 Countries are categorised according to World Bank
income categories. The inclusion of the income dummies allows to estimate a production
function for each income group and compares therefore only countries with similar income
level. The same level of income should reduce the heterogeneity of technology used in the
health care sector between countries.
Finally, to control for technological change over time, time dummies are included for
each year in the production function in all specifications (Greene, 2004).
Determinants of inefficiency (z-variables)
The inefficiency determinants or z-variables included in equation 4.9 are the log of GDP
per capita and oil rents.
The literature shows that GDP per capita is a significant determinant of life expectancy
(Edwards, 2016), however, it cannot be included in the production function because it does
not represent a health input (Greene, 2005a). On its own GDP per capita does not make
people healthier (Ogloblin, 2011). The impact of GDP per capita on life expectancy goes
through channels, such as higher spending on health, which is already controlled for in
the form of private and public expenditure or higher educational attainment, which is
also controlled for in the schooling variable. Apart from health expenditure and schooling,
4See section 4.4 for a detailed definition of the expenditure variables.
5To avoid multicollinearity the low-income dummy was dropped and represents the base category.
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GDP per capita also influences the access to goods and services that enhance health and
therefore life expectancy, such as nutrition or proxies for general working conditions in the
country that can have an effect on health outcomes (Ogloblin, 2011). The fact that the
impact of oil on income is still debated in the literature also contributed to the decision
to include GDP per capita as a z-variable. Assuming that both sides of the resource curse
literature are partly correct and oil increases income in some countries and decreases it
in others, then any effect of oil rents on inefficiency could be cancelled out resulting in
insignificant results. As long as there is no agreement about the relation between oil and
income I control for it in all specifications. Therefore, the estimates represent the impact
of oil rents on inefficiency aside from any effect oil rents have on income.
Finally, the variable of interest in this chapter is oil rents and measures oil revenues
minus the costs of oil extraction as percentage of GDP and is derived from the World
Development Indicators.
4.4 Sample, data and descriptive statistics
The data are primarily retrieved from the World Health Organization (WHO) and World
Bank databases. Analysis was restricted to 119 countries for which all data are available
for the whole period 2000 to 2015. Hence, I am using a balanced dataset. A list of all
countries in the sample is provided in appendix C table C 1. Table ?? shows descriptive
statistics of the variables used in the stochastic frontier analysis and for an overview of
definitions and sources see table C 2 in appendix C.
Life expectancy at birth is from the World Development Indicators and measures the
years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its
birth were to stay the same (The World Bank, 2018b). Life expectancy varies widely in
the sample from 39 years in Sierra Leone to 83 years in Italy with a mean of 68 years.
Public and private health expenditure data are from WHO and the basic differenti-
ation between the two follows the rule whether payments or contributions are compulsory
or not (OECD/WHO, 2014). Therefore, public and private health expenditure does not
measure who provides the health service (e.g. a private or a public hospital), rather they
measure how the money is raised (in a mandatory or voluntary scheme). Public health
expenditure includes transfers from government domestic revenues, social insurance contri-
bution, compulsory prepayment other than social contribution (variable FS1, FS3 and FS4
in the SHA2011 framework). Private health expenditure includes voluntary prepayments
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and other domestic revenues (FS5 and FS6 in the SHA2011 framework).6 Transfers from
government domestic revenues (FS1) are the funds from the state budget allocated to the
health care sector and includes income from the oil sector.
Public health expenditure per capita varies widely between countries. The smallest
public contribution to health expenditure occurs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
with a small $0.58 per capita in 2000, while Luxembourg provides a staggering $5290
in public health expenditure per capita in 2009.7 Private contributions are highest in the
United States with $4350 in 2015, which is almost three times as high as the second highest
private contribution made to the health care sector of $1630 per capita in Singapore in
the same year.
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
N Mean St.d. Min Max
Life expectancy 1904 67.66 9.24 38.70 83.09
Public health exp. p.c. 1904 518.10 848.03 0.58 5,290.82
Private health exp. p.c. 1904 291.52 429.52 3.35 4,355.71
Schooling in years 1904 7.29 3.10 1.10 13.30
Income group 1904 2.55 1.03 1 4
Democracy 1808 1.63 0.79 1 3
GDP per capita 1904 14,903.33 20,479.60 503.83 129,349.92
Oil rent (% of GDP) 1904 5.32 11.15 0.00 60.78
The average years of education of the population over 25 is around 7 years. Income
groups are defined according to World Bank income groups. The maximum value of oil
rents occurs in Kuwait in 2011.
Mehlum et al. (2006) argue that the resource curse is conditional on institutional qual-
ity and that any adverse effect should be greater or more pronounced in non-democratic
countries. To exploit this potential source of heterogeneity I categorized countries accord-
ing to the Polity2 index which measures the level of democracy on a 21 point scale ranging
from -10 to +10 with -10 indicating a fully autocratic country and +10 a fully democratic
country (Marshall and Jaggers, 2014). The countries in the sample are defined as demo-
cratic (Polity2: +4 to +10), intermediate (Polity2: -3 to +3) and autocratic (Polity2: -4
to -10) countries.8
Comparing the average values of life expectancy, public and private health expenditure
between income groups shows significant differences (see table 4.2). The mean of each
6FS2 and FS7 are not included because they have foreign origins, e.g. bilateral or multilateral aid and
poor data coverage.
7Monetary values are measured in purchasing power parity (constant 2010 international dollars).
8Table C 1 in appendix C lists all countries and the corresponding institutional category.
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variable is significantly different from the mean of the other income groups and underlines
the necessity to control for income in the production function. As discussed in section
4.3, lower income should also lead to cheaper or out-dated technology, which is usually
less efficient. Hospitals with limited funds are more likely to acquire the out-dated cheap
version of medical equipment than a hospital with more funds.
Table 4.2: Differences in life expectancy, public and private health expenditure
by income group
Panel A: Life expectancy
Low income Lower middle inc. Upper middle inc. High income
Low income 0
−
Lower middle inc. 9.5 0
(0.000) −
Upper middle inc. 14.5 4.9 0
(0.000) (0.000) −
High income 21.3 11.7 6.8 0
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) −
Panel B: Public health expenditure
Low income Lower middle inc. Upper middle inc. High income
Low income 0
−
Lower middle inc. 79.86 0
(0.000) −
Upper middle inc. 331.14 251.27 0
(0.000) (0.000) −
High income 1745.40 1665.53 1414.26 0
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) −
Panel C: Private health expenditure
Low income Lower middle inc. Upper middle inc. High income
Low income 0
−
Lower middle inc. 81.96 0
(0.000) −
Upper middle inc. 247.23 165.28 0
(0.000) (0.000) −
High income 743.46 661.50 496.23 0
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) −
Notes: The table shows the mean difference of life expectancy, public and private health expenditure per
capita between income groups. P-values from Wald tests, testing for significant differences between the
means, are shown in parenthesis.
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Before discussing the results, I perform a test for the existence of inefficiency in the
sample. By estimating the production function shown in equation 4.5 as a simple OLS
without inefficiency term to test if the distribution of the residuals is skewed. Left skewness
of the residual distribution indicates that inefficiency is present in the sample (Schmidt and
Sickles, 1984). The left panel of figure 4.3 shows the distribution of the residuals compared
to a normal distribution. The left skewness is visible in the figure and confirmed by a
skewness test for normality following D’Agostino et al. (1990) (skewness: -1.443; p-value:
0.000).
The skewness so far only shows that inefficiency is present in the sample but says
nothing about any determinants. A scatterplot of the residuals and oil rents, right panel
of figure 4.3 indicates that the skewness of the residual distribution is at least partly related
to the level of oil rents in an economy.
Figure 4.3: Residual distribution
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4.5 Results
Oil rents and inefficiency in the health care sector
Before testing for the causal relationship between oil rents and inefficiency in the health
care sector, I estimate the stochastic frontier with the plain oil rents variable to see if the
production function coefficients are according to expectation.9
Column (1) in table 4.3 shows the baseline specification with all 119 countries and
coefficients for the production function and mean inefficiency terms. The coefficients of
the frontier function are in line with the literature.
9The production function part of the tables shows the coefficients for the x-variables and their impact
on life expectancy. The mean inefficiency part shows the coefficients for the z-variables which measures
the impact on inefficiency.
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Table 4.3: SFA: Inefficiency in the health care sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Democracy Intermediate Autocracy
Prod. function
Constant 3.8∗∗∗ 3.8095∗∗∗ 3.8504∗∗∗ 3.7678∗∗∗ 3.6995∗∗∗
(0.0373) (0.0378) (0.037) (0.0708) (0.1177)
Public exp. 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.0238∗∗∗ 0.0201 −0.0042
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.002) (0.0226) (0.0058)
Private exp. 0.0157∗∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.0048∗ 0.012 0.0048
(0.002) (0.002) (0.0028) (0.0361) (0.0045)
Schooling 0.3103∗∗∗ 0.2989∗∗∗ 0.2583∗∗∗ 0.3236∗∗ 0.5996∗∗∗
(0.0372) (0.0382) (0.0434) (0.1419) (0.1232)
Schooling2 −0.0681∗∗∗ −0.0656∗∗∗ −0.0558∗∗∗ −0.0668∗ −0.1494∗∗∗
(0.0088) (0.009) (0.0103) (0.0369) (0.031)
LM income 0.0212∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.0264∗∗∗ 0.0193 0.0083
(0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0077) (0.0439) (0.022)
UM income 0.0133 0.015∗ 0.0388∗∗∗ −0.0163 0.0186
(0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0098) (0.084) (0.0229)
High income 0.0302∗∗∗ 0.0314∗∗∗ 0.0409∗∗∗ 0.0226 0.0532∗∗
(0.0095) (0.0092) (0.0127) (0.0724) (0.0266)
Mean inefficiency
Constant 1.5717∗∗∗ 1.6087∗∗∗ 2.5087∗∗∗ 1.2496∗∗∗ 1.9382∗∗∗
(0.1326) (0.1575) (0.5276) (0.1746) (0.1269)
Oil rents 0.0083∗∗∗ 0.0295∗∗∗ 0.0073∗∗∗ 0.0021∗
(0.0011) (0.0098) (0.0008) (0.0012)
Low oil dep. 0.016
(0.0189)
Medium oil dep. 0.1526∗∗∗
(0.0339)
High oil dep. 0.3291∗∗∗
(0.0489)
GDP p.c. −0.2141∗∗∗ −0.2192∗∗∗ −0.3577∗∗∗ −0.1613∗∗∗ −0.2334∗∗∗
(0.0222) (0.0254) (0.0845) (0.0291) (0.0156)
Distribution
σ2 0.034∗∗∗ 0.0345∗∗∗ 0.0618∗∗∗ 0.0136∗ 0.0237∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0173) (0.0079) (0.0013)
λ 0.9952∗∗∗ 0.9953∗∗∗ 0.9996∗∗∗ 0.9811∗∗∗ 0.9997∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.1044) (0.0001)
LL 2591.366 2589.115 1525.359 535.1794 522.2409
Notes: Production functions include time dummies. Public, private health care expenditure, schooling,
schooling2 and GDP per capita are converted to their natural logarithm. Low, medium and high oil
dependent are dummies for countries producing between 1-10%, 11-20% and more than 20% of oil rents
as percentage of GDP, respectively. *, ** and *** stand for significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Private and public health expenditure are positively correlated with life expectancy. A
one percentage point increase in public health expenditure increases life expectancy by 0.014
percentage points. At the sample mean, a one percentage point increase in public health
expenditure is equivalent to US$ 5 per capita and would increase life expectancy by 0.0095
years or around 3.5 days. Private health expenditure also has a positive correlation with
life expectancy. The coefficient is slightly bigger compared to public health expenditure.
Educational attainment, schooling, shows a bigger effect than health care expenditure.
The schooling coefficient of 0.3103 and -0.0681 of the square term indicate that an addi-
tional year of schooling at the sample mean of 7 years increases life expectancy by around
0.34% or 0.23 years (83 days). The maximum effect of schooling on life expectancy occurs
at 10 years with 0.35% after which the effect slowly diminishes.
To interpret the income dummies, remember that low-income countries are the base
category and therefore the positive significant coefficient of 0.0212 for lower middle-income
countries indicates that life expectancy is 2.1% or 1.1 years higher in lower middle-income
countries. Considering that the mean difference in life expectancy between low-income and
lower middle-income countries is around 9.5 years it seems that 8.4 years are explained
by differences in private and public health care expenditure, schooling and the z-variables
(oil rents and GDP per capita). The upper middle-income dummy is insignificant on
the other hand, which means that any difference in life expectancy is captured by the
controlled variables. The high-income dummy shows a positive significant coefficient of
0.0302 indicating that life expectancy is around 3% or 1.7 years higher in high-income
countries compared to low-income countries. Hence, 19.6 years of the difference in life
expectancy between low- and high-income countries is explained by the control variables
included in the specification.10
Now, I am turning to the determinants of inefficiency. In the Battese and Coelli (1995)
model a positive coefficient of a z-variable indicates an inefficiency increasing effect while
a negative coefficient is inefficiency decreasing.11 The z-variables, oil rents and GDP per
capita are both significant but point in opposite directions. The oil rents coefficient is
positive indicating that more oil rents in an economy is positively correlated with ineffi-
10Mean difference in life expectancy between low-income and high-income countries is 21.3 years, see
table 4.2.
11Note, to interpret the magnitude of a z-coefficient it is necessary to calculate the marginal effects which
require the calculation of an adjustment term. The adjustment term or marginal effects are not part of
the output in Frontier4.1, the software developed by Coelli (1996) and used in this chapter. Therefore,
I am restricted here to interpret signs and compare coefficient size relative to each other. However, the
adjustment term in this setting is always positive, because the z-variables are only included in the mean of
uit but not in the variance of uit or vit (Wang, 2002). Hence, the sign of the z-coefficients unambiguously
indicates the direction of the effect.
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ciency and explains partly why oil rich countries underperform in terms of life expectancy.
The opposite is true for GDP per capita which seems to decrease inefficiency.
In column (2) of table 4.3, I test whether the correlation of oil rents and inefficiency
is non-linear by introducing dummy variables for low, medium, and high oil dependent
countries into the regression instead of oil rents.12 The coefficient for low oil dependent
countries is insignificant indicating that a low level of oil dependency does not necessarily
affect inefficiency. Medium and high oil dependent countries on the other hand have highly
significant coefficients, both positive indicating that more oil dependency leads to higher
inefficiency with the coefficient for high oil dependent countries double the size of the
coefficient for medium oil dependent countries. Hence, higher oil dependency increases
inefficiency whereas at low levels there seems to be no effect. This is in line with other
findings of the resource curse literature that oil can be beneficial in a more developed
and diversified economy but can be harmful in a less developed and more concentrated
economy (Ross, 2017).
Next, I split the sample according to institutional quality to exploit potential hetero-
geneity. Mehlum et al. (2006) argue that the resource curse is conditional on institutional
quality and that any adverse effect should be greater in autocratic countries. The countries
are defined as democratic, intermediate and autocratic countries according to Marshall and
Jaggers (2014) Polity2 index as explained in section 3.4.
Columns (3)-(5) show the results for the democratic, intermediate and autocratic sub-
sample respectively. Surprisingly, the results are inverse of what Mehlum et al. (2006)
predicted. The inefficiency increasing effect of oil rents is around 4 and 14 times bigger
in democracies as it is in intermediate and autocratic countries respectively. This result
is perhaps surprising but not entirely new. Cotet and Tsui (2013b) also find that oil rich
autocracies are better performing with respect to life expectancy than their democratic
counterparts.
The results reported in table 4.3, so far confirm the hypothesis that there is a correla-
tion between oil rents and inefficiency in the health care sector.
12Low oil dependent countries are defined as countries with oil rents between 1 and 10% of GDP, medium
oil dependent countries produce oil rents between 11 and 20% of GDP and high oil dependent countries
produce more than 20% of GDP in oil rents. The omitted category are countries with less than 1% oil
rents in GDP.
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Technical efficiency over time
Next, I analyse how efficiency developed over time. Note that the efficiency estimates in
this section do not show the impact of oil rents alone. They also incorporate the effects
of GDP per capita and the constant term. It is a way of showing by how much a country
could improve life expectancy if it could eradicate inefficiency completely. To bring the oil
dimension back into the analysis all the results are shown according to oil dependency.13
The average efficiency estimates for each individual country are shown in table C 3 in
appendix C.
Figure 4.4 shows average efficiency estimates by income group and oil dependency.
The efficiency estimate can be interpreted as percentage term showing the actual perform-
ance of a country in terms of life expectancy as percentage of the maximum possible life
expectancy.
Figure 4.4: Technical efficiency by income groups
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Notes:‘No oil’ countries are defined as countries producing less than 1% of GDP in oil rents (blue line),
‘low oil dependent’ countries are countries with 1-10% oil rents of GDP (red line) and ‘oil dependent’
countries include all countries with oil rents more than 10% of GDP (green line).
13The oil dependency categories are: ‘no oil’ countries, defined as countries producing less than 1%
of GDP in oil rents; ‘low oil dependent’ are countries with 1-10% oil rents of GDP; and ‘oil dependent’
countries include all countries with oil rents more than 10% of GDP.
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In the low and lower middle-income group, ‘no oil’ countries have the highest efficiency
score and ‘low oil dependent’ countries generally perform better than ‘oil dependent’ coun-
tries (Graph a) and b)). The sub-sample of upper middle-income countries shows that
‘low oil’ dependency can be beneficial with higher efficiency scores compared to ‘no oil’
and ‘oil dependent’ countries (Graph c)). In high-income countries ‘no oil’ and ‘low oil
dependent’ countries are almost identical (Graph d)). The worst performing countries in
the upper middle-income and high-income group are ‘oil dependent’ countries (Graph c)
and d)).
The results previously derived from table 4.3 −oil rents increase inefficiency− seem to
be driven by low- and high-income countries. To illustrate this, table 4.4 lists the mean
efficiency score and life expectancy for each income group and compares them according
to oil dependency. Potential gains in table 4.4 shows the number of years life expectancy
would increase if inefficiency could be eradicated completely.
Table 4.4: Average efficiency, life expectancy and potential gains
by income groups and oil dependency
no oil low oil dep. oil dep.
Low income efficiency 0.86 0.83 0.79
life expectancy 56.22 54.50 49.45
potential gain 9.32 10.96 13.38
LM income efficiency 0.91 0.89 0.88
life expectancy 66.60 64.59 62.72
potential gain 6.68 8.11 8.20
UM income efficiency 0.91 0.96 0.90
life expectancy 69.20 73.04 67.88
potential gain 6.77 2.86 7.57
High income efficiency 0.97 0.97 0.94
life expectancy 77.91 78.10 74.38
potential gain 2.40 2.32 4.98
Notes: ‘No oil’ countries are defined as countries producing less than 1% of GDP in oil rents, ‘low oil
dependent’ countries are countries with 1-10% oil rents of GDP and ‘oil dependent’ countries include all
countries with oil rents more than 10% of GDP. Income groups are defined according to World Bank
income groups.
Comparing ‘no oil’ countries with ‘low oil dependent’ countries there seems to be
only minor differences in efficiency, life expectancy and potential gains in most income
groups. The exception is the sub-sample of upper middle-income countries where ‘low oil
dependent’ countries outperform ‘no oil’ countries and ‘oil dependent’ countries. Efficiency
is as high as 96% in ‘low oil dependent’ upper middle-income countries, whereas it is only
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91% and 90% in ‘no oil’ and ‘oil dependent’ countries, respectively.
‘Oil dependent’ countries underperform significantly in the sub-sample of low- and
high-income countries. The potential gains of eradicating inefficiency in life expectancy
amounts to 13 years in ‘oil dependent’ low-income countries which is two and five years
more than in ‘no oil’ and ‘low oil dependent’ countries respectively. The gap is smaller in
high-income countries, nevertheless, ‘oil dependent’ countries could still gain five years in
terms of life expectancy compared to two years in ‘no oil’ and ‘low oil dependent’ countries.
Oil rents and inefficiency in boom and bust years
So far, the analysis used simply oil rents to establish the relationship between oil and
inefficiency in the health care sector. This measure is easily marked as endogenous because
an underperforming government could increase oil extraction and use the funds to close the
gap and produce more efficiently in the health care sector. This would make inefficiency
the reason for higher oil rents and not oil rents the reason for inefficiency.
Therefore, in this section I test for a causal relationship between oil rents and inef-
ficiency in the health care sector by exploiting price fluctuations of the international oil
price as exogenous income shocks. The oil rents variable is divided into boom, bust and
valley years, whereas boom and bust years are defined as years in which the international
oil price fluctuated by more than 10% compared to the previous year. The remaining
years with fluctuation less than 10% are considered as valley years and serve as compar-
ison group. The basic idea is that a significantly greater coefficient of the oil rents variable
in bust years compared to the coefficient in valley years is an indication of causality from
oil rents to inefficiency. See section 4.2 for a detailed discussion.
Table 4.5 shows the results with the oil rents variable divided into boom, bust and
valley years. Overall, the coefficients for the production function are similar to those in
table 4.3. Column (1) shows the result for the full sample, all three coefficients of the oil
rents variable are positive and significant indicating that oil rents increase inefficiency in
the health care sector in boom, bust and valley years. Comparing the oil rents coefficient
in boom and valley years shows a smaller coefficient in boom years by around 9%. The
difference between the two coefficients, however, is insignificant.14
14Any statement claiming a ‘significant’ difference between two coefficients have been tested with a
Wald-test
(√
(A−B)2
var(A)+var(B)−2cov(A,B)
)
.
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Table 4.5: SFA: Inefficiency in boom, bust and valley years
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democracy Intermediate Autocracy
Production function
Constant 3.8004∗∗∗ 3.8506∗∗∗ 3.8184∗∗∗ 3.5827∗∗∗
(0.0365) (0.0363) (0.0589) (0.1066)
Public exp. 0.014∗∗∗ 0.0238∗∗∗ 0.0132 −0.0039
(0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0089) (0.0039)
Private exp. 0.0157∗∗∗ 0.0048 0.0106∗∗ 0.0067∗∗
(0.0021) (0.003) (0.0051) (0.0033)
Schooling 0.31∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.3227∗∗∗ 0.6859∗∗∗
(0.0365) (0.042) (0.0491) (0.1252)
Schooling2 −0.0681∗∗∗ −0.0557∗∗∗ −0.0693∗∗∗ −0.1653∗∗∗
(0.0087) (0.01) (0.0106) (0.0338)
LM income 0.0213∗∗∗ 0.0264∗∗∗ 0.0151 0.0133
(0.0062) (0.0076) (0.01) (0.1067)
UM income 0.0134∗ 0.0388∗∗∗ −0.0101 0.0037
(0.0078) (0.0093) (0.0062) (0.1216)
High income 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.0409∗∗∗ 0.0444∗∗∗ 0.0414
(0.0095) (0.0118) (0.0042) (0.1436)
Mean inefficiency
Constant 1.5706∗∗∗ 2.5077∗∗∗ 1.5341∗∗∗ 1.8264∗∗∗
(0.1557) (0.517) (0.0552) (0.3155)
Oil rents boom 0.0078∗∗∗ 0.0278∗∗∗ 0.0075∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0094) (0.0008) (0.0012)
Oil rents bust 0.0111∗∗∗ 0.0426∗∗∗ 0.0087∗∗∗ 0.0025
(0.0017) (0.0113) (0.0013) (0.002)
Oil rents valley 0.0085∗∗∗ 0.0285∗∗∗ 0.0083∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0101) (0.0013) (0.0003)
GDP per capita −0.2138∗∗∗ −0.3574∗∗∗ −0.1963∗∗∗ −0.2204∗∗∗
(0.0249) (0.0827) (0.0056) (0.0452)
Distribution
σ2 0.0339∗∗∗ 0.0617∗∗∗ 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0168) (0.0009) (0.0075)
λ 0.9952∗∗∗ 0.9996∗∗∗ 0.9991∗∗∗ 0.9998∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0002) (0.0016) (0.0013)
LL 2592.348 1525.586 560.5318 518.0747
Notes:Production functions include time dummies. Public, private health care expenditure, schooling,
schooling2 and GDP per capita are converted to their natural logarithm. *, ** and *** stand for significant
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Comparing the coefficient in bust and valley years yields the expected result. The
coefficient in bust years is significantly larger by around 30% compared to the coefficient in
valley years indicating that inefficiency increases when the international oil price decreases.
This result shows that the causal relationship between oil rents and inefficiency moves from
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oil rents to inefficiency. An exogenous decrease in oil income due to a negative price shock
increases inefficiency in the health care sector.
Columns (2)-(4) in table 4.5 show the results for the democratic, intermediate and
autocratic sub-samples. In democracies the direction of the effect and the causal relation-
ship is the same as in the full sample with a significant difference between bust and valley
years. The inefficiency increasing effect becomes larger by about 50% in bust years when
the international oil price decreases.
The coefficients in the intermediate sub-sample have the same pattern as the demo-
cratic sub-sample with smaller coefficient in boom years and larger coefficient in bust years
compared to valley years. However, the Wald test reveals that the differences between the
coefficients are not significantly different from zero, i.e. causality cannot be established in
the intermediate sub-sample. Furthermore, the causal relation does not hold in autocratic
countries. The result indicates that autocratic countries are wasteful with their funds in
boom years but not in bust years. Hence, causality running from oil rents to inefficiency
present in the full sample is purely driven by the democratic sub-sample. The results for
the intermediate and autocratic sub-samples do not show signs of a causal relationship
between oil rents and inefficiency.
Oil rents and inefficiency in the health care sector by sex
Next, I analyse whether the oil rents driven inefficiency effect in the health care sector
is heterogenous across sexes. Ross (2008) argues that oil leads to lower female labour
participation and lower female representation in parliament. The sex discrepancy could
also occur in the health care sector. Lower labour market participation of women reduces
their income and could decrease private health investments and fewer women in parliament
could lead to lower public health care spending for women.
Panel A of table 4.6 shows the results using life expectancy, male as dependent variable.
The overall causal relationship is the same as before with life expectancy, both sexes (shown
in Table 4.5). In the democratic sub-sample, the oil rents coefficient is significantly greater
in bust years compared to valley years, showing a causal relation. Again, this is not the case
for the intermediate sub-sample. While the coefficients point in the same direction, the
differences are not significant. The sub-sample of autocratic countries does not show any
significant effect of oil rents on inefficiency in boom, bust or valley years, i.e. inefficiency
in the health care sector is not affected by oil rents for men in autocratic countries.
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Table 4.6: SFA: Inefficiency by sex
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democracy Intermediate Autocracy
Panel A: Life expectancy, male
Constant 1.2358∗∗∗ 1.4179∗∗∗ 1.3575∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗
(0.0992) (0.1154) (0.085) (0.1942)
Oil rents boom 0.0058∗∗∗ 0.0192∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗ 0.0007
(0.0007) (0.0032) (0.0007) (0.0017)
Oil renst bust 0.0081∗∗∗ 0.0291∗∗∗ 0.0095∗∗∗ 0.0032
(0.0016) (0.0065) (0.002) (0.0025)
Oil renst valley 0.0061∗∗∗ 0.0175∗∗∗ 0.0083∗∗∗ −0.0012
(0.001) (0.004) (0.0014) (0.0026)
GDP per capita −0.159∗∗∗ −0.1896∗∗∗ −0.1683∗∗∗ −0.1018∗∗∗
(0.0153) (0.0166) (0.0121) (0.0214)
Panel B: Life expectancy, female
Constant 1.9417∗∗∗ 3.3678∗∗∗ 1.1668∗∗∗ 2.0609∗∗∗
(0.2244) (0.4252) (0.1014) (0.1284)
Oil rents boom 0.01∗∗∗ 0.0243∗∗∗ 0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.006) (0.0009) (0.0012)
Oil rents bust 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0346∗ 0.0087∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0183) (0.002) (0.0023)
Oil rents valley 0.0112∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.0066∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0052) (0.0014) (0.0015)
GDP per capita −0.2723∗∗∗ −0.4746∗∗∗ −0.1458∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗
(0.0363) (0.0692) (0.0145) (0.0156)
Notes: Production functions (not shown) include public, private health care expenditure, schooling,
schooling2 (converted all to their natural logarithm), income dummies and time dummies. GDP per
capita is converted to natural logarithm. *, ** and *** stand for significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Panel B shows the results for life expectancy, female and while all the oil rents coef-
ficients are positive and significant, the differences between boom, bust and valley years
are not significant. There is no evidence for causality for female health production, only
a strong correlation.
Nevertheless, comparing the coefficients between men and women shows that the in-
efficiency increasing effect of oil rents is generally greater for women. For example, in
the full sample the boom, bust and valley coefficients are 72, 74, and 83% greater for life
expectancy, female respectively compared to life expectancy, male. The same is true in
the sub-samples of democratic and autocratic countries with greater coefficients in Panel
B. For intermediate countries the opposite is the case. Oil rents coefficients are greater for
men’s health outcome compared to women’s. For democratic and autocratic countries the
results are in line with Ross (2008) argument and point towards a potential consequence
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of lower labour market participation and representation in parliament of women due to
oil.
Oil rents and inefficiency in the health care sector by sub-population
Certain sub-groups of the population are more vulnerable than others, especially children
and older people need more medical care than adults. To explore this potential source
of heterogeneity in the effect of oil rents on inefficiency I test whether mortality rates of
certain sub-groups of the population are affected in a different way by oil rents.
The dependent variable in this setting is mortality rate instead of life expectancy. The
reason for this change is that life expectancy is generally defined as the numbers of years
a person would live if prevailing patterns of mortality were to stay the same (The World
Bank, 2018a). Because of this definition a government investment aiming to improve health
and therefore life expectancy of older people affects the ‘prevailing pattern of mortality’
for everyone younger than the older people. Life expectancy at birth would be affected in
the same way as life expectancy for a 10-, 20-, 30- or 40-year-old person. Therefore, using
life expectancy for different age groups would not be comparable. Mortality rate on the
other side is specific for each age group or sub-sample of the population and a change in
the mortality rate between 60 and 70 years does not affect the mortality rate between 10
and 20 year old people.
Mortality rates measure the number of the population in a sub-group dying before
reaching a certain age and the available categories are neonatal, infant, child, adult (both
sexes), adult (male), adult (female), and maternal mortality rate. Neonatal, infant and
child mortality rates measure the number of dying newborns before reaching the age of
28 days, 1 year and 5 years, respectively. Adult mortality corresponds to the probability
of dying between the age 15 and 60 years and maternal mortality measures the number
of women dying because of pregnancy related reasons up to 48 days after pregnancy
termination. Except for maternal mortality the data are measured as the number of
deaths per 1000 people of the specific sub-population, maternal mortality measures the
number of deaths per 100,000 live births.
All the mortality rates are rescaled by dividing the minimum number of deaths in
year i by the actual number of deaths in year i and was multiplied by 100. The new
scale is equal 100 for the best performing country, i.e. lowest mortality rate in year i and
the measure decreases with higher mortality rate. Hence, the direction of the variable is
the same as for life expectancy (higher values equal better outcomes) and a production
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function can be used again to estimate inefficiency.
Table 4.7: SFA: Inefficiency by age-groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mortality rate Neonatal Infant Child Adult
Mean inefficiency
Constant 0.4002∗∗∗ 4.1171∗∗∗ 4.8574∗∗∗ -0.1775
(0.0927) (0.2404) (0.4631) (0.538)
Oil rents boom 0.0086∗∗∗ 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0161∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.001) (0.0011) (0.001) (0.0043)
Oil rents bust 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0221∗∗∗ 0.0235∗∗∗ 0.0129
(0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0077)
Oil rents valley 0.0101∗∗∗ 0.0173∗∗∗ 0.0185∗∗∗ 0.0072∗
(0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0041)
GDP per capita −0.0355∗∗∗ −0.3864∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗ -0.0952∗∗
(0.0094) (0.0246) (0.0285) (0.0396)
(5) (6) (7)
Mortality rate Adult, male Adult, female Maternal
Mean inefficiency
Constant −0.8783 −0.5664 0.0293∗
(0.6697) (1.8459) (0.0162)
Oil rents boom −0.0005 0.0502∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0221) (0.0003)
Oil rents bust −0.0016 0.0682 0.0054∗
(0.007) (0.0515) (0.0028)
Oil rents valley −0.0049 0.047∗∗ 0.0032
(0.0052) (0.0193) (0.0023)
GDP per capita 0.0383 −0.5753∗∗ −0.0242∗∗∗
(0.0399) (0.2506) (0.0051)
Notes: Neonatal are newborn babies between 0 and 28 days. Infants are children between 0 and 1 years.
Children are between 0 and 5 years old. Adults are between 15 and 60 years old. Maternal mortality
measures pregnancy-related deaths. Production functions (not shown) include public, private health care
expenditure, schooling, schooling2 (all converted to their natural logarithm), income dummies and time
dummies. GDP per capita is converted to natural logarithm. *, ** and *** stand for significant at the
10%, 5% and 1% level.
Table 4.7 shows the results for the full sample and table C 4 in appendix C shows
estimates for the democratic, intermediate and autocratic sub-samples. Neonatal, infant
and child mortality rates do all look similar with highly significant oil rents coefficients,
significantly greater coefficient in bust years and insignificantly smaller coefficients in boom
years compared to valley years, showing a causal relation. The pattern is the same in
democratic, intermediate and autocratic countries (see table C 4 in appendix C).
The results for the different groups of adult mortality rates show a weaker effect and
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sometimes even no effect for the full sample. For example, all coefficients for male adults
are insignificant and for females and both sexes only the oil rents coefficients in valley and
boom years are significant at the 5 or 10% level. A look at the institutional sub-samples
shows that the weak effects for the full sample is driven by insignificant coefficients in
autocracies and sometimes democracies. Inefficiency in the adult health care sector is
only influenced in intermediate countries and to a smaller extent in democratic countries
due to oil rents.
The significant results for adults in intermediate countries could be driven by the
fact that the polity score categorizes countries ‘interregnum’ and in transition as 0 on
the Polity2 index. A period of interregnum are years with total collapse of political
authority and include internal wars and periods of anarchy (Marshall and Jaggers, 2014).
Periods of civil unrest are accompanied by higher mortality rates and because the conflict
parties consist of adults, the adult mortality rate should be affected. A huge literature
exists analysing the relation between natural resources and civil war (e.g. Arezki et al.
(2015); Bell and Wolford (2015); Cotet and Tsui (2013a); Lei and Michaels (2014); Ross
(2015); De Soysa and Neumayer (2007); Wegenast (2013). However, scholars concerned
with the question have not delivered a clear answer yet (e.g. Lei and Michaels (2014)
find a positive effect while Cotet and Tsui (2013a) find no effect with similar data and
slightly different strategies). However, if natural resources led to periods of interregnum
and civil unrest with higher mortality rates, this could explain the significant results for
intermediate countries. To test if this is the driving factor I re-run the specifications,
excluding countries with interregnum years from the sample. The results are the same as
before, hence this possibility does not drive the results.
In summary, the analysis concerned with different age-groups reveals that the ineffi-
ciency increasing effect of oil rents is strong for the most vulnerable part of the population
(newborns, infants, and children) while the effect for adults is weaker and only significant
in intermediate countries.
4.6 Robustness checks
In this section, I conduct robustness checks concerned with potential oil price setters, time
lags of the effect and different definition of price shocks.
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Excluding Saudi Arabia and the US
I start by testing whether the causal relationship found in the data is driven by the
inclusion of OPEC, Saudi Arabia and the United States. As discussed in section 4.2, Saudi
Arabia was the traditional swing producer collaborating with OPEC and the United States
have the potential to be the new swing producer today due to the shale oil revolution.
The US can also influence the oil price through monetary policy. These countries or group
of countries −in the case of OPEC− could have influenced the international oil price
rendering the oil rents boom, bust and valley variable as endogenous which would reduce
the identification strategy as invalid.
Table C 5 in the appendix shows the main specifications excluding one country at a time
and combined. Significance and signs of the oil rents boom, bust, and valley coefficients do
not change and changes in the magnitude of any coefficient are minor. Hence, I conclude
that the results concerned with causality are robust and not driven by the inclusion of
potential oil price setters.
Time lags of the effect
The next robustness check is concerned with potential time lags of the effect of oil rents on
inefficiency. Grigoli and Kapsoli (2013) argue that health expenditure needs time to affect
life expectancy and inefficiency. The same could be argued for oil rents and an additional
concern for the identification strategy is that a country could smooth out consumption
through borrowing in bust years.
However, this does not seem to be the case here. Table C 6 in the appendix shows
the results with lagged values of life expectancy by 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 years to test if the
effect of oil rents on inefficiency this year is different in 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 years. The oil rents
coefficients in boom, bust and valley years slightly decrease with increasing lags, hence
the effect can be seen as immediate and diminishing over time but does not take a certain
lagged number of years to develop.
Different definitions of boom, bust and valley years
A further robustness check is concerned with the definition of boom and bust years. So far,
the definition was a more than 10% change in the international oil price. The chosen 10%
benchmark is arbitrary and for this reason I re-run the main specification with different
benchmarks.
Table C 7 in the appendix shows the results using 5, 10, 15 and 20% price fluctuation
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as benchmark. The results are almost identical in all specifications; hence my main results
are robust to different definitions of price shocks.
4.7 Two potential mechanisms
In this section, I discuss two mechanisms through which oil rents potentially influence
inefficiency in the health care sector. The first mechanism is that oil increases inequality,
which in turn increases inefficiency and the second mechanism is that oil reduces trans-
parency, which in turn increases inefficiency.
The spoils of oil are often unevenly distributed in the population benefiting the elite
proportionally more than the rest. This is because oil is a capital intensive industry with
only few linkages to the rest of the economy, therefore creating little employment (Karl,
2007). The result is that oil rich countries are plagued with high inequality (Mallaye et al.,
2015). In turn, high inequality influences inefficiency in the health care sector (Herrera
and Pang, 2005; Ogloblin, 2011; Ravallion, 2003). Inequality can create a barrier for the
poor to access health care services and generally reflects unhealthy working conditions.
Further, unequal societies tend to misallocate resources more in favour of the population
that can afford them and away from the part of the population who actually needs them
(Ogloblin, 2011).
The enclave characteristic and high profitability of oil makes it also lucrative for gov-
ernments to be less transparent allowing them to use the spoils of oil for their own purposes
(Karl, 2007). Williams (2011) confirms this argument empirically finding that point-source
resources, such as oil, decrease transparency. Less transparency should increase inefficiency
due to missing ways of holding the government accountable for their decisions.
Both −inequality and transparency− should lead to more inefficiency in the health
care sector, because an unequal income distribution is seen as obstacle for many to access
health care services and lower transparency could lead to the wrong kind of public health
investments. Therefore, I test here the two following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (H1) : oil rents decrease transparency, which in turn increases inef-
ficiency
Hypothesis 2 (H2) : oil rents increase inequality, which in turn increases ineffi-
ciency
To test the hypotheses I follow Carmignani and Avom (2010) and include a variable
measuring inequality and transparency in addition to the oil rents variable in the model.
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If the hypotheses are correct then the oil rents coefficients should lose in magnitude and
significance after including inequality or transparency. This is because any effect of oil
rents on inefficiency should be accounted for by the estimated coefficient of inequality or
transparency. Further, the inequality and transparency coefficient should be significant.
I am using Gini from the World Income Inequality database provided by UNU-WIDER
(2017) to capture inequality and to measure transparency I use the Release of Information
Index compiled by Williams (2009). The inclusion of the two variables creates some data
issues due to lower data coverage in terms of countries and years. To include the maximum
amount of countries the time dimension of the panel was shortened to 2000-2010. Even
with this adjustment some countries were lost completely. In the case of inequality the
number of countries drops from 119 to 96. Because of this, I first estimate the model with
the smaller sample to see whether the results still hold and then I include the transparency
and inequality variables to see whether they affect the oil rents coefficients.
Table 4.8 shows the results testing H1 (oil rents decrease transparency, which in turn
increases inefficiency). The odd columns re-estimate the specifications without transpar-
ency for the new smaller sample. The results are overall in line with the main results.
Column (2) of table 4.8 shows the results for the full sample including transparency.
The transparency coefficient is insignificant and has no influence on the oil rents coeffi-
cients. Hence, H1 cannot be confirmed. However, the situation changes for the democratic
sub-sample in column (4) where transparency is significant, and the oil rents coefficient
lose in magnitude and significance as it would be expected if H1 is true. The situation
changes again for the intermediate and autocratic sub-samples (columns (6) and (8)).
Whereas the sub-sample of intermediate countries is not affected by transparency (insig-
nificant transparency coefficient and no changes in oil rents coefficients), the autocratic
sub-sample surprisingly shows a significant and this time positive transparency coefficient.
The transparency coefficient indicates that more transparency increases inefficiency in
autocratic countries.
Concluding the transparency results: the inefficiency increasing effect due to oil rents
is partly driven by lower transparency in democratic countries, but transparency does not
seem to be the driving force in intermediate or autocratic countries.
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Table 4.8: Transparency mechanism
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All countries All countries Democratic Democratic
Mean inefficiency
Constant 1.6283∗∗∗ 1.6308∗∗∗ 1.6835∗∗∗ 1.7651∗∗∗
(0.1684) (0.1729) (0.1227) (0.1251)
Oil rents boom 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0082∗∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0085∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0036) (0.0043)
Oil rents bust 0.011∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0206∗∗∗ 0.0108
(0.002) (0.0022) (0.007) (0.0083)
Oil rents valley 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0094∗∗∗ 0.0161∗∗ 0.0094
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.007) (0.0072)
Transparency 0.0007 −0.0155∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0022)
GDP per capita −0.2193∗∗∗ −0.2238∗∗∗ −0.2159∗∗∗ −0.1279∗∗∗
(0.0267) (0.0293) (0.0159) (0.0215)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Intermediate Intermediate Autocracy Autocracy
Mean inefficiency
Constant 1.3163∗∗∗ 1.5386∗∗∗ 3.3746∗∗∗ 1.4454∗∗∗
(0.1233) (0.0964) (0.1683) (0.0978)
Oil rents boom 0.0061∗∗∗ 0.0073∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0005)
Oil rents bust 0.0089∗∗∗ 0.0106∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.0022) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Oil rents valley 0.0067 ∗ ∗∗ 0.0082∗∗∗ 0.0059∗∗∗ 0.0044∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.001)
Transparency 0.0039 0.0091∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0018)
GDP per capita −0.166∗∗∗ −0.2161∗∗∗ −0.434∗∗∗ −0.2073∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.0235) (0.0048)
Notes: Production functions (not shown) include public, private health care expenditure, schooling,
schooling2 (all converted to their natural logarithm), income dummies and time dummies. GDP per
capita is converted to natural logarithm. *, ** and *** stand for significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Table 4.9 shows the results testing H2 (oil rents increase inequality, which in turn
increases inefficiency). Inequality data are rare and Papyrakis (2016) even shows that
resource rich countries tend to under-report or not report inequality at all. The sample
is reduced to 96 countries and the list of excluded countries consists mainly of resource
rich countries.15 Replicating the main specifications for the smaller inequality sample
15The countries with missing inequality data are: Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Benin, Brunei, Cent-
ral African Republic, Chad, Rep. of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Guyana, Jamaica,
Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, Myanmar, Oman, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab
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resulted in insignificant results for intermediate and autocratic countries. Therefore, it is
not possible to test the inequality mechanism for intermediate and autocratic countries
and only the results for the full sample and democratic samples are discussed.
Table 4.9 shows the results for the full sample and the democratic sub-sample. In
column (1) and (3) the main specifications are re-estimated for the smaller samples without
inequality. Both show similar effects of oil rents in boom, bust and valley years as before.
Column (2) and (4) include inequality and the coefficients are positive and significant in
both samples, i.e. more inequality increases inefficiency. The oil rents coefficients for the
full sample lose in magnitude, but not in significance. The oil rents coefficients for the
democratic sub-sample again lose in magnitude and this time they also lose significance.
Not being able to test H2 for intermediate and autocratic countries leaves the conclusion
that inequality drives the oil rents effect on inefficiency to some degree in democratic
countries.
Table 4.9: Inequality mechanism
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All countries All countries Democratic Democratic
Mean inefficiency
Constant 2.762∗∗∗ 0.9804∗∗∗ 2.4606∗∗∗ 0.6021∗∗∗
(0.5777) (0.0772) (0.1261) (0.0932)
Oil rents boom 0.0114∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0042
(0.0036) (0.0011) (0.0054) (0.005)
Oil rents bust 0.0157∗∗∗ 0.0097∗∗∗ 0.0273∗∗∗ 0.0153∗
(0.005) (0.0025) (0.0105) (0.0085)
Oil rents valley 0.0136∗∗∗ 0.0085∗∗∗ 0.0212∗∗∗ 0.0042
(0.004) (0.0023) (0.0079) (0.0069)
Inequality 2.8942∗∗∗ 3.1154∗∗∗
(0.1752) (0.1799)
GDP per capita −0.4007∗∗∗ −0.2904∗∗∗ −0.349∗∗∗ −0.2499∗∗∗
(0.0943) (0.0123) (0.019) (0.0147)
Notes: Production functions (not shown) include public, private health care expenditure, schooling,
schooling2 (all converted to their natural logarithm), income dummies and time dummies. GDP per
capita is converted to natural logarithm. *, ** and *** stand for significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Emirates, and Uzbekistan.
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4.8 Conclusion
This chapter uses stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to estimate inefficiency in the health
care sector and focuses in particular on the question whether unexpected changes in oil
rents have an impact on inefficiency. The SFA estimates show that oil dependent countries
could increase life expectancy between 5 and 13 years by eradicating inefficiency in health
care spending. Further, the results confirm that oil rent is a significant determinant of
inefficiency in the health care sector, i.e. higher oil dependency leads to more inefficiency.
Exploiting exogenous fluctuations in the international oil price also shows that the effect
can be considered as causal for democratic countries.
The inefficiency increasing effect is heterogenous in several dimensions. First, the effect
is stronger in democratic countries compared to intermediate and autocratic countries.
Second, women’s health is affected by higher inefficiency compared to men’s and finally,
vulnerable parts of the population, such as infants and children, are affected by higher
inefficiency compared to adults.
Two mechanisms that could drive the effect have been postulated and tested. The
identified mechanisms are transparency and inequality. The results show that both mech-
anisms are responsible for the effect in democracies, but not in intermediate and autocratic
countries. Hence, policy implications for democratic oil rich countries would be to invest
the oil dividends into poverty reducing policies to battle inequality and reform institutions
to increase transparency.
Two caveats accompany the analysis and could not have been resolved yet. The first
is that the applied SFA model from Battese and Coelli (1995) includes all time-invariant
unobserved country heterogeneity in the inefficiency term and therefore represent upper
bound estimates. Other models, such as Greene (2005b) ‘true fixed effects’ model would
be capable to exclude time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity from the inefficiency term.
However, it is debatable how much of the unobserved heterogeneity should be included or
excluded in the inefficiency term and −as was noted by Greene himself− the true estimates
should be somewhere in between. The results in this chapter are derived completely from
Battese and Coelli (1995) model, because the Greene (2005b) model did not converge.
Therefore, the results should be seen as upper bound estimates of the real effect.
The second caveat is concerned with the quantification of the z-variables. The analysis
would benefit from the calculation of the marginal effects of oil rents and GDP per capita.
Wang (2002) shows that the marginal effects in this setting would be the slope coefficient
of the z-variables multiplied by an adjustment function. Using the Frontier4.1 software
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from Coelli (1996) I was unable to calculate the adjustment function and therefore cannot
make a statement by how much inefficiency increases if oil rents increases by one percent.
However, because oil rents and GDP per capita are included only in the mean of uit
the direction of the effect (inefficiency increasing or decreasing) is still valid because the
adjustment function would be positive Wang (2002).
Future research could focus on allocative inefficiency. The analysis here is restricted
to technical inefficiency due to missing data measuring input quantity and prices in the
health care sector. However, with time comes data and an analysis taking the allocation
of inputs into account would be of interest because resource curse theories predict that
oil rents increase the misallocation of resources which could be detected with allocative
inefficiency. Further, the analysis is not limited to the health care sector and stochastic
frontier analysis could analyse whether oil influences inefficiency in other areas as well,
such as education or infrastructure.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis has provided an empirical analysis of the political economy of natural resources.
The thesis consists of three chapters, each of them providing new insights on how natural
resources influence political survival, taxation and efficiency in the health care sector.
Here, I summarize the findings of each chapter, discuss their shortcomings and offer an
outlook for future research.
The first empirical chapter (chapter 2) asked the question whether natural resources
influence the time a leader stays in office. The question was addressed by applying ‘single
risk’ and ‘competing risk models’ to a large dataset of 1255 leaders from 158 countries.
The ‘single risk model’ measures the impact of giant resource discoveries on the hazard
of leaving office and the results indicate that giant mineral discoveries reduce the overall
risk of leaving office in non-election years. The same is true for giant oil discoveries, but
only in countries with a low level of institutional quality. The results of the ‘competing
risk model’ refines the results derived from the ‘single risk model’ and show that the risk
reducing effect in non-election years induced by giant mineral discoveries is solely driven
by a reduced risk of resignation. The risk reducing effect of oil discoveries in countries with
low level of institutional quality is due to a reduction in risk of resignation and military
coups.
The risk reducing effect of giant mineral and oil discoveries appear to be induced
by actual income rather than by income expectation. The time evolution of the effect
of a mineral discovery shows that risk is significantly reduced during construction and
extraction stages of a mine. The effect of oil discoveries needs almost a decade to develop
and coincides with the extraction stage when income is generated. Identified mechanisms
through which resource discoveries reduce the risk for the incumbent are lower taxation
of the non-resource economy and increased military expenditures.
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The findings are mostly in line with the existing literature and include some new
results. With respect to our results for oil, Omgba (2008) finds the same risk reducing
effect for African leaders, Wright et al. (2013) and Andersen and Aslaksen (2013) for regime
survival and Cuaresma et al. (2011) for autocratic leaders. Our result of a risk reducing
effect for mineral discoveries contradicts to some degree the zero effect in Omgba (2008)
and the risk increasing effect in Andersen and Aslaksen (2013). The different findings
could be explained by the mineral variable used in our analysis. Mineral rents −used in
Omgba (2008) and Andersen and Aslaksen (2013)− capture also small mines, while we
only include giant mineral discoveries. The effect could be non-linear, risk increasing for
small mineral deposits, which can be easier captured by the opposition, while bigger mines
benefit the incumbent. The significant findings of the ‘competing risk model’ represent
new results.
While the timing of resource discoveries represents a cleaner identification strategy
than resource production related variables, the discovery variable comes with a trade-off.
Giant resource discoveries are rare events and the two chosen categories of minerals and
oil could be too broadly defined. For example, the category of oil includes oil and gas
discoveries and the analysis cannot differentiate whether the effect is different between
the two resources. While oil and gas have a lot in common, they also have some different
characteristics in form of extraction, price or transportation. These differences could
influence the effect on political survival. The same is true for mineral discoveries. Hence,
the results should be interpreted as the net effect of giant resource discoveries.
Future research could pick up at this point and analyse the heterogeneity of different
resource discoveries. Case studies focusing on individual events would enrich our un-
derstanding of the effect of giant resource discoveries on political survival. Comparing
case studies with different resource types could answer the question whether the broad
categories of oil and minerals are justified.
A potential mechanism on how resource discoveries reduce the risk of a leader leaving
office −reduced non-resource tax− was already mentioned in the first empirical chapter.
Taxes are part of the fiscal contract between citizens and the government and any change
to it can have severe effects on development. Hence, this mechanism deserves an analysis
on its own.
The second empirical chapter (chapter 3) analyses whether resource revenues crowd
out domestic taxation. The question was addressed by applying synthetic control method
to a dataset of 25 resource exporting countries and by exploiting the 2000s commodity
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price boom as exogenous positive income shock.
The results confirm the existence of a crowding-out effect, more resource revenues de-
creased domestic tax income during the 2000s commodity price boom. An advantage of
the synthetic control method is the possibility to test for an effect in small samples. The
results for different sub-samples show that the crowding-out effect is not a necessity for
resource rich countries and only shows up significantly in countries with certain charac-
teristics. The sub-sample analysis shows that the crowding-out effect depends on resource
type, institutional quality, the amount of resources in the state budget, and government
preferences in terms of ownership structure and applied fiscal instruments. For example,
the crowding-out effect is present in oil exporting countries, but not in mineral or precious
mineral exporting countries. Within the sub-sample of oil exporting countries, a low level
of institutional quality and high oil dependency affects the significance of the crowding-
out effect positively. Further, a higher reliance on tax instruments compared to non-tax
instruments supports the existence of a crowding-out effect and while the effect is present
for both ownership structures −state and private− a nuanced difference in the timing and
magnitude between the two could be observed, with a delayed but overall greater effect in
countries with private oil ownership.
The confirmation of the crowding-out effect is in line with the existing literature
(Bornhorst et al., 2009; Crivelli and Gupta, 2014; Thomas and Trevin˜o, 2013; Ossowski
and Gonzales, 2012). The heterogeneity analysis represents new results and is the main
contribution of the chapter to the literature. The results improve our understanding of
the necessary conditions in a country for a crowding-out effect to be present and provide
possible policy implications. For example, new producers could avoid the crowding-out
effect by improving institutional quality, investing into tax administration and diversify
their revenue sources.
One caveat of the analysis rests in the availability of tax data in combination with
restrictive data requirements for the synthetic control method. The overall sample consists
of only 25 resource exporting countries, including six mineral producers. Compared to
other studies1 who managed to include over 30 oil rich countries this could be a concern.
Future research will hopefully benefit from the continuous effort of the International Centre
of Tax and Development in collecting reliable and comparable tax data.
Another concern regarding the analysis in chapter 3 relates to the assumption that the
treatment is the same in all treatment countries. Synthetic control method is only capable
1For example Bornhorst et al. (2009); Crivelli and Gupta (2014); Knebelmann (2017)
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to assign one price boom to each treatment country. Some countries extract more than
one resource. Therefore, they could be affected by several price booms. Countries are
identified by the main commodity they extract contributing most to government income
and should be the main contributor to any observed effect. However, there is no certainty
that the main resource is the sole contributor to the captured effect.
A natural follow-up analysis of chapter 3 would be an investigation of potential hetero-
genous effects across different tax types. Currently, the analysis is solely concerned with
the impact of resource revenues on total tax income. The effect could be different for VAT,
property tax, individual income tax or company’s profit tax and the insights of such an
analysis would highlight government preferences. The burden of different taxes is carried
by different parts of the population. Whether the government of a resource rich country
supports the elite or the poor can be seen in the way resource revenues affect regressive
or progressive taxes.
The third empirical chapter (chapter 4) asked the question whether oil rents are a
determinant of inefficiency in the health care sector. The question was addressed by
applying stochastic frontier analysis to a sample covering 119 countries and the period
2000 to 2015.
The applied stochastic frontier model from Battese and Coelli (1995) estimates health
production functions and inefficiency determinants simultaneously and by exploiting unex-
pected price fluctuations of the international oil price it was possible to test for causality.
The results of the chapter show that the efficiency score of oil rich countries is on
average lower compared to oil poor countries. The efficiency estimates show that oil
rich countries could increase life expectancy by eradicating inefficiency in the health care
sector between 5 and 13 years. Further, the analysis confirms that oil rents are a significant
determinant for inefficiency in the health care sector, i.e. higher oil dependency leads to
higher inefficiency. In terms of causality, the price fluctuation analysis shows that the
results can be considered as causal for democratic countries.
The analysis further reveals that the effect of oil rents on inefficiency in the health care
sector depends on institutions and is heterogenous for different parts of the population.
The inefficiency increasing effect of oil rents is greater and more significant in democratic
countries compared to intermediate and autocratic countries. Comparing the results for
different parts of the population shows that oil rents influence inefficiency more for wo-
men’s health than men’s and that the most vulnerable part of the population (infants and
children) is affected by higher inefficiency due to oil than adults.
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Inequality and transparency are identified as mechanisms through which oil rents in-
fluence inefficiency in the health care sector. This part of the analysis shows that parts of
the oil rents inefficiency increasing effect is explained by higher inequality and lower trans-
parency in oil rich countries. This result only holds for democratic countries and policy
implications for oil rich democratic countries could include investment of the oil dividend
into transparency increasing reforms and re-distributional policies to reduce inequality.
In the current form, the analysis in chapter 4 has one shortcoming that I couldn’t
resolve. The results derived from the Battese and Coelli (1995) stochastic frontier model
should be interpreted as upper bound estimates of the true effect. The reason for this
is that the Battese and Coelli (1995) model incorporates all time-invariant unobserved
country characteristics into the inefficiency term, which can lead to misspecification bias
in the presence of time-invariant unobservable factors that influence the outcome, but are
not part of the production process. A more precise analysis would also present lower bound
estimates of the true effect by applying a model that excludes output related time-invariant
unobserved country characteristics from the inefficiency term (e.g. the ‘true fixed effects’
model from Greene (2005b)). However, the ‘true fixed effects’ model did not converge and
therefore I am restricted to present only upper bound estimates.
Future research could go in two directions. First, with regards to the health care sector
an analysis estimating allocative inefficiency could provide more insights into the question
how oil influences inefficiency in the health care sector than the technical inefficiency es-
timated in chapter 4. Second, the stochastic frontier analysis is not restricted to the health
care sector and could also be applied to other areas, such as education or infrastructure,
to evaluate the impact of oil on inefficiency once respective data is collected and made
available.
In summary, this thesis contributes to our understanding of the political economy of
natural resources by analysing the impact of natural resources on political power, taxes and
inefficiency in the health care sector. It is important to understand how natural resources
influence policies and politicians’ behaviour to create and apply efficient instruments to
counteract any adverse effect natural resources potentially have on economic, political and
social development.
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Appendix A
Appendix to chapter 2
A.1 Tables
Table A 1: List of countries in the sample
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China,
Colombia, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland,
France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea Bissau,
Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea South, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos,
Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco,
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger,
Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Por-
tugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden,
Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tur-
key, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, USA, Uganda, Ukraine,
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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Table A 2: Countries and number of giant oil discoveries
Russia (139), Iran (64), Saudi Arabia (55), China (36), USA (33), Australia (32), Brazil
(32), Iraq (28), Nigeria (27), Norway (27), Libya (26), United Kingdom (22), Canada
(20), Indonesia (16), Egypt (14), Mexico (14), Kuwait (13), Venezuela (13), Angola (11),
Malaysia (8), Colombia (7), United Arab Emirates (7), India (5), Myanmar (5), Oman
(5), Pakistan (5), Algeria (4), Argentina (4), Bolivia (4), Congo, Rep. (4), Kazakhstan
(4), Thailand (4), Netherlands (3), Peru (3), Tunisia (3), Turkmenistan (3), Vietnam (3),
Yemen (3), Azerbaijan (2), Ecuador (2), France (2), Ghana (2), Italy (2), Mozambique
(2), Qatar (2), Sudan (2), Trinidad and Tobago (2), Afghanistan (1), Bangladesh (1),
Denmark (1), Ethiopia (1), Gabon (1), Germany (1), Hungary (1), Israel (1), Ivory Coast
(1), Morocco (1), New Zealand (1), Philippines (1), Romania (1), Sierra Leone (1), Spain
(1), Syria (1)
Table A 3: Countries and number of giant mineral discoveries
Australia (48), Canada (46), USA (43), Chile (37), Russia (37), South Africa (33), Brazil
(18), Peru (18), China (16), Indonesia (14), Argentina (11), Philippines (10), Mexico (9),
Colombia (7), Tanzania (7), Turkey (6), Congo, Dem. Rep. (5), Finland (5), Ghana
(5), Greece (5), Ecuador (4), Mongolia (4), Botswana (3), Guatemala (3), Iran (3), Mali
(3), Panama (3), Poland (3), Romania (3), Venezuela (3), Burkina Faso (2), Congo, Rep.
(2), Guinea (2), Iraq (2), Ivory Coast (2), Madagascar (2), Mauritania (2), Mozambique
(2), Niger (2), Saudi Arabia (2), Afghanistan (1), Angola (1), Bolivia (1), Bulgaria (1),
Burundi (1), Cameroon (1), Egypt(1), Hungary (1), India (1), Japan (1), Myanmar (1),
Namibia (1), New Zealand (1), Norway (1), Pakistan (1), Portugal (1), Sierra Leone (1),
Sudan (1), Sweden (1), Zambia (1), Zimbabwe (1)
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Table A 4: List of further variables
List of variables used in tables 2.2 and 2.3, for others see section 2.2.1:
(log of) GDP p.c.: Natural logarithm of real GDP at constant national prices, ob-
tained from national accounts data for each country divided by
population (Source: Penn World Table)
Economic growth: Yearly percentage change of GDP p.c. (Source: Penn World
Table)
Trade (% of GDP): Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as
a share of gross domestic product (Source: World Development
Indicators)
Wildcat: Number of explorative boreholes drilled in a country in a year,
serves as a proxy for exploration effort (Source: Cotet and Tsui
(2013a))
Crude oil price: Real crude oil price measured in 1990 US Dollar (Source: Cotet
and Tsui (2013a))
Metal index: Price index for bauxite, copper, lead, zinc, nickel, iron ore, tin.
Base year 2010. (Source: World Bank)
Precious metal index: Price index for gold, silver and platinum. Base year 2010 (Source:
World Bank)
Land area: Measures the size of a country in square kilometres (Source:
Cotet and Tsui (2013a))
Human capital: Human capital is measured using the average years of schooling
for the population aged 15 and older and the rates of return
for completing different sets of years of education (Source: Penn
World Table)
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Table A 5: Resource poor countries in 1950 according to Smith (2015)
Asia and Pacific
Afghanistan Bangladesh Cambodia China India
Indonesia Japan Laos Malaysia Mongolia
Nepal New Zealand Pakistan Philippines Korea, Rep.
Singapore Sri Lanka Taiwan Thailand Vietnam
Latin America and the Caribbean
Costa Rica Dominican Rep. Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala
Honduras Jamaica Nicaragua Panama Paraguay
Uruguay
Middle East and North Africa
Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon
Libya Morocco Oman Syria Tunisia
Turkey Yemen
Europe
Albania Belgium Bulgaria Czech Rep. Denmark
Finland France Germany Greece Hungary
Ireland Italy Netherlands Norway Poland
Portugal Spain Sweden UK
Sub-Saharan Africa
Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon
Centr. African Rep. Chad Congo, Rep. Ivory Coast Gabon
Gambia Ghana Guinea Kenya Lesotho
Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania
Mauritius Mozambique Namibia Niger Nigeria
Rwanda Senegal Somalia Sudan Swaziland
Tanzania Togo Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe
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Table A 6: First Resource Discovery, Institutions and Political Survival:
Single Risk Model in election years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Institution: x-polity x-polity xconst xconst
F. oil discovery −0.839 −44.394∗∗∗ −0.923 −35.048∗∗∗
(0.627) (4.015) (0.625) (2.830)
F. mineral discovery −1.239∗∗ −2.093 −1.296∗∗ −2.948
(0.588) (2.204) (0.576) (2.277)
Insitution 0.205∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.033) (0.067) (0.068)
F. oil # Institution 3.187∗∗∗ 5.037∗∗∗
(0.308) (0.426)
F. mineral # Inst. 0.091 0.340
(0.197) (0.402)
Observations 596 596 596 596
# of leaders 371 371 371 371
# of countries 83 83 83 83
LL -301 -298 -304 -300
Notes: The table shows the impact of first (F.) resource discoveries in initially resource poor countries on
the hazard of leaving office for leaders in election years. Included control variables: (log of) Population,
leader entry age, first leader after independence, oil discoveryt−10 and mineral discoveryt−10. Standard
errors are robust and clustered at the country level; *, ** and *** stand for significant at the 10%, 5% and
1% level.
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Table A 7: Resource Discovery and the Risk of Other:
Competing Risk Model in non-election years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Institution: x-polity x-polity xconst xconst xrcomp xrcomp
Oil discovery −0.389 −0.998 −0.431 −1.070 −0.382 −2.145∗
(0.470) (0.619) (0.469) (0.703) (0.466) (1.164)
Mineral disc. −0.355 0.454 −0.323 −0.300 −0.366 −1.243
(0.542) (0.983) (0.544) (0.868) (0.531) (0.784)
Institution 0.012 0.007 −0.054 −0.076 −0.522∗∗ −0.609∗∗
(0.039) (0.043) (0.088) (0.097) (0.218) (0.242)
Oil # Inst. 0.117 0.227 0.796
(0.087) (0.198) (0.499)
Mineral # Inst. −0.139 −0.023 0.362
(0.147) (0.203) (0.294)
Observations 5,211 5,211 5,211 5,211 5,212 5,213
# of leaders 1053 1053 1053 1053 1053 1053
# of countries 143 143 143 143 143 143
LL -1957 -1957 -1957 -1957 -1940 -1906
Notes: The table shows the impact of resource discoveries and institutions on the hazard of leaving
office because of other reasons in non-election years. Other reasons include domestic protest, domestic
rebels, other government actors, foreign force and assassination by unsupported individuals. Included
control variables: (log of) Population, leader entry age, first leader after independence, oil discoveryt−10
and mineral discoveryt−10. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level; *, ** and ***
stand for significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
150
T
a
b
le
A
8:
E
x
p
lo
ra
ti
on
E
ff
or
t,
R
es
ou
rc
e
D
is
co
ve
ry
,
In
st
it
u
ti
on
s
an
d
S
u
rv
iv
a
l:
S
in
gl
e
R
is
k
M
o
d
el
in
n
on
-e
le
ct
io
n
ye
ar
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
S
am
p
le
:
o
ri
gi
n
al
co
te
t
&
ts
u
i
co
te
t
&
ts
u
i
or
ig
in
al
co
te
t
&
ts
u
i
co
te
t
&
ts
u
i
o
ri
g
in
a
l
co
te
t
&
ts
u
i
co
te
t
&
ts
u
i
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
:
x
-P
ol
it
y
x
-P
o
li
ty
x
-P
ol
it
y
x
-P
ol
it
y
x
-P
ol
it
y
x
-P
ol
it
y
x
co
n
st
x
co
n
st
x
co
n
st
O
il
d
is
co
ve
ry
−0
.2
8
1
−0
.4
01
−0
.3
89
−1
.5
84
∗∗
∗
−1
.5
31
∗∗
∗
−1
.5
5
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.3
2
3
−0
.4
3
1
−0
.4
2
2
(0
.2
5
4)
(0
.2
7
4)
(0
.2
78
)
(0
.4
37
)
(0
.4
44
)
(0
.4
4
2)
(0
.2
5
9
)
(0
.2
7
8
)
(0
.2
8
2
)
M
in
er
al
d
is
c.
−0
.3
4
2
∗∗
−0
.1
7
4
−0
.1
56
−0
.4
13
−0
.3
57
−0
.4
74
−0
.3
2
6∗
−0
.1
7
8
−0
.1
6
3
(0
.1
6
3)
(0
.2
1
8)
(0
.2
21
)
(0
.4
68
)
(0
.6
43
)
(0
.6
5
4)
(0
.1
6
9
)
(0
.2
2
1
)
(0
.2
2
3
)
W
il
d
ca
t
−0
.0
61
−0
.1
8
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
5
1
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.0
67
)
(0
.0
5
3
)
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
0
.0
5
9
∗∗
∗
0.
07
1∗
∗
0
.0
71
∗∗
0
.0
40
∗∗
0.
03
3
0.
0
31
0.
0
8
4∗
∗
0
.1
0
2
∗
0
.1
0
4
∗
(0
.0
1
7)
(0
.0
2
9)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.0
2
7)
(0
.0
3
6
)
(0
.0
5
7
)
(0
.0
5
7
)
O
il
#
In
st
.
0
.1
59
∗∗
∗
0.
13
9∗
∗∗
0
.1
47
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.0
43
)
(0
.0
42
)
M
in
er
a
l
#
In
st
.
0.
00
5
0.
01
5
0.
03
5
(0
.0
45
)
(0
.0
68
)
(0
.0
69
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
on
s
5,
2
11
1,
8
39
1,
83
9
5,
21
1
1,
83
9
1,
8
39
5
,2
1
1
1
,8
3
9
1
,8
3
9
#
o
f
le
ad
er
s
10
53
39
6
39
6
10
53
39
6
39
6
1
0
5
3
3
9
6
3
9
6
#
o
f
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
1
43
57
57
14
3
57
57
1
4
3
5
7
5
7
L
L
-1
59
8
-5
90
-5
89
-1
58
4
-5
81
-5
8
0
-1
6
0
5
-5
9
3
-5
9
3
N
o
te
s:
T
h
e
ta
b
le
sh
ow
s
th
e
im
p
a
ct
o
f
re
so
u
rc
e
d
is
co
v
er
ie
s,
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s
a
n
d
th
ei
r
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
s
o
n
th
e
h
a
za
rd
o
f
le
av
in
g
o
ffi
ce
fo
r
th
e
si
n
g
le
ri
sk
m
o
d
el
in
n
o
n
-e
le
ct
io
n
y
ea
rs
.
M
o
d
el
1
,
4
a
n
d
7
u
se
s
a
ll
le
a
d
er
s
fr
o
m
th
e
re
su
lt
s
se
ct
io
n
.
M
o
d
el
2
,
5
a
n
d
8
re
-e
st
im
a
te
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
w
it
h
th
e
d
a
ta
av
a
il
a
b
le
fr
o
m
C
o
te
t
a
n
d
T
su
i
(2
0
1
3
a
)
a
n
d
M
o
d
el
3
,
6
a
n
d
9
in
cl
u
d
es
W
il
d
ca
t
va
ri
a
b
le
a
s
m
ea
su
re
o
f
ex
p
lo
ra
ti
o
n
eff
o
rt
.
In
cl
u
d
ed
co
n
tr
o
l
va
ri
a
b
le
s:
(l
og
o
f)
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
,
le
a
d
er
en
tr
y
a
ge
,
fi
rs
t
le
a
d
er
a
ft
er
in
d
ep
en
d
en
ce
,
o
il
d
is
co
ve
ry
t−
1
0
a
n
d
m
in
er
a
l
d
is
co
ve
ry
t−
1
0
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
ro
b
u
st
a
n
d
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
co
u
n
tr
y
le
v
el
;
*
,
*
*
a
n
d
*
*
*
st
a
n
d
fo
r
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
a
n
d
1
%
le
v
el
.
151
T
ab
le
A
9
:
(c
o
n
t’
d
fr
o
m
ta
b
le
A
8)
E
x
p
lo
ra
ti
on
E
ff
or
t,
R
es
ou
rc
e
D
is
co
ve
ry
,
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s
a
n
d
S
u
rv
iv
a
l:
S
in
gl
e
R
is
k
M
o
d
el
in
n
on
-e
le
ct
io
n
ye
ar
s
(1
0
)
(1
1)
(1
2)
(1
3)
(1
4)
(1
5)
(1
6
)
(1
7
)
(1
8
)
S
am
p
le
:
o
ri
gi
n
al
co
te
t
&
ts
u
i
co
te
t
&
ts
u
i
or
ig
in
al
co
te
t
&
ts
u
i
co
te
t
&
ts
u
i
o
ri
g
in
a
l
co
te
t
&
ts
u
i
co
te
t
&
ts
u
i
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
:
x
co
n
st
x
co
n
st
x
co
n
st
x
rc
om
p
x
rc
om
p
x
rc
om
p
x
rc
o
m
p
x
rc
o
m
p
x
rc
o
m
p
O
il
d
is
co
ve
ry
−1
.7
1
5
∗∗
∗
−1
.6
3
7∗
∗∗
−1
.6
75
∗∗
∗
−0
.3
46
−0
.4
46
−0
.4
4
2
−2
.5
6
9∗
∗∗
−2
.3
8
9
∗∗
∗
−2
.4
6
9∗
∗∗
(0
.5
12
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.2
65
)
(0
.2
85
)
(0
.2
89
)
(0
.6
9
9
)
(0
.7
5
5
)
(0
.7
4
9
)
M
in
er
al
d
is
c.
−0
.4
8
3
−0
.3
79
−0
.5
21
−0
.2
83
−0
.1
54
−0
.1
4
8
−0
.9
1
5
−0
.9
9
6
−1
.2
0
9
(0
.4
7
4)
(0
.6
2
3)
(0
.6
41
)
(0
.1
74
)
(0
.2
25
)
(0
.2
2
9)
(0
.6
0
8
)
(0
.9
4
6
)
(0
.9
9
0
)
W
il
d
ca
t
−0
.1
83
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
1
−0
.1
9
3∗
∗∗
(0
.0
69
)
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.0
7
1
)
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
0
.0
4
8
0.
03
2
0.
02
7
−0
.0
29
0.
05
0
0.
05
1
−0
.1
0
0
−0
.0
9
9
−0
.1
1
1
(0
.0
3
6)
(0
.0
5
4)
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.0
70
)
(0
.1
09
)
(0
.1
1
0)
(0
.0
7
1
)
(0
.1
0
8
)
(0
.1
0
7
)
O
il
#
In
st
.
0
.3
3
7
∗∗
∗
0.
29
8∗
∗∗
0
.3
16
∗∗
∗
0.
8
1
1∗
∗∗
0
.7
1
4
∗∗
∗
0
.7
5
9∗
∗∗
(0
.0
94
)
(0
.0
99
)
(0
.0
98
)
(0
.2
1
1
)
(0
.2
4
1
)
(0
.2
3
5
)
M
in
er
al
#
In
st
.
0
.0
2
6
0.
02
9
0.
07
5
0
.2
0
7
0.
2
6
4
0.
3
6
0
(0
.0
9
2)
(0
.1
3
1)
(0
.1
33
)
(0
.1
9
4
)
(0
.3
1
9
)
(0
.3
3
2
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
5
,2
1
1
1
,8
3
9
1
,8
39
5,
21
1
1,
83
9
1
,8
3
9
5
,2
1
1
1
,8
3
9
1
,8
3
9
#
of
le
a
d
er
s
1
05
3
3
96
3
96
10
53
39
6
3
96
1
0
5
3
3
9
6
3
9
6
#
of
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
14
3
5
7
57
14
3
57
5
7
1
4
3
5
7
5
7
L
L
-1
5
91
-5
8
5
-5
84
-1
61
1
-5
97
-5
97
-1
5
9
3
-5
8
5
-5
8
4
N
o
te
s:
C
o
n
ti
n
u
a
ti
o
n
fr
o
m
ta
b
le
A
8
.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
sh
ow
s
th
e
im
p
a
ct
o
f
re
so
u
rc
e
d
is
co
v
er
ie
s,
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s
a
n
d
th
ei
r
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
s
o
n
th
e
h
a
za
rd
o
f
le
av
in
g
o
ffi
ce
fo
r
th
e
si
n
g
le
ri
sk
m
o
d
el
in
n
o
n
-e
le
ct
io
n
y
ea
rs
.
M
o
d
el
1
0
,
1
3
a
n
d
1
6
u
se
s
a
ll
le
a
d
er
s
fr
o
m
th
e
re
su
lt
s
se
ct
io
n
.
M
o
d
el
1
1
,
1
4
a
n
d
1
7
re
-e
st
im
a
te
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
w
it
h
th
e
d
a
ta
av
a
il
a
b
le
fr
o
m
C
o
te
t
a
n
d
T
su
i
(2
0
1
3
a
)
a
n
d
M
o
d
el
1
2
,
1
5
a
n
d
1
8
in
cl
u
d
es
W
il
d
ca
t
va
ri
a
b
le
a
s
m
ea
su
re
o
f
ex
p
lo
ra
ti
o
n
eff
o
rt
.
In
cl
u
d
ed
co
n
tr
o
l
va
ri
a
b
le
s:
(l
og
o
f)
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
,
le
a
d
er
en
tr
y
a
ge
,
fi
rs
t
le
a
d
er
a
ft
er
in
d
ep
en
d
en
ce
,
o
il
d
is
co
ve
ry
t−
1
0
a
n
d
m
in
er
a
l
d
is
co
ve
ry
t−
1
0
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
ro
b
u
st
a
n
d
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
co
u
n
tr
y
le
v
el
;
*
,
*
*
a
n
d
*
*
*
st
a
n
d
fo
r
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
a
n
d
1
%
le
v
el
.
152
Table A 10: Resource Discovery, Institutions and Political Survival:
Single Risk Model in non-election years excluding leaders with term limit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Institution: x-polity x-polity xconst xconst xrcomp xrcomp
Oil discovery −0.215 −1.784∗∗∗ −0.277 −1.962∗∗∗ −0.326 −3.368∗∗∗
(0.280) (0.462) (0.290) (0.560) (0.302) (0.856)
Mineral disc. −0.450∗∗ −0.883∗ −0.445∗∗ −1.047∗ −0.366∗ −1.606∗∗
(0.197) (0.512) (0.203) (0.557) (0.211) (0.744)
Institution 0.094∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗ 0.023 −0.073
(0.020) (0.020) (0.039) (0.040) (0.086) (0.087)
Oil # Inst. 0.187∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 1.099∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.099) (0.253)
Mineral # Inst. 0.050 0.132 0.430∗∗
(0.047) (0.100) (0.219)
Observations 3,513 3,513 3,513 3,513 3,513 3,513
# of leaders 684 684 684 684 684 684
# of countries 124 124 124 124 124 124
LL -1120 -1103 -1130 -1113 -1145 -1119
Notes: The table shows the impact of resource discoveries, institutions and their interactions on the hazard
of leaving office in non-election years for leaders without term limits. Included control variables: (log of)
Population, leader entry age, first leader after independence, oil discoveryt−10 and mineral discoveryt−10.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level; *, ** and *** stand for significant at the
10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table A 11: Resource Discovery, Institutions and Political Survival:
Single Risk Model in non-election years excluding leaders not facing elections
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Institution: x-polity x-polity xconst xconst
Oil discovery 0.016 −1.075∗∗ 0.003 −1.117∗∗
(0.246) (0.511) (0.247) (0.565)
Mineral discovery −0.492∗∗∗ −0.758 −0.497∗∗∗ −0.835
(0.170) (0.493) (0.173) (0.521)
Institution 0.046∗∗∗ 0.031∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.050
(0.018) (0.018) (0.037) (0.036)
Oil # Institution 0.117∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗
(0.044) (0.101)
Mineral # Institution 0.030 0.073
(0.046) (0.098)
Observations 4,687 4,687 4,687 4,687
# of leaders 1016 1016 1016 1016
# of countries 132 132 132 132
LL -1510 -1502 -1512 -1505
Notes: The table shows the impact of resource discoveries, institutions and their interactions on the
hazard of leaving office in non-election years for leaders from countries with elections. Included control
variables: (log of) Population, leader entry age, first leader after independence, oil discoveryt−10 and
mineral discoveryt−10. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level; *, ** and *** stand
for significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table A 12: Resource Discovery, Institutions and Political Survival:
Single Risk Model in election years with lagged covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Institution: x-polity x-polity xconst xconst
Oil discoveryt−1 −0.015 −1.723 −0.036 −2.073∗
(0.311) (1.258) (0.315) (1.079)
Mineral discoveryt−1 −0.365 −1.284 −0.381 −1.246
(0.312) (0.915) (0.314) (0.946)
Institutiont−1 0.116∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.026) (0.053) (0.054)
Oil # Institutiont−1 0.154 0.374∗∗
(0.099) (0.170)
Mineral # Institutiont−1 0.084 0.158
(0.072) (0.150)
Observations 785 785 785 785
# of leaders 505 505 505 505
# of countries 126 126 126 126
LL -448 -444 -450 -445
Notes: The table shows the impact of lagged resource discoveries, institutions and their interactions on
the hazard of leaving office in election years. Included control variables: (log of) Population, leader entry
age, first leader after independence, oil discoveryt−10 and mineral discoveryt−10. Standard errors are robust
and clustered at the country level; *, ** and *** stand for significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table A 13: Resource Discovery, Institutions and Political Survival:
Single Risk Model in non-election years treating assassinated leaders as censored
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Institution: x-polity x-polity xconst xconst xrcomp xrcomp
Oil discovery −0.312 −1.655∗∗∗ −0.354 −1.783∗∗∗ −0.377 −2.624∗∗∗
(0.261) (0.452) (0.266) (0.532) (0.273) (0.727)
Mineral disc. −0.378∗∗ −0.500 −0.362∗∗ −0.560 −0.319∗ −0.968
(0.166) (0.474) (0.172) (0.484) (0.176) (0.624)
Institution 0.059∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.047 −0.031 −0.102
(0.018) (0.017) (0.037) (0.036) (0.071) (0.072)
Oil # Inst. 0.163∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.098) (0.220)
Mineral # Inst. 0.011 0.035 0.213
(0.046) (0.096) (0.203)
Observations 5,211 5,211 5,211 5,211 5,211 5,211
# of leaders 1053 1053 1053 1053 1053 1053
# of countries 143 143 143 143 143 143
LL -1582 -1566 -1588 -1574 -1594 -1576
Notes: The table shows the impact of resource discoveries, institutions and their interactions on the
hazard of leaving office in non-election years treating assassinated leaders as censored. Included control
variables: (log of) Population, leader entry age, first leader after independence, oil discoveryt−10 and
mineral discoveryt−10. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level; *, ** and *** stand
for significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table A 14: Resource Discovery, Institutions and Political Survival:
Single Risk Model in non-election years excluding resource dependent countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Institution: x-polity x-polity xconst xconst xrcomp xrcomp
Oil discovery −0.281 −1.783∗∗∗ −0.316 −1.877∗∗ −0.319 −2.581∗∗∗
(0.347) (0.607) (0.356) (0.729) (0.365) (0.914)
Mineral disc. −0.585∗∗ −1.239∗∗ −0.587∗∗ −1.543∗∗ −0.591∗∗ −1.975∗∗
(0.227) (0.559) (0.233) (0.616) (0.242) (0.777)
Institution 0.051∗∗∗ 0.029 0.069∗ 0.028 −0.069 −0.138∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.038) (0.038) (0.082) (0.083)
Oil # Inst. 0.192∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.126) (0.261)
Mineral # Inst. 0.094∗ 0.252∗∗ 0.568∗∗
(0.050) (0.114) (0.239)
Observations 3,670 3,670 3,670 3,670 3,670 3,670
# of leaders 745 745 745 745 745 745
# of countries 92 92 92 92 92 92
LL -1191 -1176 -1195 -1181 -1197 -1181
Notes: The table shows the impact of resource discoveries, institutions and their interactions on the
hazard of leaving office in non-election years for countries considered as resource poor in 1950. Included
control variables: (log of) Population, leader entry age, first leader after independence, oil discoveryt−10
and mineral discoveryt−10. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level; *, ** and ***
stand for significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table A 15: Resource Discovery, Institutions and Political Survival:
Single Risk Model in election years excluding resource dependent countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Institution: x-polity x-polity xconst xconst
Oil discovery −0.518 −2.693 −0.555∗ −3.030∗∗
(0.343) (2.105) (0.334) (1.512)
Mineral discovery −0.891∗∗ −2.862 −0.956∗∗ −2.939∗
(0.429) (1.818) (0.428) (1.537)
Institution 0.200∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.033) (0.066) (0.068)
Oil # Institution 0.193 0.447∗
(0.160) (0.234)
Mineral # Institution 0.197 0.414
(0.159) (0.280)
Observations 596 596 596 596
# of leaders 371 371 371 371
# of countries 83 83 83 83
LL -301 -298 -304 -300
Notes: The table shows the impact of resource discoveries, institutions and their interactions on the
hazard of leaving office in election years for countries considered as resource poor in 1950. Included control
variables: (log of) Population, leader entry age, first leader after independence, oil discoveryt−10 and
mineral discoveryt−10. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level; *, ** and *** stand
for significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Appendix B
Appendix to chapter 3
B.1 Tables
Table B 1: Market shares of mineral and precious mineral producers
Country Commodity Year Production Unit Production in %
Mongolia Gold 1998 9990 kg 0.41
Papua New Guinea Gold 1998 61641 kg 2.51
Guyana Gold 1998 14146 kg 0.58
World Gold 1998 2460000 kg 100.00
Chile Copper 2003 4904200 tonnes 35.80
World Copper 2003 13700000 tonnes 100.00
Guinea Bauxite 2003 17072200 tonnes 10.74
World Bauxite 2003 159000000 tonnes 100.00
Mauritania Iron Ore 2003 10153000 tonnes 0.82
World Iron Ore 2003 1237000000 tonnes 100.00
Notes: Data are from the British Geological Survey. Values for 1998 are from the World Mineral Statistics
1998-2002 and values for 2003 are from the World Mineral Production 2003-07.
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Table B 2: Test for structural breaks in the resource price 1991-2010
Structural breaks in the oil price
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
χ2 0.697 1.093 1.359 1.908 2.484 2.783 2.661 3.427 6.775 6.236
p-value 0.706 0.579 0.507 0.385 0.289 0.249 0.264 0.180 0.034 0.044
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
χ2 4.321 6.819 9.086 12.979 17.962 13.002 11.610 10.960 7.874 8.454
p-value 0.115 0.033 0.011 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.020 0.015
Structural breaks in the precious mineral price index
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
χ2 1.377 1.616 1.956 2.148 2.031 2.677 2.917 3.864 4.623 5.676
p-value 0.502 0.446 0.376 0.342 0.362 0.262 0.233 0.145 0.099 0.059
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
χ2 6.462 8.065 7.802 8.003 8.666 15.357 7.617 8.299 7.805 11.309
p-value 0.040 0.018 0.020 0.018 0.013 0.000 0.022 0.016 0.020 0.004
Structural breaks in the minerla price index
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
χ2 0.661 0.681 0.743 1.281 1.030 0.940 1.479 1.450 2.422 2.903
p-value 0.719 0.711 0.690 0.527 0.597 0.625 0.477 0.484 0.298 0.234
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
χ2 2.475 3.313 4.488 6.469 7.047 26.661 5.969 8.339 13.034 9.435
p-value 0.290 0.191 0.106 0.039 0.030 0.000 0.051 0.015 0.001 0.009
Notes: The table shows the results of the Wald test for structural breaks of a regression of resource price
(oil, precious minerals and minerals) on its lagged value. Bold values indicate significance at the 10% level,
i.e. the years in which the null of no structural break could not be rejected.
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Table B 3: Pre-treatment RMSPE for different specifications
Country Average Last one Last two Last three Last four Last five
Algeria 0.209394 0.227484 0.227484 0.259413 0.258011 0.268318
Azerbaijan 0.348738 0.492621 0.492621 0.480328 0.366515 0.348738
Brunei 0.214589 0.144999 0.144999 0.144999 0.144999 0.138707
Cameroon 0.081726 0.242671 0.242671 0.157677 0.056397 0.061256
Ecuador 0.094921 0.099655 0.099655 0.098910 0.096587 0.094659
Egypt 0.079122 0.097305 0.097305 0.129435 0.096731 0.051671
Gabon 0.134347 0.230730 0.230730 0.137486 0.140647 0.142252
Indonesia 0.060928 0.105735 0.105735 0.067354 0.061719 0.064171
Kazakhstan 0.120002 0.120002 0.120002 0.120002 0.120002 0
Kuwait 0.138102 0.125660 0.125660 0.141060 0.144727 0.138102
Libya 0.135874 0.151220 0.151220 0.139160 0.116046 0.143747
Malaysia 0.073897 0.103895 0.103895 0.097057 0.097039 0.094724
Norway 0.010089 0.021518 0.021518 0.011229 0.010089 0
Saudi Arabia 0.118347 0.106749 0.106749 0.125084 0.128814 0.118347
Syria 0.091288 0.214746 0.214746 0.198099 0.107504 0.092112
Trinidad and Tobago 0.118062 0.186572 0.186572 0.171844 0.166922 0.182515
Turkmenistan 0.160192 0.207279 0.207279 0.160192 0 0
Venezuela 0.091063 0.156282 0.156282 0.098616 0.088818 0.091063
Yemen 0.086801 0.106354 0.106354 0.105369 0.101327 0.102417
Chile 0.053291 0.087181 0.087181 0.128976 0.123073 0.122050
Guinea 0.091400 0.220861 0.220861 0.279881 0.170376 0.110831
Mauritania 0.089651 0.066503 0.066503 0.094146 0.139468 0.150084
Guyana 0.105608 0.098625 0.098625 0.076988 0.091265 0.101005
Mongolia 0.181123 0.215510 0.215510 0.239121 0.240301 0.220605
Papua New Guinea 0.055980 0.054798 0.055021 0.055167 0.055206 0.055347
Average 0.117781 0.155398 0.155407 0.148704 0.130108 0.131487
Notes: Table shows pre-treatment RMSPEs calculated with different lagged outcome variables. Minimum
average RMSPE is achieved by including the average of the outcome variable which is used in the analysis.
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Table B 4: Treatment countries, treatment periods and data adjustments
Pre- Post-
treatment treatment Interpolated
period period years
Country Start End Start End
Algeria 1989 1998 1999 2012
Azerbaijan 1994 1998 1999 2012
Brunei 1991 1998 1999 2012 2010
Cameroon 1993 1998 1999 2012 2007-2008
Chile 1994 2003 2004 2012
Ecuador 1989 1998 1999 2012 1989
Egypt 1989 1998 1999 2010
Gabon 1989 1998 1999 2012
Guinea 1993 2003 2004 2012
Guyana 1993 1998 1999 2012
Indonesia 1989 1998 1999 2012
Kazakhstan 1995 1998 1999 2004
Kuwait 1994 1998 1999 2012
Libya 1991 1998 1999 2010
Malaysia 1989 1998 1999 2008
Mauritania 1994 2003 2004 2012 1989
Mongolia 1992 1998 1999 2007
Norway 1995 1998 1999 2012
Papua New Guinea 1989 1998 1999 2012
Saudi Arabia 1994 1998 1999 2012 2005-2008
Syria 1991 1998 1999 2007
Trinidad and Tobago 1989 1998 1999 2005
Turkmenistan 1996 1998 1999 2008 1999
Venezuela 1994 1998 1999 2012
Yemen 1989 1998 1999 2003 1989
Notes: Values for interpolated years are calculated by linear interpolation.
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Table B 6: Definition and source of variables used in the analysis
Variable Definition Source
Total tax per cap-
ita
Total tax per capita are total tax reven-
ues (excluding revenues from the resource
sector and social contributions) divided by
population. Values are measured in con-
stant 2010 US$.
Authors calculation
with data from ICTD
GRD for taxes and
World Develop-
ment Indicators for
population
ODA (% of non-
resource GDP)
Net official development assistance (ODA)
consists of disbursements of loans made on
concessional terms (net of repayments of
principal) and grants by official agencies of
the members of the Development Assist-
ance Committee (DAC), by multilateral in-
stitutions, and by non-DAC countries to
promote economic development and wel-
fare in countries and territories in the DAC
list of ODA recipients. It includes loans
with a grant element of at least 25 percent
(calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per-
cent).
World Development
Indicators
GDP per capita GDP divided by population, converted to
constant 2010 US-Dollar, expenditure ap-
proach
IMF World Economic
Outlook
Population Total population is based on the de facto
definition of population, which counts all
residents regardless of legal status or cit-
izenship. The values shown are midyear
estimates.
World Development
Indicators
Continued on next page
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Table B 6 – continued from previous page
Variable Definition Source
Agriculture,
value added (%
of non-resource
GDP)
Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions
1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fish-
ing, as well as cultivation of crops and
livestock production. Value added is the
net output of a sector after adding up all
outputs and subtracting intermediate in-
puts. It is calculated without making de-
ductions for depreciation of fabricated as-
sets or depletion and degradation of nat-
ural resources. The origin of value added is
determined by the International Standard
Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3.
Note: For VAB countries, gross value ad-
ded at factor cost is used as the denomin-
ator.
World Development
Indicators
Inflation Inflation as measured by the annual growth
rate of the GDP implicit deflator shows the
rate of price change in the economy as a
whole. The GDP implicit deflator is the
ratio of GDP in current local currency to
GDP in constant local currency.
World Development
Indicators
Polity2 Combined Polity Score; measuring on a
scale from -10 to +10 the polity of a coun-
try.
Centre of Systematic
Peace
OPEC Dummy variable equal one for OPEC mem-
ber countries
www.opec.org
Tax to non-tax
ratio
Government revenues from the resource
sector derived by taxes divided by govern-
ment revenues from the resource sector de-
rived by non-tax instruments
Author calculation
with data from ICTD
GRD
Continued on next page
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Table B 6 – continued from previous page
Variable Definition Source
Resource depend-
ency
Resource revenues as percentage of total
government revenues.
ICTD GRD
Nationalised
resource sector
Dummy equal one if the resource sector is
state owned.
Luong and Weinthal
(2010)
Government final
consumption ex-
penditure (% of
GDP)
General government final consumption ex-
penditure (formerly general government
consumption) includes all government cur-
rent expenditures for purchases of goods
and services (including compensation of
employees). It also includes most expendit-
ures on national defense and security, but
excludes government military expenditures
that are part of government capital forma-
tion.
World Development
Indicators
Continued on next page
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Table B 6 – continued from previous page
Variable Definition Source
Gross capital
formation (% of
GDP)
Gross capital formation (formerly gross do-
mestic investment) consists of outlays on
additions to the fixed assets of the eco-
nomy plus net changes in the level of in-
ventories. Fixed assets include land im-
provements (fences, ditches, drains, and so
on); plant, machinery, and equipment pur-
chases; and the construction of roads, rail-
ways, and the like, including schools, of-
fices, hospitals, private residential dwell-
ings, and commercial and industrial build-
ings. Inventories are stocks of goods held
by firms to meet temporary or unexpec-
ted fluctuations in production or sales, and
”work in progress.” According to the 1993
SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are also
considered capital formation.
World Development
Indicators
Total reserves
(includes gold, %
of GDP)
Obtained by dividing total reserves (in-
cludes gold, current US$) by GDP (current
US$).
Author calculation
with data from
Word Development
Indicators
Corruption Control of corruption captures perceptions
of the extent to which public power is exer-
cised for private gain, including both petty
and grand forms of corruption, as well as
”capture” of the state by elites and private
interests.
Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators
Continued on next page
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Table B 6 – continued from previous page
Variable Definition Source
Non-resource
GDP
Non-resource GDP is calculated from Na-
tional accounts data calculating value ad-
ded and GDP from the production side,
published by the UN. NRGDP is defined
as total value added minus value added in
Mining and Utilities (ISIC C and E).
UN, National Ac-
counts Main Aggreg-
ates Database
Table B 7: Summary statistics
N Average Std. Min Max
Total tax p.c. 3671 2773.53 4671.23 2.75 28356.94
Non-resource GDP p.c. 4327 8356.96 12345.03 108.65 77243.10
Gov. Expenditure 3515 16.84 6.96 3.46 76.22
Capital formation 3555 23.15 8.49 -0.69 70.23
Reserves 3647 16.48 17.78 0.01 318.56
Corruption 2470 0.09 1.02 -1.72 2.47
Agriculture 4327 14.79 13.62 0.04 72.80
ODA 4099 7.65 16.24 -0.67 551.03
Inflation 4067 25.94 290.39 -32.03 13109.50
Polity2 3438 2.94 6.99 -10.00 10.00
Tax to non-tax ratio dummy 1188 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Resource dependency 1735 0.16 0.25 0.00 0.96
Notes: Total tax p.c., non-resource GDP p.c. are in constant 2010 US$; Government expenditure, Capital
formation, reserves are in percent of GDP; agriculture and ODA is in percent of non-resource GDP.
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Table B 9: Predictor weights for new producers
Vietnam Sudan
Variable Weight Variable Weight
total tax(1988) 0.934194260 total tax(1989) 0.024057518
non-res. GDP p.c. 0.047342226 total tax(1990) 0.084118182
capital formation 0.013768641 total tax(1993) 0.031093122
agriculture 0.000615903 total tax(1997) 0.433040660
ODA 0.000032585 total tax(1998) 0.426815067
inflation 0.004046384 capital formation 0.000108246
reserves 0.000433593
Equatorial Guinea gov. expenditure 0.000217718
Variable Weight inflation 0.000115894
total tax(1984) 0.136357628
total tax(1988) 0.163690431 Chad
total tax(1992) 0.670930230 Variable Weight
reserves 0.002773620 total tax(1994) 0.145433338
gov. expenditure 0.000229995 total tax(1995) 0.453272476
inflation 0.001132240 total tax(1997) 0
non-res. GDP p.c. 0.021511988 total tax(2001) 0
agriculture 0.001007070 total tax(2002) 0.315070637
ODA 0.002366799 non-res. GDP p.c. 0.069753476
gov. expenditure 0.006045358
East Timor capital formation 0.001090368
Variable Weight reserves 0.001029538
total tax(2002) 0.287637752 corruption 0.005312116
total tax(2003) 0.703315994 ODA 0.000610302
non-res. GDP p.c. 0.009030336 agriculture 0.002170606
gov. expenditure 0.000000099 inflation 0.000211786
capital formation 0.000001497
ODA 0.000011108
agriculture 0.000001305
inflation 0.000001907
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Table B 10: Pre-treatment RMSPE for new producers
Included outcome variable to construct synthetic control
first, first two,
middle, middle,
Country average last two last first, last last last two
Vietnam 0.1811948 0.1808405 0.1808878 0.1964921 0.1820008 0.2162516
Sudan 0.1047668 0.1096324 0.0972895 0.1229826 0.1048950 0.0831126
Eq. Guinea 0.2534069 0.2233420 0.3735048 0.2061530 0.2026414 0.2047065
Chad 0.0508203 0.0541413 0.0639323 0.0534216 0.0553685 0.0487793
East Timor 0.1047185 0.0955727 0.0922129 — — —
Notes: Table shows pre-treatment RMSPEs calculated with different lagged outcome variables. Bold
indicates the minimum RMSPE and is used in the analysis.
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B.2 Figures
Figure B.1: Oil price and World Bank forecasts
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Figure B.2: Synthetic control estimates for mineral exporters
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Figure B.3: Synthetic control estimates for precious mineral exporters
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Figure B.4: Robustness check: Excluding Saudi Arabia
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Figure B.5: Continuation of Fig. B.4
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Figure B.6: Robustness check: Excluding Libya and Gabon
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Figure B.7: Continuation of Fig: B.6
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Figure B.8: Robustness check: Including additional predictor variable
(a) Including inflation
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(b) Including agriculture
.7
.8
.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
.7
.8
.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
to
ta
l t
ax
 p
.c
. (n
orm
ali
ze
d t
o 1
 in
 19
89
)
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
year
oil exporters synthetic control
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
th
at
 th
is 
wo
ul
d 
ha
pp
en
 b
y 
ch
an
ce
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Number of years after event (1=1999)
(c) Including ODA
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(d) Including all additional predictor variable
(inflation, agriculture and ODA)
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Figure B.9: Robustness check: Excluding Norway
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Figure B.10: Continuation of Fig: B.9
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Appendix C
Appendix to chapter 4
C.1 Tables
Table C 1: List of countries in the sample
# Country Oil rent Income group Institution
1 Albania 1.47 Upper Middle Income Democracy
2 Algeria 19.69 Upper Middle Income Intermediate
3 Angola 41.67 Upper Middle Income Intermediate
4 Argentina 3.21 Upper Middle Income Democracy
5 Armenia 0.00 Lower Middle Income Democracy
6 Azerbaijan 30.72 Upper Middle Income Autocratic
7 Bahamas 0.00 High Income
8 Bahrain 6.00 High Income Autocratic
9 Bangladesh 0.95 Lower Middle Income Intermediate
10 Belarus 1.10 Upper Middle Income Autocratic
11 Belize 2.33 Upper Middle Income
12 Benin 0.04 Low Income Democracy
13 Bolivia 6.76 Lower Middle Income Democracy
14 Botswana 0.00 Upper Middle Income Democracy
15 Brazil 1.71 Upper Middle Income Democracy
16 Brunei 21.79 High Income
17 Bulgaria 0.07 Upper Middle Income Democracy
18 Burundi 0.00 Low Income Intermediate
19 Cambodia 0.00 Lower Middle Income Intermediate
Continued on next page
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Table C 1 – continued from previous page
# Country Oil rent Income group Institution
20 Cameroon 5.51 Lower Middle Income Autocratic
21 Canada 2.73 High Income Democracy
22 Cape Verde 0.00 Lower Middle Income Democracy
23 Central Afr. Rep. 0.00 Low Income Intermediate
24 Chad 18.80 Low Income Intermediate
25 Chile 0.07 High Income Democracy
26 China 1.43 Upper Middle Income Autocratic
27 Colombia 4.39 Upper Middle Income Democracy
28 Congo 44.43 Lower Middle Income Autocratic
29 Costa Rica 0.00 Upper Middle Income Democracy
30 Cote d’Ivoire 2.55 Lower Middle Income Intermediate
31 Croatia 0.65 High Income Democracy
32 Cyprus 0.00 High Income Democracy
33 DR of Congo 1.72 Low Income Intermediate
34 Denmark 1.37 High Income Democracy
35 Dominican Rep. 0.00 Upper Middle Income Democracy
36 Ecuador 11.61 Upper Middle Income Democracy
37 Egypt 9.17 Lower Middle Income Autocratic
38 El Salvador 0.00 Lower Middle Income Democracy
39 Ethiopia 0.00 Low Income
40 Finland 0.00 High Income Democracy
41 Gabon 30.82 Upper Middle Income Intermediate
42 Gambia 0.00 Low Income Autocratic
43 Georgia 0.26 Upper Middle Income Democracy
44 Germany 0.05 High Income Democracy
45 Ghana 1.52 Lower Middle Income Democracy
46 Guatemala 0.56 Lower Middle Income Democracy
47 Guinea 0.00 Low Income Intermediate
48 Guyana 0.00 Upper Middle Income Democracy
49 Honduras 0.00 Lower Middle Income Democracy
50 India 1.23 Lower Middle Income Democracy
Continued on next page
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Table C 1 – continued from previous page
# Country Oil rent Income group Institution
51 Indonesia 3.61 Lower Middle Income Democracy
52 Iran 24.14 Upper Middle Income Autocratic
53 Italy 0.11 High Income Democracy
54 Jamaica 0.00 Upper Middle Income Democracy
55 Jordan 0.04 Upper Middle Income Intermediate
56 Kazakhstan 18.77 Upper Middle Income Autocratic
57 Kenya 0.00 Lower Middle Income Democracy
58 Kuwait 47.87 High Income Autocratic
59 Kyrgyz Republic 0.52 Lower Middle Income Intermediate
60 Laos 0.00 Lower Middle Income Autocratic
61 Latvia 0.00 High Income Democracy
62 Lesotho 0.00 Lower Middle Income Democracy
63 Liberia 0.00 Low Income Intermediate
64 Lithuania 0.16 High Income Democracy
65 Luxembourg 0.00 High Income Democracy
66 Madagascar 0.00 Low Income Democracy
67 Malawi 0.00 Low Income Democracy
68 Malaysia 5.67 Upper Middle Income Intermediate
69 Mali 0.00 Low Income Democracy
70 Malta 0.00 High Income
71 Mauritania 3.16 Lower Middle Income Intermediate
72 Mauritius 0.00 Upper Middle Income Democracy
73 Moldova 0.04 Lower Middle Income Democracy
74 Mongolia 1.08 Lower Middle Income Democracy
75 Morocco 0.01 Lower Middle Income Autocratic
76 Mozambique 0.93 Low Income Democracy
77 Myanmar 2.68 Lower Middle Income Autocratic
78 Namibia 0.00 Upper Middle Income Democracy
79 Nepal 0.00 Low Income Intermediate
80 Nicaragua 0.00 Lower Middle Income Democracy
81 Niger 0.88 Low Income Democracy
Continued on next page
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Table C 1 – continued from previous page
# Country Oil rent Income group Institution
82 Oman 38.59 High Income Autocratic
83 Pakistan 1.83 Lower Middle Income Intermediate
84 Panama 0.00 Upper Middle Income Democracy
85 Papua New G. 7.25 Lower Middle Income Intermediate
86 Paraguay 0.00 Upper Middle Income Democracy
87 Peru 1.67 Upper Middle Income Democracy
88 Philippines 0.20 Lower Middle Income Democracy
89 Portugal 0.00 High Income Democracy
90 Qatar 32.88 High Income Autocratic
91 Romania 1.77 Upper Middle Income Democracy
92 Russia 14.42 Upper Middle Income Democracy
93 Rwanda 0.00 Low Income Intermediate
94 Samoa 0.00 Lower Middle Income
95 Saudi Arabia 40.94 High Income Autocratic
96 Senegal 0.01 Low Income Democracy
97 Sierra Leone 0.00 Low Income Democracy
98 Singapore 0.00 High Income Intermediate
99 South Africa 0.07 Upper Middle Income Democracy
100 South Korea 0.00 High Income Democracy
101 Sri Lanka 0.00 Lower Middle Income Democracy
102 Sudan 10.90 Lower Middle Income Autocratic
103 Swaziland 0.00 Lower Middle Income Autocratic
104 Tajikistan 0.15 Lower Middle Income Intermediate
105 Tanzania 0.07 Low Income Intermediate
106 Thailand 1.42 Upper Middle Income Democracy
107 Togo 0.00 Low Income Intermediate
108 Trin. and Tobago 14.66 High Income Democracy
109 Tunisia 3.95 Lower Middle Income Intermediate
110 Uganda 0.00 Low Income Intermediate
111 Ukraine 1.95 Lower Middle Income Democracy
112 UAE 21.19 High Income Autocratic
Continued on next page
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Table C 1 – continued from previous page
# Country Oil rent Income group Institution
113 United Kingdom 0.84 High Income Democracy
114 United States 0.63 High Income Democracy
115 Uruguay 0.00 High Income Democracy
116 Uzbekistan 19.62 Lower Middle Income Autocratic
117 Vietnam 5.92 Lower Middle Income Autocratic
118 Yemen 26.05 Lower Middle Income Intermediate
119 Zambia 0.00 Lower Middle Income Democracy
Table C 2: Definition and source of variables used in the analysis
Variable Definition Source
Life expectancy
at birth, total,
male, female
(years)
Life expectancy at birth indicates the num-
ber of years a newborn infant would live if
prevailing patterns of mortality at the time
of its birth were to stay the same.
World Development
Indicators
Oil rents (% of
GDP)
Is the sum of oil and gas rents from WDI.
Oil and gas rents are the difference between
the value of crude oil and gas production at
world prices and total costs of production.
World Development
Indicators
Oil price Crude oil, average spot price of Brent,
Dubai and West Texas Intermediate,
equally weighed in real 2010 US$
World Bank Com-
modity Price Data
(The Pink Sheet)
Continued on next page
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Table C 2 – continued from previous page
Variable Defintion Source
GDP per capita GDP per capita based on purchasing power
parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic
product converted to international dollars
using purchasing power parity rates. An
international dollar has the same purchas-
ing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has
in the United States. GDP at purchasers
prices is the sum of gross value added by
all resident producers in the economy plus
any product taxes and minus any subsidies
not included in the value of the products.
It is calculated without making deductions
for depreciation of fabricated assets or for
depletion and degradation of natural re-
sources. Data are in constant 2011 inter-
national dollars.
World Development
Indicators
Schooling (years) Mean years of education of population over
25
Human Development
Indicators
Mortality rate,
adult (per 1,000
live births)
Adult mortality rate is the probability of
dying between 15 and 60 years per 1000
population
World Health Organ-
ization
Mortality rate,
child (per 1,000
live births)
Under-five mortality rate is the probabil-
ity per 1,000 that a newborn baby will
die before reaching age five, if subject to
age-specific mortality rates of the specified
year.
World Development
Indicators
Mortality rate,
infant (per 1,000
live births)
Infant mortality rate is the number of in-
fants dying before reaching one year of age,
per 1,000 live births in a given year.
World Development
Indicators
Continued on next page
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Table C 2 – continued from previous page
Variable Defintion Source
Maternal mor-
tality ratio (per
100,000 live
births)
Maternal mortality ratio is the number
of women who die from pregnancy-related
causes while pregnant or within 42 days
of pregnancy termination per 100,000 live
births. The data are estimated with a re-
gression model using information on the
proportion of maternal deaths among non-
AIDS deaths in women ages 15-49, fertility,
birth attendants, and GDP.
World Development
Indicators
Mortality rate,
neonatal (per
1,000 live births)
Neonatal mortality rate is the number of
neonates dying before reaching 28 days of
age, per 1,000 live births in a given year.
World Development
Indicators
Polity2 Combined Polity Score; measuring on a
scale from -10 to +10 the polity of a coun-
try.
Centre of Systematic
Peace
Public health
expenditure per
capita
Mandatory payments or contributions to
the health care sector including transfers
from government domestic revenues, so-
cial insurance contribution and compuls-
ory prepayment other than social contri-
bution (variable FS1, FS2 and FS4 in the
SHA2011 framework)
World Health Organ-
ization
Private health
expenditure per
capita
Voluntary contributions to the health care
sector including voluntary prepayments
and other domestic revenues (FS5 and FS6
in the SHA2011 framework)
World Health Organ-
ization
Continued on next page
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Table C 2 – continued from previous page
Variable Defintion Source
Transparency Transparency is measured as the Release
of Information index and is based on the
quantity of reported socio- economic data
contained in the World Development Indic-
ators and the International Finance Stat-
istics databases.
(Williams 2015)
Inequality Inequality is measured as the Gini index.
The Gini index is defined as the deviation
of the income distribution from a perfectly
equal distribution.
World Income In-
equality Dataset
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Table C 3: Technical efficiency ranking by income groups
Low income Lower middle income Upper middle income High income
# Country Eff. # Country Eff. # Country Eff. # Country Eff.
1 Nepal 0.9880 1 Vietnam 0.9927 1 Costa Rica 0.9946 1 Italy 0.9920
2 Senegal 0.9460 2 Morocco 0.9866 2 Albania 0.9911 2 Singapore 0.9909
3 Ethiopia 0.9360 3 Cape Verde 0.9859 3 China 0.9887 3 UK 0.9891
4 Niger 0.9058 4 Sri Lanka 0.9841 4 Panama 0.9863 4 Canada 0.9885
5 Gambia 0.8974 5 Bangladesh 0.9834 5 Jamaica 0.9814 5 South Korea 0.9882
6 Madagascar 0.8973 6 Nicaragua 0.9799 6 Ecuador 0.9802 6 Malta 0.9880
7 Guinea 0.8883 7 Tunisia 0.9779 7 Thailand 0.9754 7 Cyprus 0.9849
8 Rwanda 0.8848 8 Samoa 0.9747 8 Algeria 0.9736 8 Chile 0.9840
9 Benin 0.8839 9 Honduras 0.9743 9 Georgia 0.9727 9 Finland 0.9814
10 Liberia 0.8687 10 Armenia 0.9727 10 Argentina 0.9725 10 Germany 0.9810
11 Mali 0.8487 11 Guatemala 0.9565 11 Peru 0.9686 11 Luxembourg 0.9775
12 Tanzania 0.8469 12 Tajikistan 0.9472 12 Malaysia 0.9684 12 Portugal 0.9771
13 Burundi 0.8404 13 El Salvador 0.9404 13 Colombia 0.9633 13 Denmark 0.9738
14 DRC 0.8345 14 PNG 0.9388 14 Mauritius 0.9605 14 Brunei 0.9675
15 Mozambique 0.8333 15 Myanmar 0.9366 15 Romania 0.9590 15 Croatia 0.9658
16 Togo 0.8293 16 Kyrgyz Rep. 0.9349 16 Dominican Rep. 0.9577 16 Uruguay 0.9621
17 Malawi 0.8163 17 Uzbekistan 0.9334 17 Jordan 0.9561 17 Qatar 0.9589
18 Chad 0.7871 18 Egypt 0.9294 18 Paraguay 0.9556 18 Oman 0.9582
19 Uganda 0.7844 19 Yemen 0.9251 19 Bulgaria 0.9504 19 Bahrain 0.9551
20 Centr. Afr. Rep. 0.7113 20 Philippines 0.9192 20 Iran 0.9488 20 UAE 0.9443
21 Sierra Leone 0.6911 21 Moldova 0.9178 21 Brazil 0.9450 21 United States 0.9424
22 Ukraine 0.9142 22 Belize 0.9275 22 Bahamas 0.9340
23 Cambodia 0.9139 23 Belarus 0.9256 23 Kuwait 0.9297
24 Indonesia 0.9125 24 Azerbaijan 0.9254 24 Lithuania 0.9275
25 Pakistan 0.9099 25 Kazakhstan 0.8939 25 Latvia 0.9258
26 India 0.9095 26 Guyana 0.8933 26 Saudi Arabia 0.9234
27 Laos 0.8880 27 Russia 0.8832 27 Trinidad and Tobago 0.8789
28 Mongolia 0.8865 28 Gabon 0.8214
29 Sudan 0.8776 29 Angola 0.7709
30 Mauritania 0.8771 30 Namibia 0.7567
31 Bolivia 0.8720 31 Botswana 0.7438
32 Kenya 0.8215 32 South Africa 0.7318
33 Ghana 0.8177
34 Congo 0.8015
35 Cameroon 0.7559
36 Zambia 0.7367
37 Cote d’Ivoire 0.7022
38 Lesotho 0.6870
39 Swaziland 0.6710
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Table C 4: SFA: Inefficiency by age-groups and institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neonatal mortality Democracy Intermediate Autocracy
Mean inefficiency
Constant 0.4002∗∗∗ −3.7839∗∗∗ −1.6531∗∗∗ 2.2471∗∗∗
(0.0927) (0.9926) (0.347) (0.5486)
Oil rent boom 0.0086∗∗∗ 0.0405∗∗∗ 0.0193∗∗∗ 0.0136∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0097) (0.0022) (0.0016)
Oil rent bust 0.0145 ∗ ∗∗ 0.0537 ∗ ∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗ 0.0189∗∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0189) (0.0047) (0.0032)
Oil rent valley 0.0101∗∗∗ 0.0526∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.012) (0.0031) (0.0019)
GDP per capita −0.0355∗∗∗ 0.3849∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ −0.2322∗∗∗
(0.0094) (0.0856) (0.0364) (0.0614)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Infant mortality Democracy Intermediate Autocracy
Mean inefficiency
Constant 4.1171∗∗∗ −3.7998∗∗∗ −0.8486∗∗∗ 3.2416
(0.2404) (1.1158) (0.1066) (9.042)
Oil rent boom 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0613∗∗∗ 0.0231∗∗∗ 0.0106∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.017) (0.0019) (0.0016)
Oil rent bust 0.0221∗∗∗ 0.0832∗∗∗ 0.0363∗∗∗ 0.0152∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0288) (0.0052) (0.0034)
Oil rent valley 0.0173∗∗∗ 0.0808∗∗∗ 0.0283∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0208) (0.0029) (0.0021)
GDP per capita −0.3864∗∗∗ 0.3224∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ −0.1946∗∗∗
(0.0246) (0.0862) (0.0127) (0.0697)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Child mortality Democracy Intermediate Autocracy
Mean inefficiency
Constant 4.8574∗∗∗ −3.2242∗∗ −1.5642∗∗∗ 8.441∗∗∗
(0.4631) (1.5055) (0.573) (0.8466)
Oil rent boom 0.0161∗∗∗ 0.0779∗∗∗ 0.0302∗∗∗ 0.0119∗∗
(0.001) (0.0248) (0.0032) (0.0049)
Oil rent bust 0.0235∗∗∗ 0.1068∗∗ 0.0461∗∗∗ 0.0197∗∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0481) (0.0064) (0.0053)
Oil rent valley 0.0185∗∗∗ 0.1074∗∗∗ 0.0368∗∗∗ 0.0176∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0353) (0.0048) (0.0042)
GDP per capita −0.39∗∗∗ 0.1897∗ 0.1271∗∗ −0.8078∗∗∗
(0.0285) (0.0971) (0.0636) (0.1231)
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Table C 4 - continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Adult mortality Democracy Intermediate Autocracy
Mean inefficiency
Constant −0.1775 −2.2541 1.4332∗∗∗ 0.0035
(0.538) (2.096) (0.2422) (0.9455)
Oil rent boom 0.01∗∗ 0.1196∗ 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0066
(0.0043) (0.0691) (0.0028) (0.0093)
Oil rent bust 0.0129 0.1883∗ 0.0228∗∗∗ 0.0083
(0.0077) (0.0997) (0.0066) (0.0247)
Oil rent valley 0.0072∗ 0.1317∗ 0.0175∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.0041) (0.0673) (0.0045) (0.0424)
GDP per capita −0.0952∗∗ −0.0796 −0.1769∗∗∗ −0.0216
(0.0396) (0.1161) (0.0352) (0.084)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Adult mort., male Democracy Intermediate Autocracy
Mean inefficiency
Constant −0.8783 −1.3159∗ 1.3232∗∗∗ −0.0619
(0.6697) (0.6984) (0.3297) (0.976)
Oil rent boom −0.0005 0.0451∗∗∗ 0.0111∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0141) (0.0025) (0.0032)
Oil rent bust −0.0016 0.0772∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.0085
(0.007) (0.0271) (0.0065) (0.0285)
Oil rent valley −0.0049 0.0481∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗ 0.0054
(0.0052) (0.0175) (0.0044) (0.0072)
GDP per capita 0.0383 0.0835 −0.1368∗∗∗ −0.0139
(0.0399) (0.0557) (0.0425) (0.0611)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Adult mort., female Democracy Intermediate Autocracy
Mean inefficiency
Constant −0.5664 −4.22 2.0047 0.0167
(1.8459) (7.6279) (2.9722) (0.9912)
Oil rent boom 0.0502∗∗ 0.3226 0.0142∗∗∗ 0.0077
(0.0221) (0.3024) (0.0025) (0.0086)
Oil rent bust 0.0682 0.4867 0.0217∗∗∗ 0.0103
(0.0515) (0.4196) (0.0066) (0.0436)
Oil rent valley 0.047∗∗ 0.3756 0.0183∗∗∗ 0.0076
(0.0193) (0.2845) (0.0044) (0.0296)
GDP per capita −0.5753∗∗ −0.7615 −0.2617 −0.024
(0.2506) (0.5435) (0.2748) (0.1218)
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Table C 4 - continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Maternal mortality Democracy Intermediate Autocracy
Mean inefficiency
Constant 0.0293∗ −2.2496∗∗ −0.7823∗∗∗ 0.5746
(0.0162) (1.0926) (0.2453) (0.7361)
Oil rent boom 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0339∗∗ 0.0086∗∗∗ 0.0112
(0.0003) (0.0138) (0.002) (0.0091)
Oil rent bust 0.0054∗ 0.0788∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ 0.0113
(0.0028) (0.0202) (0.005) (0.0134)
Oil rent valley 0.0032 0.0529∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.0081
(0.0023) (0.0176) (0.0031) (0.0111)
GDP per capita −0.0242∗∗∗ 0.2217∗ 0.1216∗∗∗ −0.0947
(0.0051) (0.1136) (0.0296) (0.1179)
Notes: Neonatal are newborn babies between 0 and 28 days. Infants are children between 0 and 1 years.
Children are between 0 and 5 years old. Adults are between 15 and 60 years old. Maternal mortality
measures pregnancy-related deaths. Production functions (not shown) includes public, private health
care expenditure, schooling, schooling2 (measured all in natural logarithm), income dummies and time
dummies. GDP per capita is converted to natural logarithm. *, ** and *** stand for signifcant at the
10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table C 5: Robustness check: Excluding potential oil price setters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Excluded Saudi Arabia OPEC
countries: Saudi Arabia USA + USA OPEC + USA
Prod. function
Constant 3.7926∗∗∗ 3.805∗∗∗ 3.797∗∗∗ 3.7473∗∗∗ 3.7495∗∗∗
(0.0369) (0.0366) (0.0354) (0.0358) (0.0361)
Public exp. 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0147∗∗∗ 0.0147∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013)
Private exp. 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0179∗∗∗ 0.0177∗∗∗ 0.0157∗∗∗ 0.0182∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Schooling 0.3197∗∗∗ 0.2958∗∗∗ 0.3055∗∗∗ 0.3656∗∗∗ 0.3526∗∗∗
(0.0367) (0.0364) (0.0356) (0.0363) (0.0366)
Schooling2 −0.0706∗∗∗ −0.0645∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗ −0.0823∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗
(0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0084) (0.0087) (0.0087)
LM income 0.021∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0206∗∗∗ 0.0192∗∗∗ 0.0187∗∗∗
(0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.006) (0.006)
UM income 0.0135∗ 0.011 0.011 0.0114 0.0084
(0.008) (0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0078)
High income 0.0315∗∗∗ 0.0256∗∗∗ 0.0266∗∗∗ 0.0299∗∗∗ 0.0245∗∗∗
(0.0097) (0.0095) (0.0094) (0.0096) (0.0094)
Mean inefficiency
Constant 1.5914∗∗∗ 1.5865∗∗∗ 1.6082∗∗∗ 1.6573∗∗∗ 1.6945∗∗∗
(0.1627) (0.1458) (0.1594) (0.2008) (0.21)
Oil boom 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.0083∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0018)
Oil bust 0.0111∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗∗ 0.0107∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0024) (0.0033)
Oil valley 0.0085∗∗∗ 0.0086∗∗∗ 0.0086∗∗∗ 0.0096∗∗∗ 0.0098∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0022)
GDP pc −0.2173∗∗∗ −0.2166∗∗∗ −0.2202∗∗∗ −0.2322∗∗∗ −0.2387∗∗∗
(0.0262) (0.0235) (0.0255) (0.033) (0.0347)
Distribution
σ2 0.0347∗∗∗ 0.0343∗∗∗ 0.0352∗∗∗ 0.0413∗∗∗ 0.0425∗∗∗
(0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0071) (0.0074)
λ 0.9954∗∗∗ 0.9952∗∗∗ 0.9954∗∗∗ 0.9966∗∗∗ 0.9965∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008)
LL 2567.409 2565.406 2540.294 2362.162 2335.029
Notes: Production functions include time dummies. Public, private health care expenditure, schooling,
schooling2 and GDP per capita are converted to natural logarithm. *, ** and *** stand for significant at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table C 6: Robustness check: Lagged outcome variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome in: t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
Prod. function
Constant 3.8196∗∗∗ 3.8349∗∗∗ 3.8499∗∗∗ 3.8646∗∗∗ 3.8817∗∗∗
(0.0374) (0.0375) (0.039) (0.0399) (0.043)
Public exp. 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0122∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0107∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0016)
Private exp. 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗∗ 0.0147∗∗∗ 0.0144∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0024)
Schooling 0.3022∗∗∗ 0.2965∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.2874∗∗∗ 0.2801∗∗∗
(0.0375) (0.0379) (0.0396) (0.0407) (0.0435)
Schooling2 −0.0667∗∗∗ −0.0657∗∗∗ −0.0648∗∗∗ −0.0645∗∗∗ −0.0632∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.0095) (0.0098) (0.0105)
LM income 0.0211∗∗∗ 0.0207∗∗∗ 0.0206∗∗∗ 0.0206∗∗∗ 0.0215∗∗∗
(0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0071) (0.007) (0.0076)
UM income 0.0144∗ 0.0148∗ 0.0154∗ 0.0166∗ 0.0188∗
(0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0098)
High income 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0337∗∗∗ 0.0355∗∗∗ 0.0383∗∗∗ 0.0423∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.0102) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.012)
Mean inefficiency
Constant 1.5236∗∗∗ 1.4667∗∗∗ 1.4003∗∗∗ 1.323∗∗∗ 1.2423∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.1444) (0.146) (0.1371) (0.1344)
Oil rent boom 0.0075∗∗∗ 0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗ 0.0065∗∗∗ 0.0061∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.001) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Oil rent bust 0.0103∗∗∗ 0.0099∗∗∗ 0.0095∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.0084∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Oil rent valley 0.0082∗∗∗ 0.0078∗∗∗ 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0073∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015)
GDP per capita −0.2071∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗∗ −0.1895∗∗∗ −0.1782∗∗∗ −0.1664∗∗∗
(0.0243) (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0218) (0.0214)
Distribution
σ2 0.0328∗∗∗ 0.0315∗∗∗ 0.0299∗∗∗ 0.0281∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0041)
λ 0.9952∗∗∗ 0.9953∗∗∗ 0.9952∗∗∗ 0.9952∗∗∗ 0.995∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0011) (0.0014)
LL 2437.355 2283.78 2131.401 1979.129 1825.46
Notes: Production functions include time dummies. Public, private health care expenditure, schooling,
schooling2 and GDP per capita are converted to natural logarithm. *, ** and *** significant at the 10%,
5% and 1% level.
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Table C 7: Robustness check: Different definition of price shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price shock: 5% 10% 15% 20%
Production function
Constant 3.8001∗∗∗ 3.8004∗∗∗ 3.8002∗∗∗ 3.8002∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.0365) (0.0364) (0.0366)
Public exp. 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Private exp. 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.0157∗∗∗ 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.0157∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.002)
Schooling 0.3105∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.3104∗∗∗ 0.3104∗∗∗
(0.0371) (0.0365) (0.0368) (0.0365)
Schooling2 −0.0682∗∗∗ −0.0681∗∗∗ −0.0682∗∗∗ −0.0682∗∗∗
(0.0089) (0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0087)
LM income 0.0212∗∗∗ 0.0213∗∗∗ 0.0213∗∗∗ 0.0213∗∗∗
(0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0062)
UM income 0.0135∗ 0.0134∗ 0.0136∗ 0.0135∗
(0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0079)
High income 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.0307∗∗∗ 0.0306∗∗∗
(0.0096) (0.0095) (0.0094) (0.0094)
Mean inefficiency
Constant 1.5734∗∗∗ 1.5706∗∗∗ 1.5781∗∗∗ 1.5768∗∗∗
(0.1524) (0.1557) (0.1559) (0.1557)
Oil rent boom 0.0078∗∗∗ 0.0078∗∗∗ 0.0077∗∗∗ 0.0079∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0012)
Oil rent bust 0.0107∗∗∗ 0.0111∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0024) (0.0026)
Oil rent valley 0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0085∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.0084∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0011)
GDP per capita −0.2142∗∗∗ −0.2138∗∗∗ −0.2149∗∗∗ −0.2147∗∗∗
(0.0247) (0.0249) (0.025) (0.025)
Distribution
σ2 0.0339∗∗∗ 0.0339∗∗∗ 0.0339∗∗∗ 0.0339∗∗∗
(0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0048)
λ 0.9952∗∗∗ 0.9952∗∗∗ 0.9952∗∗∗ 0.9952∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LL 2592.331 2592.348 2592.727 2592.358
Notes: Production functions include time dummies. Public, private health care expenditure, schooling,
schooling2 and GDP per capita are converted to natural logarithm. *, ** and *** stand for significant at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
